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Sociologists have underestimated the importance and power of organizations established 
to unify capitalist firms and interests. Existing research on trade associations tends to take one of 
two approaches, either atheoretical studies developing typologies of trade association activities 
or cultural sociological approaches overemphasizing the cultural significance of these 
organizations for business communities. Utilizing Marxian organizational theory, this 
dissertation conceptualizes trade associations as inherently capitalist organizations created to 
build and maintain the interests of the capitalist class. This perspective is applied to build an 
historical sociological case study of the formation and subsequent activities of the American 
Petroleum Institute (API), the largest trade association representing the petroleum industry in the 
United States. Findings show that the creation of API came only after capitalists in the petroleum 
sector recognized their mutual, class-based interests. Prior to the establishment of API, in the late 
1800s, the petroleum industry was marked by bitter divisions and monopolistic practices that 
exacerbated an unstable economic and political environment. World War I proved to be a crucial 
period in which the state called on industry leaders to work together to produce and deliver war 
supplies. Their wartime experiences led petroleum capitalists to recognize their collective 
interests and therefore to create API just after the war. The planning processes that went into its 
creation shaped API as the leading formal organization through which petroleum sector 
capitalists could work together to protect and promote their collective, class-based interests. 
Since its inception in 1919, API has served to solidify both internal organization of the petroleum 
industry via the creation of standards and statistics and build strength via external activities to 
promote the interests of petro-capitalists against challenges from labor and the state, as well as 
through broader promotion of petroleum’s so-called necessity with the general public. 
 vi 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
As organizations, trade associations serve as a collective voice for business communities 
and promote cohesion among independent firms that are essentially economic competitors 
(Spillman 2012; Barnett 2013). Trade associations also serve cultural functions such as 
legitimizing certain ways of being and acting within particular business communities, sectors, 
and industries, while delegitimizing others. In effect, these organizations help promote 
hegemonic ideology that impacts not only representatives within an industry or the wider 
business community, but also the society in which the industry is embedded (Bell and York 
2010; East 2012; Spillman 2012). Trade associations, therefore, are sociologically interesting 
organizations that help to clarify how the business community organizes and implements 
organizational strategies over time.  
However, little research examines the impetus to create trade associations, which has led 
to some conceptualizations of these organizations as benign cultural institutions, whose primary 
role is to produce “meaning-making activities” for members of the business community 
(Spillman 2012:2). Additionally, most research on trade associations focuses at the population 
level, which illuminates wider trends of organizational emergence, transformation, and decline 
among trade associations (Aldrich and Staber 1988) as well as broad, atheoretical typologies of 
organizational activities performed through trade associations (Hillman and Hitt 1999). I suggest 
that studies of trade associations at the organizational and individual levels are essential to 
develop deeper insights into the core purposes of these organizations than current 
conceptualizations provide. Studying organizations at this level inspires new research questions 
focused on conditions and processes that are necessary for the emergence of trade associations. 
In order to study the inception of these organizations, however, new theoretical orientations are 
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also necessary to understand the actors participating in and shaping these inception processes. I 
argue that Marxist organizational theory, with a specific focus on the capitalist class and class 
struggle, provides such a foundation to understand the social significance of trade associations as 
social actors. 
Therefore, utilizing a Marxist framework of organizing and organizations, this 
dissertation first seeks answers to questions about organizational emergence of trade 
associations. Why and under what conditions do trade associations form? And what processes do 
capitalists go through to establish trade associations? How do capitalists understand this 
organizing process themselves? What do trade associations represent to capitalists? A second set 
of questions turns to understand the organizational activities pursued through trade associations 
over time. Once created, what activities are pursued through trade associations? How do these 
connect to class struggle and class-based interests? What are the potential impacts and effects of 
trade association activities on (American) capitalist society? 
Case Introduction 
To answer these questions, this dissertation focuses on the emergence and subsequent 
organizational activities of the American Petroleum Institute (API), the national petroleum trade 
association for the U.S. petroleum industry. This dissertation is an historical case study that 
examines the petroleum industry through an explicit Marxist lens in order to understand the 
historical organized efforts of petroleum industry capitalists beyond the firm level in the context 
of the U.S. political economy. I seek answers to questions about capitalist organizing processes 
and how class-based interests guide the creation and subsequent work of organizations like trade 
associations. A primary result of this dissertation will be insight into how capitalists attempt to 
shape political structures and opportunities as well as public perceptions and acceptance of their 
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practices. However, I also seek to answer wider questions of capitalist power and unity through 
the study of unifying organizations like trade associations.  
Founded in 1919, API has acted as a representative organization for the U.S. petroleum 
industry for nearly one hundred years (Fanning 1959; Potter 1990). In 2017, API represents over 
625 firms connected to the petroleum and natural gas. Currently, the API mission statement 
states that the organization’s primary purpose is “to influence public policy in support of a 
strong, viable U.S. oil and natural gas industry” (API 2017a). Supporting this mission, API 
funnels its work into other programs, which serve as pillars to organize the industry, and pursues 
policy and public support for the petroleum industry as a whole. These program areas include 
advocacy, research and statistics, equipment and operating standards, certification of equipment, 
and events and trainings for industry representatives (API 2017a). 
Examining API provides a timely contribution to understanding what efforts are made by 
petro-capitalists to organize themselves in attempts to shape political environments for the 
benefit of the petroleum industry. Historically, the petroleum industry as well as individual 
petroleum firms have been primary points of focus for scholars, journalists, and even creative 
storytellers. Such studies present oil and natural gas as dangerous, but essential commodities and 
an industry synonymous with greed, power, and, for some, a pathway to progress. Many facets of 
the petroleum industry have been explored in scholarly, popular, and creative pursuits: personal 
histories of oil executives, tycoons, and barons (Chernow 1998; Davis 2001); historical socio-
economic and political economy perspectives on the development and commodification of oil 
(Bridge and Le Billon 2013); and the contentious local to global politics that have emerged from 
oil extraction, production, transport, and technologies (Yergin 1991, 2011; Smil 2000, 2005; 
Parra 2004; Bower 2009). The power and politics of petroleum in particular are also central 
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focuses of many popular fictional novels and films, with romantic depictions of oil and people 
associated with oil as rugged, powerful, and dangerous.1 These scholarly and popular accounts 
confirm that oil and gas has long been a part of American public consciousness, a natural 
resource sector well examined by scholars, and, arguably, a sector long assumed to be powerful 
and political (Clarke 2007; Bridge and Le Billon 2013).  
Scholarly attention to the petroleum industry as an economic, political, and 
environmental force crosses disciplinary boundaries, providing insight into several dimensions of 
the industry as well as environmental and social impacts of oil and gas extraction (Campbell and 
Laherrère 1998; Clarke 2007; O’Rourke and Connolly 2003). In development literature, the 
promise of oil and gas extraction has, at times, been touted as a way out poverty for 
communities, nations, and whole regions. However, studies of oil development have shown that 
the development of oil brings great challenges of governance and corporate control, often 
resulting in vast inequality, violence, and environmental degradation for communities (Karl 
1997; Dunning 2008; Ross 2012). Connected to the social impacts of the petroleum industry, 
environmental costs of oil and gas production on local communities are well-documented by 
scholars, activists, and community members (Sawyer 2004; Maas 2009; Nikoforuk 2010). 
Contemporary political discussions of the ecological ramifications of oil and gas extraction, 
particularly hydraulic fracturing, the building of oil transport systems like the Keystone and 
Dakota Access pipelines, and the burning of fossil fuels, which results in greenhouse gas 
emissions that contribute to climate change, also show the prevalence of the environmental and 
political significance of oil and natural gas today. These accounts speak to how oil and gas 
extraction and burning, as an industrial practice, and petroleum products, as commodities, have 
                                                
1 For a sample of these popular, fictionalized depictions of oil, see Sinclair’s novel Oil! (1927), McLaglen’s films 
Hellfighters (1968) and Fires of Kuwait (1992), Gaghan’s film Syriana (2005), and Anderson’s film There Will Be 
Blood (2007) (based on Sinclair’s novel).  
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historically and continue to have vast impacts on communities on local to global scales. That is, 
the evidence is clear that the practices of the petroleum industry are ecologically problematic and 
contentious.  
With such a foundation, however, other research questions must be pursued to understand 
how an industry, with such wide impacts on ecological and social health, is able to survive and 
continue its practices. Although certainly a powerful actor, an understanding of the organizations 
and political efforts pursued petroleum industry leaders sheds light on the internal processes and 
practices that work to produce the unity necessary to shape and maneuver cultural and structural 
dimensions necessary for the industry’s survival. Clarke (2007) argues that although ultimately 
the petroleum industry depends on what is below ground, the social and political dynamics 
above ground are also crucial in determining development of this global, political commodity. 
This dissertation seeks to understand some of these political and social dynamics by focusing on 
an organization (the API) created with the purpose to perpetuate, protect, and promote the 
petroleum industry.   
Description of the Study 
The dissertation is organized into eight chapters. Chapter Two provides a literature 
review to situate the emergence and organizational activities of an organization such as the 
American Petroleum Institute. I examine theoretical and empirical research on trade associations 
as social actors through three social science subfields: (1) business and management studies; (2) 
cultural and economic sociology; and (3) Marxist political economy. Research questions for this 
dissertation emerge to connect and challenge these literatures, focusing primarily on the need for 
more historical examinations of trade association development at the individual and 
organizational level. I argue in particular that trade associations must be understood as capitalist 
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organizations, which makes trade associations socially, politically, and culturally significant in 
new ways. To understand trade associations as social actors, I argue that when trade associations 
are understood at the individual and organizational levels, insight into how capitalists create, 
adapt, and shape their organizations can be gained. 
In Chapter Three, I discuss my research methods, detailing my research process, data 
sources, data collection, data coding, and analysis strategies. As an historical case study, this 
dissertation primarily relied on archival data found in both traditional and digital archives as well 
as secondary sources focused on the history of the petroleum industry in the United States. I 
explain my data collection and organizational strategies working in these archives over the 
dissertation process. I also unpack my coding and analysis process, which ultimately guided the 
development of the four empirical chapters of the case study. 
Chapters Four, Five, Six, and Seven embody the case study of API. In order to 
understand why the development of API was important for the petro-capitalists, Chapter Four 
examines the state of the industry prior to the establishment of API in the early 20th century. In 
the 1870s, the oil industry was beset by cutthroat competition and rapid price fluctuations that 
were disruptive to profits. While this period is now known for the dominance of the monopoly 
“octopus,” Standard Oil, interestingly it was also a period in which petroleum capitalists 
participated in organizational and economic experimentation. This experimentation included the 
creation of trade associations as well as implementation of economic mechanisms like price 
controls and pooling of crude oil. All of these efforts were attempts to stabilize prices and profits 
in the industry. Ironically, instead of creating a more stable industry, these activities instead 
produced bitter divisions within the industry. Large firms like Standard Oil gained power during 
this time and further entrenched divisions and distrust within the industry. Whereas other 
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industries did form national trade associations during this period, the oil industry was not able to 
unify. Even after the dissolution of the Standard Oil Trust in 1911, divisions and suspiciousness 
remained in the petroleum industry, leaving little incentive or desire among industry leaders to 
work cooperatively.  
This period of bitter divisions and distrust within the oil industry were, thus, not 
propitious for the establishment of a national trade association, but by 1919 the American 
Petroleum Institute (API) had formed. What changed? Chapter Five details how and why the 
industry changed and the oil capitalists eventually found a cooperative spirit. In short, the state 
(U.S. fedgovernment) acted to bring together the oil industry firms in order to deliver crucial war 
supplies for the Allied war effort. As a result, the oil industry experienced cooperation in 
production, refining and transport of oil during World War I, and they saw how this cooperation 
still allowed them to profit and prosper. By the end of the war, petroleum industry leaders had 
experienced a recognition process in which they realized their collective, class-based interests. I 
detail how this process occurred because of shifts in three major areas:state priorities, industry 
organizations, and industry identity.  
In Chapter Six, we finally reach the establishment of the API. Although oil industry firms 
had built some class-based solidarity during the war, there was some skepticism at the end of the 
war about how and whether to continue their collective work. This chapter, therefore, details the 
events and planning processes that led to the formation of the American Petroleum Institute. 
After WWI, enthusiasm for cooperative work was high across all industrial sectors in the United 
States. Some petroleum industry leaders were particularly motivated to finally establish a private, 
national trade association representative of all sub-sectors within the industry. Doing so required 
three major intra-industry conferences. I show how these conferences served as strategy and 
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reflective sessions for capitalists within the petroleum sector following WWI. The creation of 
API was the culmination of this strategizing, with the organization representing plans for 
industry unification moving forward. This chapter shows that the establishment of API was a 
deeply intentional action, not any sort of natural or preordained development of the industry. 
The final chapter of the case study, Chapter Seven, turns to analyze the types of 
organizational activities API has sponsored and participated in over time. The establishment of 
API and the subsequent work pursued through the organization have had profound effects on the 
oil sector and its relations with government and society. In this section, I answer questions 
related to what capitalists in the petroleum industry were able to accomplish after they became 
unified through API. In particular, I find that capitalists have utilized API for two primary 
purposes over time and that each of these purposes required detailed “class work” to overcome 
collective action obstacles. The first focuses on accomplishing activities that constitute internal 
industry organizing that cements the ties among firms and membership in the capitalist class of 
oil companies. The creation of industry standards, uniform accounting procedures, and statistics 
have all served as ways for industry leaders to create a more cooperative internal industry 
environment. The second purpose was to influence external environments and actors that could 
potentially impact the ability of capitalists to continue their ability to accumulate profit. In this 
section I focus on three sets of actors – labor, the state, and the general public – and how the 
unity of the API has allowed it to grow and gain power.  
Finally, I conclude with Chapter Eight, which features a discussion and conclusion to the 
dissertation. I provide an overview of major findings, avenues for future research, and practical 
and policy implications of sociological understandings of organizations like the American 
Petroleum Institute.   
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review: Understanding Trade Associations as Social Actors 
 
Trade associations are a long-known and utilized organizational form by the business 
community across the globe. Today, most firms hold one, if not many, memberships in trade 
associations (Aldrich and Staber 1988; Spillman 2012; Barnett 2013). What can we make of 
these interesting social actors? What types of activities do they pursue? And how do they fit into 
wider scholarly discussions of economic action and economic organizations? Trade associations 
do not fit neatly into organizational typologies or, at first glance, are sometimes assumed to be 
other organizations. When only one dimension of a trade association’s work is examined, 
particularly policy campaigns, the association may be mischaracterized as a lobby or a “front 
group” or “astro-turf” organization. However, upon closer examination, these organizations 
potentially have many more interesting characteristics that are worth understanding, particularly 
from a critical sociological perspective. They are non-profit organizations representing for-profit 
organizations, particularly public and private firms. Through membership dues of the firms they 
represent, trade associations are able to acquire budgets of millions of dollars (even as non-profit, 
501(c) organizations). They employ large staffs and pursue various activities to strengthen the 
specific sectors and industries they represent. As business organizations, trade associations differ 
from individual firms because they work in “non-market environments” or “the social, political, 
and legal arrangements that structure interactions among companies and their public” (Baron 
1995:73). Such a demarcation is important because legally, at least in the United States, trade 
associations cannot directly coordinate market activities because this would violate antitrust 
laws. This makes governing context in which a trade association operates crucial because 
different states allow for different types of activities to be pursued through trade associations. 
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Some of these activities could include lobbying, educational programs, creating and monitoring 
of standards for industry technologies and practices, organizing trade shows and conventions, 
and advertising and campaign work (Gupta and Lad 1983; Lenox and Nash 2003; Barnett and 
King 2008; Barnett 2013).  
Indeed, as complex organizations performing a wide variety of work on behalf of their 
members, trade associations are interesting sites for scholarly study and may provide great 
insight into traditional areas of social science inquiry such as political economy and 
organizational studies. Although other organizations such as the corporation, social movement 
organizations, lobbies, non-profits, and labor unions have had much more scholarly attention, the 
slim literature on trade associations as social actors has noticeable trends and emerging 
theoretical niches, showing that these organizations are beginning to be recognized as important 
social actors. This chapter provides an overview and critique of this literature from across the 
social sciences. I first examine how trade associations have been conceptualized as social actors 
in the field of business and management studies. Business and management studies literature 
may seem an odd beginning to a sociological literature review. However, business and 
management studies scholars have produced the most research on trade associations as social 
actors and contribute some fascinating insights into these organizations. For most business and 
management scholars, trade associations are understood as representative organizations that 
pursue collective action on behalf of their member firms (Staber and Aldrich 1983; Aldrich and 
Staber 1988; Barnett 2013). Stemming from this conceptualization, scholars have also provided 
categories of trade association activities, showing the wide repertoire of activities that trade 
associations may pursue as organizations. Finally, business and management scholars have also 
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examined lifecycle components of trade associations detailing patterns in trade association 
emergence, decline and transformation (Aldrich and Staber 1988). 
Next, I examine how sociologists have studied trade associations. Of sociological inquiry, 
the most exhaustive study has come from Spillman’s (2012) comparative historical treatment of 
U.S. trade associations. Blending Weberian and Durkheimian perspectives on economic action, 
Spillman provides a fascinating perspective on trade associations as centers of cultural 
production, which challenges the conceptual views of trade associations by business and 
management studies scholars. She also provides an important comparative and historical 
contribution of the development of trade associations in the U.S., which shows how external 
institutional pressures led to the unique nature of trade associations in the U.S. compared to other 
countries. Finally, Spillman also details the types of activities that trade associations in the U.S. 
are known to pursue.  
After exploring this literature, I then discuss the limitations of these studies from both 
empirical and theoretical positions. Empirically, it is important to note that most studies examine 
trade associations at the population level. Although this provides generalizable characteristics 
and recognizable patterns across the population of trade associations (which serve as important 
starting points for understanding trade associations as social actors), the nuances of trade 
association development and core roots of these organizations are rarely examined and discussed 
by social scientists. Because of this, I argue that trade associations are underestimated as social 
actors and can potentially have larger impacts and effects than current conceptualizations show. 
This is particularly true for the trade association under investigation in my case study, the 
American Petroleum Institute, which has had far reaching impacts within the petroleum industry 
as an organization as well as a formidable political force for the industry on a variety of fronts. 
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By examining the motivations to establish trade associations as well as the subsequent 
organizational work pursued through trade associations, more insight into how trade associations 
function as social actors can be understood. Additionally, because population studies of trade 
associations have varying theoretical foundations, theoretical grounding for studies of trade 
associations is scattered, mostly exploratory, and tends to overgeneralize the cultural significance 
of these multi-faceted organizations. Because studies at the individual and organizational level of 
trade associations can potentially capture not only how trade associations operate, but also why 
they were created in the first place, a different theoretical foundation, Marxian political 
economy, is necessary to understand these organizations. I close the chapter introducing the 
theoretical framework and research questions that will be explored through the case study of the 
American Petroleum Institute. 
Trade Associations as Social Actors: Business and Management Studies 
It is perhaps not surprising that the majority of literature on trade associations comes 
from business and management studies scholars. After all, these organizations are meant to 
represent economic actors, particularly corporations. Trade associations also work on behalf of 
their member firms on a variety of issues internal and external to their respective industries. 
Scholars from this field focus on many dimensions of trade associations as social actors 
providing insights into how these organizations work and what types of organizational activities 
are pursued in attempts to accomplish their goals. Although slim, the literature on trade 
associations from business and management studies has clear empirical and theoretical positions 
on how to understand these organizations as social actors. Empirically, Staber and Aldrich 
(1983) suggest that trade associations can be studied from three levels. The first level is 
characterized as the individual level, which examines how potential members (either individuals 
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or firms) “explore their intentions, sense of collective identity, and expectations in joining the 
organization” (164). The second is the organizational level, which focuses on a trade association 
itself, the structure and function of the association, as well as the way the association relates to 
other social actors such as the state and social movement organizations. The third and final level 
is the population level, which Staber and Aldrich describe as a way to understand broader trends 
in the population of trade associations, which can give insight into how trade associations work 
as “an organizational form for business interests” (Staber and Aldrich 1983:164). Outlining these 
three levels show that there are multiple ways to approach studying trade associations, all of 
which potentially could provide generalizable understandings of how trade associations operate 
as social actors. 
Upon examining the literature, however, it is clear that business and management studies 
have primarily focused on the third level, the population level, to understand trade associations 
as social actors. This is not to say that the other two levels are not important. Instead, it actually 
speaks to the lack of research that has been produced on trade associations. Staber and Aldrich 
(1983) argue that population level studies give a foundation for the other levels because they 
orient an understanding of “explaining collective action among business firms” (164). Further, 
“[t]his approach allows U.S. to identify groups of organizations that are similarly situated vis-à-
vis a given set of external forces” (Staber and Aldrich 1983:164). With such a focus, business 
and management scholars have provided insights into three major areas: 1) conceptualizations of 
trade associations; 2) potential types of organizational activities performed by trade associations; 
and 3) lifecycle trends of trade associations over time. The following section details each of these 
perspectives from business and management scholars. 
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Business and management studies scholars conceptualize trade associations as 
representative organizations for business interests that pursue collective action on behalf of their 
members. Staber and Aldrich (1983) first defined a trade association as responding to external 
conditions and protecting their interests as “a coalition of firms or businesspersons who come 
together in a formal organization to cope with forces and demands to which they are similarly 
exposed.” In a later study, Aldrich and Staber (1988) amend this conceptualization and define 
trade associations as “organizations created to represent business interests within specific 
domains, mobilizing firms within their domain so that collective action can be taken on common 
problems” (111). Barnett (2013) furthers this conceptualization to cement the representative and 
collective action components of these organizations. “Trade associations are organizations 
through which a group of interdependent firms, typically in the same industry, pool their 
resources and coordinate efforts so that they may ‘speak with one voice’ on matters of shared 
interest” (Barnett 2013:214). Warner and Martin (1967) provide a succinct definition of trade 
associations: “non-profit institutions that operate cooperatively for and among competitive, 
profit-making actors” (314). Thus, in all of these works, trade associations are conceptualized as 
representative organizations created to pursue collective action that concerns their respective 
industries. 
Such a conceptualization seems to make sense from a cursory view of trade associations. 
Mission statements of trade associations often highlight the representative and service-oriented 
vision of the organization as a central part of the organization’s identity. These statements often 
work as way for these organizations to self-identify and define the proposed purpose of the 
organization (Aldrich and Staber 1988; Spillman 2012; Barnett 2013). For example, the National 
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Confectioners Association (NCA), which represents over 700 firms associated with the 
confectionary industry, has a mission statement that reads: 
The National Confectioners Association is the trade organization that advances, protects 
and promotes chocolate, candy, gum and mints, and the companies that make these 
special treats. As the leading association for the $35 billion U.S. confectionery industry, 
NCA educates the public to help ensure that it understands and appreciates the unique 
role that chocolate and candy can play in a happy, balanced lifestyle.  (National 
Confectioners Association 2017) 
The organizational mission statement paints the association as a collective voice for the $35 
billion industry with an additional emphasis on “educating” the public.  This also seems to be 
true of the trade association in this study, API. API’s 2017 mission statement claims that API “is 
the only national trade association that represents all aspects of America’s oil and natural gas 
industry” (API 2017a). The statement goes on to highlight the representative nature of the 
organization: 
Our more than 625 corporate members, from the largest major oil company to the 
smallest of independents, come from all segments of the industry. They are producers, 
refiners, suppliers, marketers, pipeline operators and marine transporters, as well as 
service and supply companies that support all segments of the industry… 
We speak for the oil and natural gas industry to the public, Congress and the Executive 
Branch, state governments and the media. (API 2017a) 
Indeed, the conceptualization of trade associations from business and management studies 
scholars seems to fit the way that trade associations self-identify.  
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Although many scholars anchor their studies in this conceptualization to explore other 
facets of trade associations, others have questioned if this is actually how these organizations 
function as social actors. For example, in his study of U.S. trade associations, Barnett (2013) 
examines whether trade associations are equally representative of their member firms. He 
acknowledges that there are vast differences in the size of firms in all industries, which makes 
him question if large and more powerful firms are able “to define, create, and manipulate the 
problems that their [industry’s] trade association pursues” (Barnett 2013:220). Focusing on trade 
associations in the U.S., Barnett examined the expenditures of a sample of 148 trade associations 
over a ten-year period to find patterns in trade association spending and how these correlated to 
financial performance of the largest firms in the trade association’s respective industry. Barnett 
suggests that this can reveal how trade associations are utilized to benefit larger firms in times of 
financial trouble. Findings from his study show that: 
…across trade associations, low performance of their primary industry’s four largest 
firms was associated with high trade association expenditures, yet low performance of 
their primary industry was not associated with high trade association expenditures. This 
suggests that trade associations may speak for and serve the interests of the dominant 
firms in an industry more so than the interests of the industry as a whole. (Barnett 
2013:227-229; emphasis added) 
With this finding, Barnett (2013) questions if trade associations are actually beneficial 
organizations for smaller firms to participate in. He challenges smaller firms to “give 
consideration to the possibility that they may be using their limited resources in a way that 
contributes more to the advancement of their rivals’ interests than to their industry’s shared 
interests” (Barnett 2013:230).  
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Barnett also acknowledges, however, that there is much to be learned about how trade 
associations decide to spend their funds, particularly because it seems that these organizations do 
have a degree of financial discretion (2013:229). Such an observation provides a challenge to the 
conceptualization of trade associations as representative organizations for collective action. 
Barnett’s criticism of trade associations provides an opening to consider more nuanced questions 
about trade associations as social actors that moves beyond the descriptive elements of the 
previous studies. Although Barnett focuses his attention on how smaller firms may divert their 
funding away from supporting trade associations, his findings inspire new questions related to 
the conceptualization of trade associations. Are these organizations actually representative of all 
of their members? What dynamics suggest that certain firms dominate the direction of trade 
association policies and practices? Indeed, Barnett ends his study with even more questions than 
he started calling on more studies to understand these business organizations.  
 Beyond the conceptualizations of trade associations as social actors, business and 
management scholars have also documented the types of activities that trade associations pursue 
to accomplish their diverse goals, ostensibly based in representative organizations pursuing 
collective action. Oliver (1990) listed the following activities: lobby state regulators, promote 
collective good (e.g. trade shows), obtain economic advantages, reduce legislative uncertainty 
(e.g. product standardization), and enhance members’ image (249). Hemphill (1992) describes 
trade association activities as valuable “services” that are provided to firm members, which 
include “data collection, educational programs, facilitating technical standards and 
specifications, insurance programs, legal assistance and government relations” (916). Staber and 
Aldrich (1983) go a step further to delineate four “activity areas” of trade association work, 
which are categorized as “commercial, public, political, and solidaristic” (168). Commercial 
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activities refer to internal industry organizing efforts, which include the sponsorship of annual 
trade conventions and other trade meetings as well as seemingly mundane activities such as 
creating and monitoring product standards and collecting statistics. The public dimension of 
trade association work refers to the relationship that many trade associations have with the state, 
particularly in regards to supplying industry information and ensuring industry compliance with 
state regulations. Political activities they define to “include representing membership to the state 
and exerting influence on governments and legislators” (Staber and Aldrich 1983:168). Finally, 
the solidaristic area constitutes activities that encourage “the building of consensus around a 
common purpose” and widespread participation in trade association leadership opportunities 
(Staber and Aldrich 1983:168). Each of these intersecting areas suggest that trade associations 
can be viewed as complex, representative organizations that operate under the banner of industry 
protection and promotion. 
Additionally, as non-profit organizations representing for-profit firms, scholars have 
noted that trade associations occupy interesting legal statuses according to their respective 
governing context (Aldrich and Staber 1988; Chandler 1988; Hemphill 1992; Herrigel 1996; Gao 
2001; Spillman 2012; Barnett 2013). Depending upon the types of laws related to business 
coordinating or “colluding” activities in their respective countries, trade associations also have 
limitations on the types of activities that they can pursue. Although the above activities are 
available across the population of trade associations, not all trade associations are able to pursue 
the same activities because of state limitations. Business and management studies scholars have 
primarily focused on trade association development in the U.S.. In the U.S., scholars suggest that 
trade associations are limited in the types of activities that they can pursue because of the legacy 
of antitrust laws, which prohibit activities that diminish possibilities for competition of trade 
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within particular sectors. This means that trade associations are legally constrained to operate in 
“non-market” (Baron 1995) or “political” (Hillman and Hitt 1999) environments. Prior to 
antitrust laws at the turn of the 20th century, scholars note that trade associations were utilized as 
conduits for economic regulatory activities within industries such as price controls or pooling of 
resources as well as the development of other industry-wide programs like product 
standardization and the gathering of industry-wide statistics (Hemphill 1992; Barnett 2013).2 For 
business and management scholars, all of these activities are seen as important processes of 
“industry self-regulation.” (Hemphill 1992:916). In many cases, business and management 
studies scholars suggest that industry self-regulation is preferable to government intervention and 
oversight. Hemphill (1992) explains: 
Industry-self regulation is capable of providing a substitute or complement for direct 
government command-and-control regulation – which is often applied at an industry-
level to control processes and behavior – in a more cost-efficient and effective manner. 
(916) 
However, following the passage of antitrust laws, at times, trade associations’ codes of conduct 
and programs have garnered the attention of federal bodies because these activities appear to 
violate these laws. This is not surprising because as Hemphill notes, “[t]rade associations, by 
their nature, involve bringing competitors together, thereby potentially facilitating the means by 
which collusive activities can occur in violation of the antitrust statuses” (1992:917). Hemphill 
suggests that this has had a “chilling effect” on industry self-regulation efforts pursued by trade 
associations, which he argues provide guidance in industries on issues of industry-wide concern 
(1992:917). That is, from this perspective, these laws have served to stifle some programs that 
                                                
2 Business and management studies scholars do not get into the historical details of antitrust law development. I will 
detail this more in the next section on sociological discussions of trade associations, which provides more discussion 
of the comparative and historical development of trade associations.  
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business and management studies scholars see as instrumental and beneficial to internal industry 
relations as well as external impacts of industry practices. Additionally, business and 
management scholars suggest that trade associations in the U.S. are not able to reach their full 
potential as regulatory organizations because of antitrust laws and limitations (Hemphill 1992; 
Hillman and Hitt 1999; Barnett 2013). 
A final area of research on trade associations from business and management studies 
scholars examines life-cycle components of trade associations, which refers to patterns of 
organizational creation, decline, and transformations in the wider population of trade 
associations (Staber 1982; Staber and Aldrich 1983; Aldrich and Staber 1988). Like other studies 
of trade associations, these studies focus on trends in the wider trade association. Additionally, 
some of these studies also give a needed historical perspective on changes in the trade 
association population over time. These studies provide perspectives on why trade associations 
emerged as organizations as well as what conditions may explain changes in the trade association 
population. For example, in their study of trade associations in the United States, Aldrich and 
Staber (1988) examine patterns of trade association “foundings, deaths, and transformations” 
(111). Taking a sample of over 3,000 trade associations, Aldrich and Staber (1988) document 
population changes in trade associations over time across sectors in the U.S.. Aldrich and Staber 
(1988) also provide a rare theoretical focus to their study by examining three theoretical models 
to examine life-cycle patterns in the U.S. population of trade associations. The three theoretical 
models tested to understand population changes are: 1) Weber’s theory of social differentiation; 
2) niche theory; and 3) impacts of government regulatory activities. For Aldrich and Staber 
(1988), each of these theories predict different outcomes in population changes:  
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If social differentiation theory is correct, the population of trade associations should 
increase inexorably, regardless of government regulations, as organizational innovations 
and the accumulation of organizing experience facilitate the formation of new 
associations.  
If the niche theory and competitive isomorphism arguments are correct, then the 
population of trade associations should expand at about the same pace as the economy. 
New associations should proliferate in emerging industries, and association foundings 
should diminish in aging industries. 
If government regulation drives the process, then it should proceed less regularly, 
corresponding roughly to events and periods of [state] intervention. (Aldrich and Staber 
1988:117) 
Each of these theoretical propositions gives different understandings of not only patterns within 
the trade association population, but also insight into the external institutional environments 
and/or actors that can potentially have an impact on how trade associations are able to operate as 
social actors. The study produced the following major finding: 
Foundings, dissolutions, and transformations in the twentieth century have produced a 
trade association population that grew rapidly from the turn of the century [1900] until 
the late 1950s. However, the gradual convergence of founding and dissolution rates after 
1960 slowed population growth to the point where the number of associations has 
essentially been stable over the last decade… (Aldrich and Staber 1988:123) 
In examining these findings from the three outlined theoretical models, Aldrich and Staber 
(1988) suggest that the findings primarily support the social differentiation and niche theory 
models, with the model of government regulation having little empirical support. That is, 
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findings show that government intervention, particularly in the form of antitrust laws, had little 
impact on the creation and decline in the trade association population in the U.S.. However, none 
of the models perfectly explain the trends found by Aldrich and Staber (1988), which makes 
them question the efficacy of explaining these trends with singular models. What can be taken 
from the study, though, is that external institutional environments and wider forces of social 
change certainly have an impact on changes in trade association populations.  
Discussion 
 Business and management studies scholars provide important empirical and theoretical 
foundations for understanding trade associations as social actors. Scholars have produced clear 
conceptualizations of trade associations, focusing on the potential for collective action that may 
be accomplished through trade associations for wider industries. Although some scholars have 
questioned the representative nature of these organizations, the potential for collective action that 
could be accomplished through these organizations is seen as a hallmark of the purposes of these 
organizations. Additionally, these studies also provide categories of the types of activities that 
may be produced through trade associations, which speaks to the roles that trade associations can 
potentially play as social actors. Finally, business and management scholars also show that 
external institutional environments must also be considered when examining trade association 
behavior. However, from these studies, findings show that state intervention cannot totally 
explain trade association behavior or population trends, although the legacy of state limitations 
on economic regulatory activities certainly has a role in some types of the activities trade 
associations may pursue.  
 The perspectives of business and management studies scholars must also be understood 
from the orientation of the field itself. Although these studies provide key insights into how these 
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organizations operate as social actors, they are not particularly critical of trade associations 
themselves or the wider system and structures that trade associations are embedded in. That is, 
empirical and theoretical orientations produced by the above studies will only go so far in 
interrogating how these organizations operate as social actors. When critique does occur, the 
focus is on how trade associations may become more efficient or beneficial for their members 
(Barnett 2013) or how trade associations could serve other roles with less state intervention 
(Hemphill 1992; Baron 1995). Additionally, business and management scholars have not 
provided much historical understanding of the development of trade associations as social actors 
aside from some studies in changes to the wider trade association population. What different 
roles have trade associations served over time?  
 Therefore, it is necessary to examine other social science orientations that take a broader 
and more critical view of economic processes and actors to provide more understanding of how 
these organizations operate as social actors. This next section provides such an orientation on 
trade associations from the field of cultural and economic sociology found in Spillman’s (2012) 
historical study of U.S. trade associations. 
Trade Associations as Cultural Producers: Economic and Cultural Sociology 
Although sociologists have not produced the breadth of studies on trade associations 
accomplished by business and management scholars, the potential for more critical views on 
trade associations as social actors is high from the sociological perspective. The most 
comprehensive challenge to the conceptualization of trade associations as representative 
organizations for collective action (and one of the few explicit sociological studies of trade 
associations as social actors) comes from Spillman’s (2012) comparative historical study of trade 
associations in the United States. Like other studies of trade associations, Spillman examines 
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trade associations at the population level, providing an impressive and exhaustive examination of 
these fascinating organizations. To set the stage for her study, Spillman questions if trade 
associations can be understood through a lens of collective, rational, and intentional action, 
which many of the business and management studies scholars above take as a given when 
studying trade associations and wider economic processes. Instead, she suggests that trade 
associations serve cultural purposes that are important to the business community and that 
collective action is not the most important role of these organizations for businesspeople. 
Although her empirical study primarily focuses on the development and subsequent work 
conducted by and through trade associations, Spillman also is interested in interrogating a 
common assumption that economic action in pursuit of profit in general is rational and self-
interested (Spillman 2012). She suggests that self-interest, particularly the pursuit of profit, is an 
assumed foundation for capitalist economic action, which colors the work of any type of 
organization that represents businesspeople or “business interests” (Spillman 2012:345). Because 
of this assumption, self-interest is assumed to be a “natural and essential” part of business 
organizations, which has resulted in little research on self-interest as a social and cultural 
construction (Spillman 2012:345).  
More to the point, Spillman is not convinced that self-interest is even necessarily the 
cornerstone of economic action for businesspeople and therefore, takes to task this assumed 
foundation of economic action. Rooted in cultural perspectives in economic sociology, Spillman 
centers her study on deconstructing this assumption with a broad set of research questions: 
… I challenge [the] assumption that business is necessarily conducted as self-interested 
action in the pursuit of profit. I ask an apparently naïve question: what makes self-
interested action in the pursuit of profit make sense? That is, how do firms and the 
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businesspeople who run them understand their interests? What meaning-making sustains 
their action? What cultural categories and vocabularies of motive make capitalist 
understandings of their norms of exchange, objects of exchange, and exchange patterns 
routinely plausible – for capitalists? (Spillman 2012: 1) 
By the end of her study, Spillman finds that the meaning-making that occurs is not centered on 
self-interest for most businesspeople. Instead, “[t]hey often think of what they are doing in terms 
of technical expertise, professionalism, [and] stewardship of the public good and occupational 
community…” (Spillman 2012:2) and “business is often understood as sociable, absorbing, 
honorable, and helpful because of the specialized knowledge and technical expertise embedded 
in “industry” practice” (Spillman 2012:369). And it is “institutions” like trade associations that 
help build and sustain such a view of economic action by serving as settings for this meaning-
making to occur: 
I argue that the pursuit of strategic interest in competitive profit-seeking is conditioned by 
and relies on institutions and discourses transcending strategic interests, and that such 
institutions and discourses make capitalist economic action routinely meaningful 
(Spillman 2012:2) 
To answer her research questions and complicate the understanding of self-interested economic 
action, Spillman turns to U.S. trade associations as the site of her study. 3 As business 
institutions, trade associations present a unique opportunity to understand the process of the 
construction of business interests.  
Guided by this assumption about self-interested action and business, Spillman develops 
her conceptualization for trade associations: 
                                                
3 Spillman switches between “trade associations” and “business associations” throughout her book, but does not 
differentiate between these two terms. For purposes of this literature review, I use the term trade associations 
throughout. 
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…these stable, long-lasting groups are, primarily, institutional settings for routine cultural 
production – generating categories, networks, industry fields, collective identities, norms, 
status orders, and camaraderie that orient and motivate economic action. (2) 
By conceptualizing trade associations this way, Spillman suggests that trade associations act as a 
conduit for cultural production making the pursuit of profit meaningful to businesspeople. She 
argues that “the American business association population cannot be explained except as an 
institution of cultural production for economic action” (Spillman 2012:345, emphasis added). 
Such a conceptualization challenges assumptions that these organizations necessarily carry 
through the types of activities that are claimed as central parts of trade association work, 
particularly collective action on issues of industry concern. By focusing on the cultural 
importance of these organizations, Spillman shows that trade associations still hold significance 
for the business community, but not in the ways that other scholars have suggested. By seeing 
trade associations as cultural production centers, trade associations potentially take on new 
meanings as social actors and the work accomplished through them may also be serving purposes 
that are not necessarily motivated towards profit-seeking (or self-interested action). Because 
Spillman’s analysis is one of the most comprehensive theoretical and empirical works on trade 
associations from a sociological perspective and represents a rather surprising framework for 
understanding organizations like trade associations, it is worthwhile to examine her theoretical 
and empirical work in detail. 
 To support her claims, Spillman centers her historical analysis on trade associations in 
cultural and economic sociology rooting her perspective in the work of classical sociological 
theorists Max Weber and Emilé Durkheim. For Spillman, Weber’s theory of economic action 
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provides the latitude to explore both “worldviews and institutional environments” that impact the 
development and subsequent work pursued through institutional settings like trade associations: 
Worldviews and institutional environments affect economic action at different scales, 
from the very encompassing civilization level through to the sectoral and the 
organizational. Three Weberian themes provide an initial framework for understanding 
how and why economic action varies, and they have implicitly influenced subsequent 
research on business associations. Organizational forms, cultural orientations, and 
political processes influence the different ways economic interests might be expressed. 
(Spillman 2012:32) 
For Spillman, Weber’s perspective on organizational forms provides grounding to understand the 
types of social relationships that organizations are built on, what to potentially expect from 
different kinds of organizational forms, and specific insight into economic action and 
organizations. Spillman notes that although Weber’s theory of economic action begins with 
individual self-interest, Weber emphasizes that “most modern economic activity takes place 
within organizations” (Spillman 2012:32). However, to understand both economic activity as 
well as organizations, Weber brings attention to the types of social relationships that 
organizations are built upon. Weber presents these relationships in dichotomies: communal v. 
associative relationships and open v. closed relationships (1978:40). For Weber, communal 
relationships of social action constitute “a subjective feeling of the parties, whether affectual or 
traditional, that they belong together” (Weber 1978:40). Further: 
Communal relationships may rest on various types of affectual, emotional, or traditional 
bases. Examples are a religious brotherhood, an erotic relationship, a relation of personal 
loyalty, a national community, the esprit de corps of a military unit. (Weber 1978:40). 
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Associative relationships refer to those social relationships where:  
… social action within [the relationship] rests on a rationally motivated adjustment of 
interests or similarly motivated agreement, whether the basis of rational judgment be 
absolute values or reasons of expediency. It is especially common, though by no means 
inevitable, for the associative type of relationship to rest on a rational agreement by 
mutual consent. (Weber 1978:71). 
Additionally, for Weber, open social relationships allow for outsiders to participate in the 
relationship if they should wish to do so whereas closed relationships prohibits the participation 
of certain people (Weber 1978:43).  
 These relationship dichotomies may seem limiting, but they are useful for characterizing 
the different types of social relationships, which also guides understandings of the types of social 
action fostered from the relationship. For Weber, these relationships were also an essential 
foundation for understanding one important social group: organizations. According to Weber, all 
organizations rest on being closed relationships. This is because an organization “limits the 
admission of outsiders,” and “its regulations are enforced by specific individuals” who have 
some authority to “carry out the order governing the organization” (Weber 1978:48). 
Additionally, Weber argues that organizations could have communal and/or associative elements 
to them. Another layer of conceptualizing an organization for Weber is whether the organization 
is autonomous or heteronomous and if it is heterocephalous or autochephalous. Autonomous 
organizations meant that organization was “established by its own members on their own 
authority” whereas heteronomous organizations were established by outside actors (Weber 
1978:50). Autochephalous or heterocephalous elements of organizations mirror the process of 
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establishment and refer to how leadership and staff of the organization are selected and/or 
appointed. 
 Weber’s perspective on organizational forms goes on to provide typologies of economic 
organizations, which give guidance for understanding trade associations as social actors from a 
Weberian perspective. Weber suggests that trade associations differ from other economic 
organizations (such as cartels, corporations, or cooperatives) because they are “economically 
regulative organizations,” (1978:74). Through these organizations, “the directing authorities of 
which carry on an “economic policy” which seeks to regulate both the ends and the procedures 
of economic activity” (Weber 1978:74). Weber also characterizes trade associations as 
“autochepalous” because of the way that leadership is typically selected for these organizations. 
After reviewing Weber’s views on trade associations, Spillman (2012) suggests a Weberian 
definition of trade associations as: “…self-organized groups of self-interested economic actors 
oriented – intermittently and temporarily – to the joint shaping of their shared action 
environment” (Spillman 2012:32). 
 The two other Weberian themes that Spillman has highlighted as being important for 
understanding trade associations, cultural orientations and political processes, bring attention to 
the different ways that many of the above elements operate in action. For Spillman, Weberian 
cultural orientations encourage an understanding that that Weberian conceptualizations are ideal 
types, which means that even though the above elements are useful for conceptualizing social 
relationships, organizations, and economic action, they are also an “empirical impossibility” 
(Spillman 2012:33). Weber also recognizes this in acknowledging that most social relationships 
have both communal and associative elements (1978:41). Spillman (2012) highlights the 
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following quote from Weber to show this recognition of the need to keep an eye to empirical 
reality: 
No matter how calculating and hard-headed the ruling considerations in such a social 
relationship – as that of a merchant to his customers – may be, it is still quite possible for 
it to involve emotional values which transcend its utilitarian significance. (Weber 
1978:41) 
As with many scholars who invoke Weberian perspectives, she notes while ideal types serve 
important theoretical and conceptualization roles, cultural orientations (and empirical realities) 
must also be valued in studies of organizations: “… in reality, they will always mix the two types 
of social relationship, drawing tradition, affect, and value-rationality into supposedly 
instrumentally rational self-interested memberships” (Spillman 2012:33). 
 Connected to this cultural and empirical acknowledgement (and pushing against 
accepting ideal types as absolutes), Spillman also finds utility in Weber’s attention to how 
political processes influence both internal organizational dynamics as well as external relations 
with other actors. Weber notes that all social relationships are subject to potential conflict and 
competition within and outside of the relationship. When applying this to organizations, this 
brings attention to how political processes can potentially play out within an organization and 
how the organization relates to other social actors. For trade associations, Spillman notes that one 
of the most important actors that potentially has an influence on trade associations is the state. In 
relation to economic organizations, Weber includes the state in his typology of economic 
organizations as an organization that “enforce[s] economic order” (1978:74). According to 
Weber, “the modern economic order under modern conditions could not continue if its control of 
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resources were not upheld by the legal compulsion of the state” (1978:75).4 This 
conceptualization is also connected to Weber’s view of the state as being an actor that 
monopolizes the use of force. For economic action, this means that the state has a role in both 
constraining and facilitating certain types of economic action.  
Thus, for Spillman, the three Weberian themes above provide a foundation for 
understanding an ideal type of trade associations as 1) a type of economic organization 
(“economically regulative organization”); 2) an organization that potentially has both associative 
and communal elements; and 3) an organization that is influenced by internal and external 
political forces and context.  
Spillman then sets out to test this framework by examining how trade associations 
operate across states. Spillman does find evidence of trade associations operating as 
economically regulative organizations, particularly in states like Germany and Japan (Chandler 
1988; Herrigel 1996; Gao 2001). She characterizes these states as having “strong associational 
governance,” where trade associations seem to enjoy a “quasi-public status” (Spillman 2012:37). 
Coleman (1988) highlights the work of trade associations in states that have strong associational 
governance as including “the autonomy and capacity to set industry targets, shape investment, 
assign territories, fix prices, punish violators, and thereby displace market governance” (134). 
Trade associations in Germany and Japan, then, seem to fit well within the Weberian ideal type 
of trade associations, particularly because of their regulatory power within these states. Spillman 
attributes this regulatory power not to the industries themselves, but to the state context within 
which these associations operate. That is, trade associations are able to operate in this way 
because of state authorization and laws that give these organizations the legal status to be able to 
                                                
4 Weber does acknowledge that this may not be true for every economic system. Weber’s attention here, though, is 
to the modern time period and, thus, the modern state.  
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do so. For Spillman, cases like Germany and Japan denote positive cases of trade association 
operation in Weberian terms. 
Spillman then turns to the U.S. to examine how trade associations operate as social 
actors. According to the Weberian framework highlighted above, she suggests that the 
institutional environment in the U.S. should actually discourage economic organizations like 
trade associations, particularly because of the history of antitrust laws and other legislation that 
limits business organizing: 
In principle, historical conditions discourage business associations in the United States 
because antitrust law has generally restricted both their formal political authorization and 
formally coordinated economic action within industries. (Spillman 2012:41) 
The U.S., then, should represent a negative case for trade association development according to 
the outlined Weberian model above. Because of the legal limitations in the institutional 
environment, trade associations should not thrive, particularly after the creation of and 
implementation of antitrust law in the early 20th century, which prohibits the very types of 
activities that trade associations are meant to serve for the wider business community as 
economic regulatory organizations. Spillman notes that from the surface, the case of U.S. trade 
associations appears to fit. Compared to the institutional environments and subsequent activities 
that trade associations are able to pursue in states like Japan and Germany, trade associations in 
the U.S. are weak, at least in Weberian terms. Although there have been times that trade 
associations have enjoyed more state attention and authorization (particularly in times of war), 
U.S. trade associations do not seem to fit well with the Weberian conceptualization of economic 
regulatory organizations. Spillman explains: 
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Superficially the historical evidence can support this view. Even before the 
implementation of antitrust law, associations [in the U.S.] were relatively informal 
organizations. They do not seem to have been particularly successful in what has been 
taken to be their major purpose: stabilizing industries with price and production 
agreements. (2012:68) 
According to the Weberian model highlighted above, trade associations should have started to 
decline in the U.S. because of the limitations on business organizing and economic mechanisms 
that were associated with the passing of antitrust laws. Additionally, as Spillman notes, trade 
associations in the U.S. were never particularly successful in establishing the very economic 
regulatory mechanisms (such as price controls, pooling, or other types of “collusion”) that seem, 
theoretically, to be core parts of their purposes as organizations. And after the passing of antitrust 
laws in the U.S., these formal mechanisms were no longer available parts of organizational 
repertoires. This is to say that trade associations could have developed in similar ways as they 
did in Japan and Germany, but because of the institutional environment in the U.S., trade 
associations in the U.S. are comparably weak in their economic regulatory power.  
From a cursory view, this seems to be true of trade associations in the U.S. They do not 
perform in the same ways that trade associations in other states do, particularly in connection to 
economic regulation. For Spillman, though, this is where the paradox of U.S. trade associations 
actually starts. Although U.S. trade associations are not able to pursue economically regulatory 
activities like trade associations in Japan and Germany, trade associations still thrive in the 
United States. In fact, in population studies of trade associations, the implementation of antitrust 
legislation did not slow the expansion of trade associations. Trade association populations 
actually grew and stabilized after the implementation of antitrust laws (Aldrich and Staber 1988; 
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Spillman 2012). What could possibly account for this population trend? Why did the trade 
association population continue to grow after the implementation of antitrust legislation?  
Spillman (2012) proposes that during this time, trade associations must have been serving 
other roles that are not captured in the Weberian model outlined above and that they 
accomplished more than economic regulation for their members. Like Aldrich and Staber (1988), 
Spillman finds that state intervention in the form of antitrust laws did not necessarily have a 
negative impact on the wider population of trade associations, particularly on the process of trade 
association survival. Instead, trade associations were adapted to serve other roles for the business 
community that did not include economic regulatory activities that were deemed illegal under 
antitrust laws that were passed in the early 1900s. Spillman actually argues that these laws may 
have helped facilitate the process of trade associations taking on or amplifying other 
organizational roles that were actually more useful for the business community in the U.S. than 
economic regulation. 
Theoretically, then, she suggests that trade associations are better understood by bridging 
Weberian accounts and predictions of trade associations within “a broader Durkheimian 
framework” of economic action (Spillman 2012:30). She explains that: 
Durkheim’s concern with the long-term, likely irreversible trend to an increasing division 
of labor in modern life led him to suggest that occupational groups might help sustain 
cohesion and coordination. This insight suggests that even through American business 
associations seem comparatively ineffective in the pursuit of economic and political 
interests, the historical record will show a sustained orientation to the production of 
coordinating information that has been mostly neglected in previous accounts and that 
 35 
provides a more plausible starting point for understanding business associations in 
contemporary American life. (Spillman 2012:30-31) 
Spillman proposes that examining trade associations through the lens of “occupational groups” 
encourages a broader view of the activities that trade associations have pursued as well as a 
deeper look into the histories and organizational roots of trade associations in the U.S. 
 Spillman then connects the deeper historical roots of contemporary trade associations to 
not only organizations that attempted to coordinate economic activities, but also to “dinner-club” 
associations, which were popular business-affiliated organizations in the late 19th century 
(Galambos 1965; Spillman 2012). The purpose of dinner club associations was not necessarily to 
implement economic regulations, mechanisms, or strategies for entire industries (which is what 
the Weberian ideal types outline as possible and likely organizational trajectories for trade 
associations). Instead, they served as more of a social meeting place for industry leadership to 
meet and discuss ideas for possible coordination even if the organization itself did not pursue 
coordinating activities. Galambos (1965) explains: 
The important function of the trade association… was to provide a meeting place, a 
dinner, a convention, or a luncheon for the members. These meetings enabled the 
members to coordinate their activities; yet their activities were seldom carried on by the 
association itself… the organization, qua organization, did little more than provide a 
platform…  
By providing an institutional setting for business executives to build relationships with one 
another, these early organizations amplified the importance of camaraderie and coordination 
within industrial sectors, which Durkheim saw as essential to sustaining economic action. 
Although these organizations began to be replaced by more formal and larger trade associations 
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at the turn of the century, Spillman suggests that the communal roots of dinner-clubs had staying 
power and cannot be discounted when understanding contemporary trade associations as social 
actors.  
Thus, by expanding the conceptualization of contemporary trade associations to include 
other organizations like dinner-club associations, Spillman shows that trade associations were 
more than economic regulatory organizations prior to antitrust laws, which explains why 
Weberian models do not necessarily fit the case of trade associations in the U.S. This also helps 
to explain why the population of trade associations did not decline following the implementation 
of these laws. Instead, these organizations historically served other important social, cultural, and 
organizational roles for industries that are not captured by the narrow conceptualization provided 
by Weberian understandings of trade associations as economic regulatory organizations.  
In the U.S. context, Spillman explains that this means that even before the 
implementation of antitrust laws, trade associations were “already multifunctional, oriented to 
collecting and exchanging general industry information, education, and occupational 
camaraderie” (Spillman 2012:53, emphasis in original). Spillman found the following activities 
to be important parts of how trade associations operated as “information production centers”: 
Technical and commercial publications; exhibitions; market research; technical 
merchandising advice; surveys on wages, hours, and working conditions, and collective 
bargaining; employee training and placement advice; libraries; used machinery 
exchanges; uniform product guidelines; certification standards; standard business forms; 
and general and industry-specific statistics… (2012:62) 
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Thus, as antitrust legislation at the turn of the century shifted the business landscape in the U.S. 
away from certain types of colluding activities, trade associations were adapted to focus more on 
serving their respective industries as information centers and conduits of professionalization. 
Spillman also explains that in amplifying their role as information production centers, 
trade associations also began to serve new purposes outside of their respective industries in the 
U.S. (Sutton, Harris, Kaysen, and Tobin 1956; Spillman 2012). This was particularly true for 
industry relations to the state. Trade associations were gathering information on a variety of 
industry activities and producing reports, which began to be important for state understandings of 
wider economic health in the country and the intricacies of specific industry dynamics. So while 
some activities that trade associations had historically used were deemed illegal after the passage 
of antitrust laws (particularly price controls or other efforts that seemed to stifle competition 
among firms), other activities pursued through trade associations were welcomed by the state. 
Spillman notes that trade association development during this time then should be understood in 
the context of “a shifting and somewhat unstable political environment,” particularly in the early 
1900s (2012:62). That is, during this time period, the U.S. federal government was also 
grappling with how to best regulate business. Antitrust laws like the Clayton Act and the 
establishment of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) were meant to be the culmination of the 
Progressive Era’s fight for protection against the impacts of big business on the public.5 
However, as seen with the shifting purposes of organizations like trade associations, these laws 
had mixed impacts and did not completely curtail forms of business collusion and coordination.  
                                                
5 The characterization of the “Progressive Era” in the United States is often painted as a moment of concrete wins 
for the public, labor, and the creation of a strong and responsive state. Antitrust legislation, particularly the 
dismantling of the Standard Oil Trust, was seen as winning example of the new era of a state willing to crack down 
on corporate greed. However, many scholars question if antitrust legislation was actually an attempt to reign in 
unwieldy corporate actors through a progressive agenda (Kolko 1963; Wienstein 1971). 
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The usefulness of trade associations as information production centers for state purposes 
was perhaps best exemplified during World War I. Although the U.S. government was still 
struggling with how to best implement antitrust laws, wartime pushed the business and 
government spheres together like never before (Kolko 1963; Lieberstein 1969). During World 
War I, business leaders were called on by the state to deliver high levels of production and 
distribution to support the Allied Forces. And in order to do so, the state relied on the leadership 
of existing trade associations and other business organizations such as the Chamber of 
Commerce to coordinate and deliver on these production and distribution goals (Baruch 1921). 
Spillman suggests that these activities represented a “newly routinized” set of relations between 
the state and the business community (2012:63), which can also help explain why the population 
of trade associations more than doubled between 1914 and 1919 (Aldrich et al 1994; Spillman 
2012).  This is not to say that trade associations necessarily enjoyed a more cooperative 
relationship with the state. Instead, Spillman explains that trade associations in the U.S. in the 
following years would see “dramatic swings in the political environment of associations” 
characterized by intense state cooperation and coordination during crises (such as wartime) 
followed by periods of strict enforcement and extension of antitrust laws. However, what 
remained was a new direction for trade associations, which established them as go-to institutions 
for information within and outside of their respective industries. By rooting their activities in 
information production instead of regulatory economic activities, trade associations now served 
more flexible roles, which had a lasting impact on the ability of trade associations to survive as 
organizations. Spillman argues that this period and organizational change was the defining 
moment for trade associations in the United States: 
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… associations developed and institutionalized an extensive portfolio of activities in the 
early twentieth century, an institutional portfolio from which each might adopt a selection 
of strategies of action according to contingent circumstances. This range of activities and 
pattern of selection is also still evident today. The common focus of almost all of these 
strategies of action was the coordination of information production. (Spillman 2012:69) 
Although these organizations were already multifunctional at the turn of the 20th century, by 
amplifying their roles as information production centers, trade associations had successfully 
carved out an organizational niche that allowed them to adapt to an unstable and shifting political 
economy of the early 20th century. After her examination of these early 20th century 
transformations, Spillman goes on to argue that trade associations continued to solidify their 
roles as information production centers in changing political environments, eventually expanding 
into “institutional settings for routine cultural production” for the business community (Spillman 
2012:2). 
After establishing this historical and theoretical perspective on trade associations as 
social actors, Spillman focuses the remainder of her analysis on the activities that are pursued 
through trade associations. Many of the activities highlighted are similar to those explored by 
business and management scholars, including sponsoring annual meetings, the creation and 
monitoring of industry standards and statistics, production of various publications and reports, 
and formal political lobbying. However, building off her historical findings of the importance of 
trade associations as centers of cultural production, Spillman asserts that these activities 
primarily serve as ways to create and strengthen business culture and shared identities among 
businesspeople. When examined through a cultural lens, many of these activities can be 
understood as constructing and maintaining “cognitive categories, networks, and fields that 
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create collective cognitive goods for economic action” (Spillman 2012:346). She argues that 
although many of the activities that trade associations pursue could potentially have external 
impacts (such as with policy or public relations), the majority of this work is focused on creating 
and perpetuating collective identities, occupational camaraderie, and solidarities within 
industries. She emphasizes that “[b]efore strategies are possible, identities and solidarities are 
essential” to any potential collective economic action and that the building of solidarity is “an 
end in itself” for trade associations (Spillman 2012:137).  
It is through this discussion of trade association activities and the building and 
maintaining of collective identities and solidarities that Spillman returns to her initial claims 
about self-interested economic action. She argues that much of the work pursued through trade 
associations, particularly these activities focused on identity and solidarity, cannot be explained 
as processes of self-interest. Instead, she frames these activities as disinterested solidarity and 
nonstrategic action. She argues that these activities have little to do with the type of self-
interested collective action described by business and management scholars and others who 
ascribe to seeing businesspeople and business organizations as inherently self-interested. And 
while many trade associations do participate in some activities that can be understood as self-
interested action (such as political lobbying), the most important role that they play, particularly 
in the U.S., is to strengthen the cultures of their particular industry.  
Spillman is firm in her assertion that these activities are best understood as disinterested 
and nonstrategic because they primarily serve as ways for businesspeople to understand 
themselves as well as the work that they do. She argues that it is activities like these that help 
sustain economic action pursued by businesspeople more than direct, self-interested action, 
which is often assumed to be the natural or assumed foundation for all economic action. By 
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taking a cultural approach to understanding economic action (and, thus, organizations like trade 
associations), she shows that business interests must also be constructed and that the activities 
that businesspeople participate in through organizations like trade associations are some of the 
best ways to understand how business culture is produced and sustained. In her view, trade 
associations, then, are important spaces for mediating and building collective identity and 
solidarity among businesspeople, which are “necessary conditions for the production and 
reproduction of industry interests” (Spillman 2012:181). She suggests that trade associations are 
essential to this process because of the variety of meaning-making activities that occur through 
trade associations. These activities impact the way that businesspeople understand both 
themselves as well as the work that they pursue. She sums up the importance of this disinterested 
and nonstrategic cultural work in the following passage: 
Recognizing this cultural structure helps understand the ideological power of business 
better that simplistic assumptions about economic self-interest. The many ways that 
business is understood as disinterested that we have seen in these pages are not trivial 
exceptions or odd anomalies; they help explain why and how self-interested, profit-
oriented action can be sustained. In fact, they suggest that capitalist relations of 
production and exchange are much more psychically powerful than analyses based on 
normative self-interest might suggest. (Spillman 2012:346) 
Indeed, by focusing on the processes and practices that businesspeople participate in, Spillman 
makes a compelling argument for understanding how business culture is created and maintained 
through organizations like trade associations.  
 In closing her analysis, Spillman cautions against the assumption that self-interested 
economic action is the best way to understand trade associations as well as motivations of the 
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wider business community. She argues that her analysis of trade associations and activities 
pursued through trade associations show that there are many processes that lead to the creation 
and maintenance of collective identities and solidarities that are essential to sustain individual 
industries. Her analysis sheds light on the fascinating meaning-making that businesspeople 
participate in to understand themselves as well as their work. By framing trade association work 
as disinterested and nonstrategic, Spillman challenges the assumption all activities pursued by 
businesspeople is necessarily rooted in attempts to control or influence economic action. 
Although much of this analysis may seem to shy away from some of the real impacts that 
businesspeople and business organizations like trade associations have as social actors, Spillman 
sees her cultural analysis as having different kinds of conclusions for the ideological and material 
power of business: 
Only if we see disinterested solidarity as fundamental to the pursuit of business interests 
– as constitutive of business orientations as is the widely recognized idea of the 
competitive pursuit of self-interest – can we begin to understand the contemporary power 
of business culture and how it is sustained. (Spillman 2012:369) 
In understanding business this way, Spillman shows that there is much cultural work that goes in 
to creating and sustaining business communities, which has historically been neglected in both 
critiques of and challenges to contemporary business practices, organizations, and institutions. 
By illuminating the cultural components of business life, Spillman provides a foundation for new 
directions of research in understanding business as a social actor with a new focus on the cultural 
dynamics that sustain economic action. 
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Discussion 
Previous scholarship on trade associations offers an essential foundation for 
understanding trade associations as social actors. Scholars give clear, albeit differing, 
conceptualizations of trade associations, speaking to the potential representative nature of these 
organizations as well some important cultural purposes these organizations serve for wider 
business communities. Additionally, scholars have also provided insight into other important 
questions related to trade association behavior, lifecycle components, and organizational changes 
at the population level of trade associations over time. Historical perspectives on trade 
associations like Aldrich and Staber (1988) and Spillman (2012) also give a window into key 
historical junctures that facilitated changes in both the size of the trade association population as 
well as the types of activities trade associations pursue in a given state environment. By having a 
broader view of the state environments that trade associations operate in, generalizable traits of 
these organizations can be amended to better capture the significance of these organizations as 
social actors and push scholars to question some core assumptions about the roles that these 
dynamic organizations play in and outside of their respective industries. 
An obvious tension between these two bodies of literature is found in the different 
conceptualizations of trade associations as social actors. Business and management studies 
scholars provide a characterization of trade associations as organizations centered on collective 
action for their members. The activities highlighted by these studies show that many of these 
activities are meant to influence internal industry dynamics as well as external actors that may 
have an impact on the way that wider industries are able to operate. Such characterizations and 
findings encourage an understanding that trade associations are active in attempting to influence 
a variety of “non-market” environments for their members (Baron 1995). Taking a cultural 
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sociology perspective, Spillman interrogates some of the core assumptions about trade 
associations as collective action oriented organizations. She suggests that such a characterization 
operates off assumptions that all business activity and organizations are rooted in self-interest. 
Through her study of trade associations, Spillman challenges this assumption, showing that 
business activity can also be understood as disinterested and nonstrategic, which she argues is 
particularly true of the development of cognitive categories and camaraderie, which are created 
and sustained through organizations like trade associations. From these findings, she suggests 
that trade associations are best understood as institutional settings that are primarily oriented 
towards cultural production for wider industries.  
These contrary conceptualizations inspire different understandings of not only the 
organizational roles that trade associations play in society, but also how their activities may be 
perceived. If trade associations are centered on collective action, then their activities will be 
perceived as always working towards collective goals for their members, which connects to an 
understanding of economic action being self-interested. If trade associations are understood as 
centers of cultural production, then the focus of activities pursued through trade associations 
shifts towards how businesspeople make sense of their own work, which has a part in sustaining 
business communities and identities. For Spillman, these activities are not as benign as they may 
seem from the surface. Instead, they have a unique role in perpetuating business communities 
and activities precisely because they matter and are meaningful to the people who operate within 
them. Spillman argues that because business organizations and business activity are almost 
always understood as self-interested, scholars have missed opportunities to understand these 
meaning-making dynamics. In recognizing the power of the concepts nonstrategic action and 
disinterested solidarity, Spillman moves beyond the more descriptive elements of business and 
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management studies research and provides interesting new directions for understanding 
economic action and organizations. By invoking a hybrid of Weberian and Durkhiemian theories 
on economic action, Spillman provides a unique perspective on how trade associations serve an 
important cultural role in for business people, particularly in the U.S. This is overlooked by other 
studies of trade associations that seem to overgeneralize the importance of trade associations as 
economic and political actors.  
After reviewing the studies of trade associations, some issues and omissions emerge. 
First, the body of literature on trade associations has primarily focused on the population level as 
outlined by Staber and Aldrich’s (1983) analytical framework. Little research has engaged on the 
individual (or motivational) and organizational levels, which Staber and Aldrich (1983) identify 
as potential levels of exploration in understanding trade associations as social actors. This 
omission makes sense since little research has been pursued on trade associations. By focusing 
on the population level of trade associations, scholars have gained insight into wider patterns 
within and across different sectors and states, which is essential for building both theoretical and 
empirical standards for scholarly work on these organizations. Scholars that have primarily 
focused on the population level of trade associations acknowledge this omission and suggest that 
research on other levels of trade associations should be pursued to have a more comprehensive 
understanding of trade associations as social actors (Staber and Aldrich 1983; Spillman 2012; 
Barnett 2013). This creates new opportunities for understanding these organizations as social 
actors and how they connect to other social and historical processes within society. Studies at the 
individual and organizational level may support or challenge results to existing trade association 
scholarship, and new questions may be able to be pursued at these levels of analysis that 
population level studies cannot answer.  
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Second, the tension concerning the concept of self-interested action invites more 
questions about not only how organizations function as social actors, but also the impetus to 
create organizations like trade associations in the first place. Neither body of literature 
highlighted above takes the question or understanding the process of organizational creation 
seriously. Business and management studies scholars recognize that trade associations are 
created to work on common problems faced by industries (Aldrich and Staber 1983; Barnett 
2013), but are not particularly interested in the process that businesspeople go through to make 
these organizations a reality. Through her cultural analysis, Spillman emphasizes the possible 
roles that trade associations play for businesspeople after they are created, focusing first on the 
failures of trade associations as economic regulatory organizations and the shift that occurred to 
push these organizations towards more cultural production. And while she argues that trade 
associations eventually became centers of cultural and information production, she neglects to 
examine the ways and reasons that many trade associations were created in the first place. 
Focusing on organizational inception processes may complicate her understanding of self-
interest as it relates to trade associations as organizations. A focus on organizational inception 
potentially provides new opportunities and insights into how the concept of self-interested 
economic action operates beyond the firm level. In essence, neither of these bodies of literature 
engages with can answer questions of organizational inception: why do these organizations 
exist? How does the impetus to create organizations that work on common issues within 
industries relate to the concept of self-interested action? And what can the creation of these 
organization show about the business community as a whole? Are organizations like trade 
associations devoid of self-interest for members? Do they produce different types of self-
interested opportunities for members?  
 47 
Finally, a serious omission of the connections trade associations potentially have to class-
based power and politics emerges when examining these studies. If either of the broad 
conceptualizations of trade associations highlighted above is true, then class-based theories of 
power and politics have much to contribute to and critique in these analyses. Although it is not 
surprising that business and management scholars do not engage with class-based theories of 
power and politics, the very observation that trade associations are representative organizations 
that pursue collective action for business interests provides an interesting challenge to some 
political economy perspectives on class-based power, organizations, and politics. The sheer 
number of trade associations in the United States and across the global should inspire more 
critical perspectives on how these organizations relate to issues of power and politics. The vast 
use of organizations like trade associations by business (or, in other terms, capitalist) interests 
necessitates discussions on the lengths that business leaders have gone to historically to organize 
themselves as well as their respective sectors and a recognition of collective interests based on 
common relations to production. It also presents is an intriguing window into how 
businesspeople work to maintain their powerful positions in society through organizations. Such 
organized efforts, however, need more theoretical grounding to connect these activities to wider 
historical and systemic structures and struggles. 
When concerning Spillman’s study (and the broader cultural sociology lens that she 
brings to economic action), class-based politics and power are glaringly absent from her 
observations as well. This omission is not particularly surprising due to the cultural perspective 
that Spillman brings to understanding these organizations as social actors. Although she may be 
correct in her assertion that taken-for-granted assumptions about self-interest and economic 
action is a large part of the reason that studies of trade associations and wider discussions of 
 48 
business culture have not been pursued in the past, ignoring how these organizations connect to 
larger class dynamics in society creates a blind spot for understanding the significance of these 
groups as social actors and how they represent larger historical shifts in capitalist ownership, 
ideology, and relations to the state. Spillman even has an opportunity to consider the connection 
between class-interest and trade associations through her Weberian framework as Weber’s 
notions of class (as well as status and party) connect to many of the cultural and communal 
themes that she highlights in her analysis. However, after using Weberian perspectives to 
understand economic regulatory organizations, she largely abandons Weber’s theories to build 
her case for the cultural significance of trade associations, which relies heavily on meaning-
making and cultural literature. 
It is possible that Spillman does not focus on the concept of class precisely because this 
would unravel some of her major points on the concept of “self-interested action” that she is so 
critical of when considering the roots of economic action. The differences between class-interest 
and self-interest is the recognition of the collective power that organized efforts can take when 
connected to class locations as well as class struggle. Collective action sometimes requires that 
individuals involved in organizations consider the collective over the self. However, this does 
not necessarily mean that forming or joining organized efforts are altruistic acts. Instead, there 
may also be incentives for the self (or individual entity like a corporation) when joining 
collective efforts, which should not be ignored when considering organizations like trade 
associations. For the business community, the existence of trade associations should inspire more 
inquiry into the concept of self-interest as well as class-interest and how this process plays out in 
the business community. 
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Additionally, the cultural work pursued through trade associations should also be 
examined through a more critical eye. Many of the activities that Spillman highlights as being 
“disinterested” or “nonstrategic” take on new meanings if they are connected to the concept of 
class-interest instead of self-interest.  These activities may look “disinterested” or “nonstrategic” 
from the outside, but if trade associations are understood as class-based organizations, then all 
cultural work is connected to the maintenance of class identity, consciousness, and class-based 
interests. These activities may still be maintaining business culture and identities that Spillman 
notes are essential for building camaraderie and solidarity within wider industries and sectors. 
Spillman’s assertion that disinterested solidarity is “an end in itself” for trade associations does 
not have to be read through a benign lens, however. When connected to class-based interests, 
these activities that go into the perpetuation and maintenance of the capitalist class position in 
society.  
Constructing and maintaining “disinterested” or “nonstrategic” cultural references for 
those who participate in trade associations must be questioned beyond the meaning-making 
processes that Spillman describes. Observations of the work that is pursued through trade 
associations inspires questions of why those with material and ideological power in society go to 
such lengths to create and maintain ideological and material structures to their benefit. Without a 
discussion of the class position of organizations like trade associations, such questions remain 
unanswered. 
This dissertation takes to task these omissions to provide new directions in empirical and 
theoretical understandings of trade associations as social actors. Empirically, the case study of 
this dissertation can be conceptualized as both an individual and organizational level case study. 
By focusing on the events and circumstances that led to the creation of the trade association the 
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American Petroleum Institute, insight will be gained into the individual/motivational level of 
trade association emergence. Additionally, the organizational level will also be examined as the 
case study provides insight into what types of activities the trade association has pursued over 
time. API has a nearly one-hundred-year history that is useful to examine through a critical 
sociological lens.  
Theoretically, this case study also departs from both business and management studies 
and cultural sociological perspectives and invokes a key perspective to unpack the history of 
API: Marxian political economy, particularly Marxian organizational theory. I suggest that 
because trade associations are ultimately organizations that represent some of the most materially 
and ideologically powerful individuals and groups in modern society, Marxian understandings of 
class and organizations provide a better way to understand the roots of these organizations as 
well as the intentional process that goes into founding these organizations by a class-conscious 
elite. By conceptualizing trade associations through a Marxian lens, these organizations become 
culturally, organizationally, and materially significant in new ways, which challenges current 
sociological conceptualizations of trade associations as social actors as well as broader 
discussions of capitalist organizations and organizing in the United States. The next section 
details both this theoretical framework, which will be utilized to understand the American 
Petroleum Institute as a social actor. 
Trade Associations as Social Actors: Marxist Perspectives on Organizing and 
Organizations 
Because trade associations are organizations that represent business interests, Marxian 
political economy or, as some scholars call it, a “class-based perspective” provides better 
theoretical grounding for understanding trade associations as social actors. Unlike business and 
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management studies research, a Marxist perspective moves beyond the descriptive elements of 
activities or trends in the wider populations to situate actors within larger historical processes and 
power relations within society. When considering Spillman’s outlined cultural perspective, 
Marxian political economy can also fill gaps in some of Spillman’s omissions, particularly 
related to organizational formation, and challenges Spillman’s concepts of “disinterested 
solidarity” and “nonstrategic action,” showing that such concepts are impossible from class-
based perspective. Marxian political economy provides a new foundation for understanding trade 
associations as social actors. I argue that trade associations are inherently capitalist organizations 
created to build and maintain the interests of the capitalist class. Activities pursued through trade 
associations, then, must be understood as processes designed to protect, maintain, and promote 
class interests.  
To support this conceptualization of trade associations, I first examine how Marxist 
perspectives understand the concept of interests, particularly as it relates to class. I then discuss 
how Marxist theorists have attempted to understand the capitalist class as a cohesive political, 
economic, and ideological force in society. Discussions of how the capitalist class relates to other 
important actors, particularly the state, are also useful for understanding some of the potential 
limitations of the organizing efforts of capitalists and can also help explain why organizations 
like trade associations have not been taken seriously through a Marxist lens. After surveying the 
literature, it is clear that Marxist political economists and sociologists have lacked empirical and 
theoretical interest in capitalist organizations for justifiable reasons, particularly because of a 
focus on other actors (such as the working class and the state) and historical processes that make 
a detailed and nuanced look at capitalist organizations seem obsolete. However, the 
pervasiveness of trade associations and the types of work accomplished through trade 
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associations suggests that these organizations should not be ignored, particularly from a critical 
perspective like Marxian political economy. I end this section examining concepts and 
theoretical propositions of Marxian organizational theory that help make sense of trade 
associations as organizations and social actors, which are essential for understanding the 
American Petroleum Institute, the case study of this dissertation. 
Class-Based Interests and Social Change: Marxian Perspectives on the Capitalist Class 
Spillman contends that sociologists have not taken organizations like trade associations 
seriously because of a taken-for-granted assumption that business organizations as well as the 
wider business community operate on “self-interest.” She argues that this assumption makes 
investigation of their concrete activities and historical development of little interest to 
sociologists because the main point of all of these activities are to pursue self-interested action. 
While Spillman never directly mentions Marxist political economy as her primary foil (indeed, 
she only mentions Marx twice in her book and usually in passing), her analysis does critique 
classic Marxist themes as a way to build and explore her cultural conceptualizations of 
organizations like trade associations. The concept of self-interested economic action echoes 
class-based perspectives and motivations, but does not unpack the diversity of Marxist thought 
on “interests” and capitalist organizing and organizations.  
Although Marxists do not use the term self-interest to understand motivations for 
economic action, class-based interests are of primary importance to understanding different 
social actors in society. Social class, class structure, and how classes interact (i.e. “class 
struggle”) are all essential parts of Marxist analysis and Marxian understandings of history. 
Indeed, Marxist theory is grounded on the premise that “the history of all hitherto existing 
society is the history of class struggles” (Marx 1848). In order to understand class struggle, 
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however, it is essential to understand Marx’s notion of class. From a Marxist perspective, class 
has both objective and subjective components. Objectively, a class shares common relations to 
ownership of the means of production. Two primary classes exist in Marxian analysis: the 
bourgeoisie (often referred to as the capitalist class or the ruling class) and the proletariat (often 
referred to as the working class or simply “labor”). Other classes are also highlighted in Marx’s 
writing such as the petite bourgeoisie, landlords, and the lumpenproletariat, all of which are 
classes that occupy social positions that are also important for understanding class struggle and 
the development of capitalism. However, most critical attention has been paid to the capitalist 
and working classes in attempts to understand class struggle and the potential for social change 
(Marx 1848). The capitalist class is signified by its ownership of the means of production as well 
as its ability to purchase labor power from other classes. The working class is characterized by 
its selling of its labor power to the capitalist class. The working class does not own the means of 
production or have the ability to purchase the labor power of other classes. These varying 
relationships to the means of production and labor power are key parts of the dynamics between 
and among classes and shape the way that capitalism has developed over time. Work for the 
proletarian has “lost all individual character” as the proletarian has become “an appendage of the 
machine” (Marx 1848). These connections to the means of production signify that objective 
component of class from a Marxist perspective. 
When considering the capitalist class, Marx is clear in his conceptualization that the 
capitalist class is a ruthless force of social change, playing “a most revolutionary part” in gaining 
institutional control and driving changes that most benefits itself (Marx 1848). In The Communist 
Manifesto, Marx provides a series of statements on the power of the bourgeoisie as well as 
signifiers of the types of changes to society the “epoch of the bourgeoisie” has brought. 
 54 
“Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, 
everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones” 
(Marx 1848). However, many of these activities also contain “weapons” which may be “turned 
against the bourgeoisie itself” (Marx 1848). Marx further explains that “not only has the 
bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself; it has also called into existence the men 
who are to wield those weapons – the modern working class – the proletarians” (1848). Marx 
describes these weapons as “political and general education.” Marx also predicted that over time 
and with the development of industry, the working class would increase both in numbers and 
concentrated masses. With these increases in the working class, “its strength grows, and it feels 
that strength more” (Marx 1848). Already a class based on its relation to the means of production 
and armed with these weapons of the bourgeoisie, Marx predicted that the working class would 
also organize into a political party. Although at times the party is “continually… upset again by 
the competition between workers themselves,” the political party of the working class “ever rises 
up again, stronger, firmer, mightier” eventually culminating in its true purpose: a revolutionary 
class (Marx 1848). 
These latter observations by Marx connect to the other component of class, the subjective 
component, from a Marxist perspective. In Marxist thought, the subjective component of class is 
often understood as “class consciousness” or the ability of a class to recognize and act upon its 
collective, class-based interests (Lukács 1923; Coser 1977; Cohen 1980; Andrew 1983) This is 
also signified as the difference of a “class in itself” (the objective component) and a “class for 
itself” (the subjective component) (Coser 1977; Draper 1978; Cohen 1980; Andrew 1983). 
Whereas the objective component of class rests on class relations to the means of production (a 
“class in itself”), the subjective component of class connects class to ideological, cultural, and 
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political processes (a “class for itself”). Some scholars have suggested that objective components 
of class are economic while subjective components of class are political and ideological (Cohen 
1980; Andrew 1983). Such a distinction is essential for understanding structural positions of 
classes in society as well as the political action (or potential political action) that classes pursue 
in organized fashions. The subjective component of class has received much scholarly debate, 
with many scholars questioning how class consciousness is achieved (Lukács 1923; Coser 1977), 
how class consciousness is related to the objective component of class (Dos Santos 1970; Draper 
1978; Cohen 1980), why these types of class distinctions matter (Przeworski 1977; Cohen 1980; 
Andrew 1983), and what impact class conscious classes potentially have on other actors such as 
the state (Poulantzas 1973; Block 1977).  
While many of these questions and detailed debates of the subjective component of class 
have been centered on the working class, attention to the capitalist class’s relationship to its class 
position and its potential consciousness is also an important scholarly discussion. When 
considering the capitalist class, some scholars question whether or not the capitalist class was 
ever or ever needed to be class conscious to bring about the social changes that led to the social 
arrangements that characterize “bourgeois society” or “capitalism.” That is, to achieve its 
dominant position in society, did the capitalist class have to achieve class consciousness and 
embody a “class for itself?” If so, how does the capitalist class continue to operate as a class 
conscious of its interests? What does class consciousness look like in action through organizing 
processes? If not, what other mechanisms are at work to sustain capitalism as a system? 
All of these questions on the capitalist class’s role in social change as a class potentially 
conscious of its interests produce quite different answers. This contested area of Marxian 
political economy has ramifications for understanding capitalists as a class, an organized force, 
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and any organizations that represent capitalists (such as trade associations). When reading 
Marx’s writing, he is clear in his position that the capitalist class is a powerful and 
transformative force in society. And in the “bourgeois epoch,” the capitalist class must be 
understood as a “ruling class” (Marx 1848). Many scholars and political actors have taken his 
points on the capitalist class literally and developed their perspectives on the capitalist class and 
its influence on society as a powerful and intentional force in history. Such a perspective is often 
referred to as a part of the classical Marxist perspective. Political parties and organizations as 
well as scholars who utilize this perspective operate off the assumption that the capitalist class is 
indeed a class conscious of its interests, working to instill its values and worldviews onto others 
in society.  
However, scholars that take the more classical Marxist view have still questioned the 
degree to which the capitalist class is conscious of its interests and how the capitalist class 
operates as a class-conscious force.  In his seminal work History and Class Consciousness, 
Lukács (1926) develops the concept of class consciousness and considers how the concept 
relates to different historical time periods as well as different classes. Lukács’s work on class 
consciousness is often connected to how class consciousness functions for the working class, 
which has inspired many studies of the working class as an emerging conscious and political 
force (Thompson 1963; Hechter 1975; Wilentz 1984; Jones 2001) However, he also had much to 
say about the class consciousness of the capitalist class and its potential impacts. When 
considering the capitalist class, Lukács does not see that capitalist class as ever being able to 
achieve what he terms as “true” class consciousness. “True” class consciousness is reserved for 
the working class, which is the only class capable of achieving a class consciousness that allows 
them to change their conditions within society. Instead, he sees the efforts of the capitalist class 
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to actualize their interests as being rooted in a “false” consciousness. Although the capitalist 
class does act to protect its interests (and does so intentionally), Lukács sees all of these efforts 
as unsustainable because of the inherent contradictions of capitalist as a system. He states: 
The hegemony of the bourgeoisie really does embrace the whole of society; it really does 
attempt to organize the whole of society in its own interests (and in this it has had some 
success). To achieve this, it was forced both to develop a coherent theory of economics, 
politics and society… and also to make conscious and sustain its faith in its 
own mission to control and organize society. The tragic dialectics of the bourgeoisie can 
be seen in the fact that it is not only desirable but essential for it to clarify its own class 
interests on every particular issue, while at the same time such a clear awareness 
becomes fatal when it is extended to the question of the totality. The chief reason for this 
is that the rule of the bourgeoisie can only be the rule of a minority. Its hegemony is 
exercised not merely by a minority but in the interest of that minority, so the need to 
deceive the other classes and to ensure that their class consciousness remains amorphous 
is inescapable for a bourgeois regime. (Lukács 1926:65; emphasis in original) 
Thus, for Lukács, the way that the capitalist class attempts to justify its activities is rooted in 
“false” consciousness. That is, it will never live up to the promises it makes as an organizing 
force in society. While the capitalist class attempts to understand economic, political, and social 
problems, its analysis is flawed because it cannot overcome the crises and contradictions inherent 
in the capitalist system. Lukács explains that “[t]he ‘falseness’, the illusion implicit in this 
situation is in no sense arbitrary; it is simply the intellectual reflex of the objective economic 
structure” (1926:52). And further, 
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The class consciousness of the bourgeoisie may well be able to reflect all the problems of 
organization entailed by its hegemony and by the capitalist transformation and 
penetration of total production. But it becomes obscured as soon as it is called upon to 
face problems that remain within its jurisdiction but which point beyond the limits of 
capitalism. (Lukács 1926:52) 
For Lukács, then, the capitalist class is a class conscious of its interests. The activities it pursues, 
the knowledge it creates and advocates, and even its attempts at organizing to face issues that 
emerge because of the way that capitalism operates can all be understood as efforts of a class 
conscious of its interests. However, this consciousness is “false” because it can never escape the 
inherent contradictions within capitalism: 
For despite all the dialectical contradictions, despite all its objective falseness, the self-
deceiving ‘false’ consciousness that we find in the bourgeoisie is at least in accord with 
its class situation. It cannot save the bourgeoisie from the constant exacerbation of these 
contradictions and so from destruction, but it can enable it to continue the struggle and 
even engineer victories, albeit of short duration. (Lukács 1926:69). 
This last point shows that the capitalist class will continue to struggle to maintain its dominant 
position in the bourgeois epoch. And although Lukács does not believe that the activities that 
capitalist class pursues will ensure its dominance and hegemonic position in society, his analysis 
still paints the capitalist class as a “class for itself.”  
Other scholars have examined the impacts of the capitalist class on other institutions, 
particularly the state, to understand the capitalist class as a class-conscious actor. The Marxist 
view of the state was largely developed as a response to the pluralist perspective of the state as a 
 59 
neutral institution. Milliband (1969) explains that scholars who take a pluralist perspective of the 
state acknowledge that: 
…there are elites in different economic, social, political, administrative, professional and 
other pyramids of power. But these elites altogether lack the degree of cohesion required 
to turn them into dominant or ruling classes.” (Milliband 1969:4) 
Indeed, this view of multiple, competing elites constitutes an “elite pluralism,” which, 
from the pluralist perspective is meant to ensure that “power in society will be diffused and not 
concentrated” (Milliband 1969:4; emphasis in original). Marxist scholars reject such a view of 
both the capitalist class as well as the state. Alford and Friedland (1985) explain that from a 
Marxist perspective: 
… the state is fundamentally biased in its operations in favor of those who privately 
control the means of production. Such a system is neither natural nor inevitable but is a 
historical product of sometimes open, sometimes covert class struggle. In a capitalist 
society there is no public interest but only class interests. (Alford and Friedland 
1985:272) 
However, scholars disagree on the nature of the state as a capitalist institution particularly the 
state’s relationship to the capitalist class. Some scholars contend that since the capitalist class is 
an intentional, powerful and pervasive force that acts as a ruling class, the state is an instrument 
of the capitalist class and, therefore, must reflect the capitalist class’s interests (Milliband 1969, 
1977; Alford and Friedland 1985). Such a conceptualization echoes many of Marx’s early 
writings on the power of the capitalist class. When capitalists are assumed to have unlimited and 
unchecked control of the state (and, therefore, its power), scholars have characterized this 
perspective as an “instrumentalist view of the state,” where the state and state policies are a 
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“mere reflection of economic interests” of the capitalist class (Block 1977:6). Recent 
developments on the concept of the capitalist class as a ruling class have considered how the 
capitalist class has developed beyond the confines of state power and influence to develop into a 
transnational capitalist class (TCC), which is considered a global ruling class (Van Der Pijl 
1984, 1998; Sklair 1995, 2002; Robinson and Harris 2000; Robinson 2003). In this view, the 
TCC controls not only individual states, but also international policy-making bodies such as the 
World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund. The development of the 
transnational corporation is also an important instrument for the TCC to actualize its goals and 
move capital more freely around the globe (Robinson and Harris 2000).  
However, other scholars have questioned this view of the capitalist class and whether or 
not a class-conscious capitalist class is able to wield as much power and control as the classical 
Marxist perspective suggests. Instead, these scholars suggest that the staying power of capitalism 
is structural and historical rather than behavioral saying “[t]hese mechanisms operate 
independently of any political consciousness on the part of the ruling class” (Block 1977:27). 
This perspective is best understood as structural Marxism, which orients discussions away from 
intentional actions by the capitalist class and more towards the ways that structural conditions 
encourage the maintenance and growth of capitalism (Poulantzas 1973; Offe 1974; Block 1977). 
This is particularly true of how the state is understood in relation to the capitalist class. Instead of 
the capitalist class driving state policy to actualize its own interests, scholars have challenged 
this assumption calling attention to the relative autonomy of the state, arguing that there are 
genuine avenues for state actors to have influence over the direction of the state and state 
policies. Block’s (1977) resounding and influential statement “the ruling class does not rule” 
embodies this position, challenging the assumption of an all-powerful capitalist class (6). Indeed, 
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Block contends that “a viable Marxist theory of the state depends on the rejection of the idea of a 
conscious, politically directive, ruling class” (1977:26). 
Unlike scholars that take a pluralist view of the state as a neutral space for all actors to 
contest their issues and potentially garner benefits in the form of policies, structuralists still 
position the state as a capitalist institution (or, the capitalist state). Structuralists argue that the 
activities pursued by the state differ from those pursued by capitalists because they represent 
long-term interests of the capitalism as a system, rather than short-term interests of capitalists 
(Offe 1974). This perspective is meant to encourage an understanding that the state serves a 
unique role in maintaining capitalism that capitalists cannot do alone through their class-based 
position (Block 1977). For example, some policies that the state passes may appear to be anti-
capitalist such as the passage of laws that protect some workers’ rights. However, when 
considered in the long-term, these short-term concessions actually help to perpetuate capitalism 
because they dissuade an uprising that could overthrow the whole capitalist economic system 
and class-based social order (Offe 1974). A final point about structuralism, though, is that even 
in these instances, state actors may not be intentional in their actions. Instead, structuralists argue 
that much of this work and “the historical process unfolds “behind the backs” of the actors” and 
that it is therefore imperative to “locate the structural mechanisms that shape the workings of the 
capitalist state” instead of attributing capitalist development primarily to an active capitalist class 
conscious of its interests and actions (Block 1977:27). Alford and Friedland explain the 
structuralist view this way: 
Although structures of organized power are important to the class perspective, class 
power does not normally depend upon the political organization of the class, even if the 
transformation of social relations does depend upon their political organization. Class 
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power depends upon the state, and the state is shaped by class power. In this sense, class 
power is political. But accumulation, the systemic source of class power, does not require 
the existence of a politically organized ruling class. (Alford and Friedland 1985:286) 
This theoretical point is meant to center the idea that structural power of capitalism as a system 
that supersedes individual action and organized efforts by any group in society even those with 
assumed power, like the capitalist class.  
Discussion 
After examining these elements of Marxian political economy particularly as these 
perspectives relate to the concept of class-based interests, important theoretical and empirical 
insights serve as different guides to understanding the capitalist class as a social actor. A Marxist 
perspective encourages a view of society that centers class struggle to explain economic and 
social development. When considering how the capitalist class fits into this struggle, scholars 
have questioned the power of the capitalist class to control social institutions and social change. 
These studies have produced differing understandings of the capitalist class as a “ruling class,” 
organizing for class rule. Some scholars operate off a definition of the capitalist class as an all-
powerful and conscious actor constantly working to ensure their interests are protected, 
promoted, and advanced (Andrew 1983; Milliband 1969; Van Der Pijl 1984, 1998; Sklair 1995, 
2002; Robinson and Harris 2000; Robinson 2003). Others reject this conceptualization and 
instead highlight the structural conditions that supersede any actions pursued by the capitalist 
class to control the state (Poulantzas 1973; Offe 1974; Block 1977).  
These two dominant perspectives on the capitalist class represent an obvious and familiar 
binary to sociologists: structure v. agency. On one side is a perspective that advocates a view of a 
class-conscious and active capitalist class that is considered a ruling class of the “bourgeois 
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epoch.” This agent-centered perspective is meant to show the ways that the capitalist class was 
able to build power and take control of social institutions like the state and the family (Marx 
1848; Milliband 1969, 1977; Andrew 1983). After gaining control, scholars have then shown 
how the capitalist class attempts to maintain its power through institutions as well as ideological 
mechanisms, some even arguing that the capitalist class has taken on a global dimension, 
becoming a global ruling class or a transnational capitalist class (Sklair 1995, 2002; Robinson 
and Harris 2000; Robinson 2003). On the other end of this binary is attention to the power of 
structure and roles other actors play in maintaining capitalism as a system, challenging the notion 
of both a ruling and class-conscious capitalist class (Poulantzas 1973; Offe 1974; Block 1977). 
Calling attention to structure encourages an understanding that all actions and choices are 
constrained because of the existing patterns in society (Alford and Friedland 1985). 
Such a binary, however, presents theoretical and empirical difficulties for understanding 
the capitalist class. Because the structuralist position on the state (and, therefore, on the capitalist 
class) has come to dominate much Marxist thought in the past few decades, little Marxist 
analysis has been applied to understand the capitalist class as an organized entity. The exception 
to this is the research on the TCC, which focuses on the increasingly global dimensions of the 
capitalist class as a global ruling class. If structure is too centered in analysis, then there is also a 
danger of assuming that actions of individuals and groups have little impact on social structures, 
which makes any organized action meaningless. From a Marxist perspective, this not only has an 
impact on how capitalists are understood, but also how the potential of the working class is 
theorized. If capitalism is too powerful because of its structural mechanisms, then social change 
efforts may also be painted as obsolete, hopeless, and ineffective. For studies of capitalists in 
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particular, the study of capitalist organizations would seem inconsequential given these 
theoretical propositions from structural theorists.  
Additionally, both classical and structural Marxisms are narrow in their understandings of 
the purposes of class organizing for the capitalist class. Whether scholars have taken a classical 
or structural view of the activities of the capitalist class, these perspectives primarily focus on 
how the capitalist class attempts to organize for class rule of wider society and social institutions 
like the state. Scholars provide important theoretical arguments on the impacts and outcomes of 
capitalist organizing with most of these perspectives coming to the same conclusion that the 
capitalist class cannot be successful in the long-run because of the inherent contradictions of 
capitalism. This focus on the long-term impacts and potential success of capitalist organizing 
does not leave much room for analyzing other types of organizing purposes and the nuances of 
collective action pursued by the capitalist class. This also gets away from the core of Marxist 
thought: that class struggle defines the history of society. If class struggle defines society, then 
capitalists must be actively participating, struggling, and organizing in ways to protect and 
promote their interests. And while the inherent contradictions of capitalism as a system may 
eventually lead to its demise, it does not appear this way to capitalists. Instead, capitalists will 
continue to see, justify, and believe in the infallible tenets of capitalism that have been crafted 
through their own eyes and worldviews. And in doing so, they will organize in ways to promote 
and actualize their ideas, which is inherently connected to protecting their interests as a class. 
Understanding capitalists this way inspires new questions and empirical sites of study for 
Marxist scholars. Instead of only focusing on theoretical propositions of the inevitable failures of 
capitalism, Marxist perspectives can be utilized to better understand the ways that capitalists 
participate in class struggle and what types of organized efforts capitalists pursue in this struggle. 
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This is not meant to suggest that studies of capitalists should supersede other types of 
organizational studies such as those of the working class. Indeed, studies of the working class are 
connected to the tradition of Marxist political thought being “a guide to action” (Alford and 
Friedland 1985:286). I suggest that focusing on capitalist organizations and organizing 
processes can also connect to the political project of Marxist thought by shedding light on those 
efforts that capitalists pursue in order to protect themselves and perpetuate the wider system of 
capitalism as a whole. By focusing attention on capitalist organizations and organizing, Marxist 
scholars can show how the capitalist class pursues their own strategies within the larger historical 
process of class struggle. Indeed, without an examination of the many dimensions of the 
capitalist class, scholars may be missing important opportunities to contribute theoretical and 
empirical observations on the historical and contemporary efforts that capitalists participate in to 
support the continuation of the capitalist system.  
I suggest that trade associations and other types of capitalist organizations and organizing 
processes present a unique opportunity to provide some of these empirical observations, which 
can then support and challenge sweeping generalizations of the capitalist class that Marxian 
political economy often operates upon. In order to pursue these studies, however, some key 
assumptions about organizations and organizing as well as research questions must be identified 
to orient these studies. The next and final section of this chapter provides these assumptions 
about organizations and organizing from a Marxist perspective as well as the research questions 
that will be pursued in the case study of the trade association, the American Petroleum Institute. 
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A Marxian Framework of Organizational Studies: Understanding Trade Associations as Social 
Actors 
When considering types of political action and social change from a Marxist perspective, 
Alford and Friedland (1985), state “it is the organizational and individual levels of analysis that 
become important, but they are theoretically neglected or subordinated” because of the systemic 
and structural focus of most contemporary Marxist thought (286). Alford and Friedland (1985) 
highlight the importance of the organizational and individual analytical levels because it is here 
that scholars can test theoretical propositions about class struggle that are so central to Marxian 
analysis. And although Marxist perspectives typically focus on long historical and structural 
processes, it is necessary to engage with the individual and organizational levels to better 
understand how class struggle works in action within both the capitalist and working classes. 
Although there are not many studies of capitalist organizations through a Marxist lens, some 
scholars have provided key theoretical and analytical propositions on how to study organizations 
through a Marxist perspective. As a perspective rooted in class-based struggle in larger historical 
and structural contexts, a Marxist perspective provides new ways to understand all types of 
organizations. Of course, for purposes of this study, capitalist organizations, primarily trade 
associations, will be focused on. Given the ubiquity of capitalist organizations and organized 
efforts, however, a Marxian perspective is necessary to understand these organizations beyond a 
descriptive or cultural level. The studies on trade associations highlighted above from business 
and management studies scholars as well as the cultural sociology are prime example of why 
Marxian perspectives are essential to understanding these organizations beyond these levels.  
The first key theoretical assumption of organizations from a Marxist perspective connects 
organizations explicitly to class struggle as a process. Heydebrand (1977) argues that 
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organizations must be understood as the culmination of organizing for specific objectives. Still 
connected to class-based positions, this calls attention to the way class-specific groups form 
organizations and centers organizational formation in class struggle. From a Marxist perspective, 
organizations are understood as a part of an organizing process connected to class positions: 
It is not difficult to conceive of an “organization” – an established structure – as the 
outcome of organization as process – that is, of organizing activity. This outcome is not 
so much an accumulated material product or commodity as it is a social structure, a set of 
established social relations. (Heydebrand 1977:87) 
Such a perspective important for understanding organizations like trade associations that have 
such strong ties to the capitalist class. Unlike the cultural sociology perspective that serves as a 
foundation for Spillman’s analysis, a Marxist perspective on trade associations does not begin 
with attempting to understand how a concept like self-interest does or does not work through 
organizations like trade associations. Instead, a Marxist perspective connects individual 
businesspeople and organizations to an understanding that class struggle and, therefore, class-
based interests, are inherent parts of organizational formation as well as subsequent 
organizational activities.  
Further, Heydebrand (1977) explains: 
The historical character of the processes mediating between activity and outcome is 
particularly salient in the formation and transformation of organizations. Organizations 
are concrete social structures formally established for the purpose of achieving specific 
objectives. As such, organizations can be seen as objective historical outcomes of 
practical collective activity, especially activity organized around the production of 
material life and the reproduction of social life. (86; emphasis added) 
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When understood this way, organizations and organizational activities potentially take on new 
meanings, particularly when compared to the cultural sociology that anchors Spillman’s study 
and the atheoretical studies provided by business and management scholars. A Marxian view of 
organizations shows that individuals likely already have some forms of solidarity based upon 
their class positions instead of it being built after an organization is formed. With this 
perspective, then, the issue of why an organization like a trade association would be established 
in the first place has theoretical roots that are lacking in the above studies on trade associations. 
Trade associations are intimately connected to class struggle and must be understood as an 
outcome of recognition of common class positions. This also echoes perspectives on the 
subjective component of class, suggesting the process of building class consciousness goes hand-
in-hand in building organizations to achieve specific objectives as a class. 
 This assumption, then inspires a set of guiding questions centering on the importance of 
organizational formation and transformations and how these connect to class-based interests: 
• Why and under what conditions do trade associations form?  
• What processes do capitalists go through to establish trade associations?  
• How do capitalists understand this organizing process themselves?  
• What do trade associations represent to capitalists?  
Focusing attention on organizational formations and transformations provides insight into the 
decision-making that capitalists participate in and potentially how the capitalist class attempts to 
not only understand itself as a “class for itself,” but also how capitalist organize in attempts to 
become one. This dissertation takes seriously the process of organizational formation detailing 
the events that led to the creation of the American Petroleum Institute.  
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The second theoretical assumption of organizations from a Marxist perspective connects 
organizational activities to class struggle. Alford and Friedland (1985) explain that through a 
class-based perspective, “individual actions and organizational interests must be understood via 
the societal contradictions inherent in the class relations comprising a mode of production” 
(271). This means that, from a class-based perspective, individual decision-making or 
organizational activities cannot be understood in isolation. Instead, they are manifestations of 
class struggle within society. By calling attention to how individuals and organizations are 
inextricably linked to larger class dynamics in society, individuals and organizations become 
intertwined with long-standing class positions, which guide behavior and action particularly 
through organizations. Spillman’s concepts “disinterested solidarity” and “nonstrategic action” 
do not make sense from a Marxist perspective because they are explicitly disconnected from 
class-based interests. A Marxist perspective argues that when individuals form organizations, 
class locations are crucial parts of organizations as social actors and essential for understanding 
subsequent organizational activities. Organizational activities, then are another important 
window into how capitalists attempt to understand what is important for them to work on 
collectively as a class. Research questions inspired by this theoretical assumption are as follows: 
• Once created, what activities are pursued through trade associations?  
• How do these activities reflect class struggle and the pursuit of class-based 
interests?  
• What are the potential impacts and effects of trade association activities on 
(American) capitalist society? 
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By focusing on organizational activities, insight can be gained into the types of activities 
capitalist organizations perform, which also shows what issues capitalists believe they must work 
on collectively.  
Through the case study of API in the following chapters, I will show that trade 
associations then must be understood through a new conceptualization: trade associations are 
inherently capitalist organizations created to build and maintain the interests of the capitalist 
class. Such a conceptualization is a direct challenge to the cultural sociological perspective of 
Spillman and the atheoretical perspectives of business and management studies scholars. Before 
unpacking this conceptualization and exploring these questions in the case study of API, in the 
next chapter, I provide a brief methodological discussion of how I came to study API by 






 In order to explore research questions on the organizational inception and activities of the 
American Petroleum Institute, this dissertation relied on archival methods and qualitative data 
analysis to build an historical case study. In this chapter, I detail my research process and 
methods including data sources, data collection and organization, and analysis strategies.  
Research Process 
 This dissertation research began with fundamental questions about how the petroleum 
industry pursued political work through industry-funded organizations. The American Petroleum 
Institute piqued my interest after observing some of API’s work in my everyday life. It seemed 
somehow that API was everywhere: commercials on television and music streaming services 
advocating the use of natural gas, social media accounts sharing articles about “balanced” energy 
choices, stories and pictures of oil workers coupled with concerns about the loss of jobs if 
petroleum regulations were passed, “rallies” of petroleum industry workers opposing 
environmental regulations – all of these messages and images were a part of my daily reality. 
Having studied a coal industry-funded organization and its political and cultural activities for my 
Master’s thesis research, I suspected that these messages were industry-sponsored, which led me 
to research what organization (or perhaps organizations) was creating and distributing these 
messages. All roads, in one way or another, seemed to lead back to one organization: the 
American Petroleum Institute. In some of my preliminary examinations, I found API to be active 
not only on the airwaves and on the Internet, but also on the ground through lobbying and in 
Congressional hearings on policies related to the petroleum industry. One day while helping my 
sister change her oil, I saw a sticker on her car’s engine that indicated the part was certified by 
the American Petroleum Institute, leading me to later research and discover that API was also 
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responsible for creating and maintaining many internal industry standards. With all of these 
activities, I thought API would be an interesting organization to study for my dissertation 
research.  
I originally had intentions to study API from its inception to the present day with a focus 
on API’s organizational activities over time. I wanted to know how the organization shaped and 
maneuvered political and cultural spaces within and outside of the industry. Knowing that the 
organization was created in 1919, I believed that by examining and documenting its long history, 
much insight could be gained into how the organization was utilized by the petroleum industry to 
accomplish its goals. As I began data collection and learning more about the history of API, 
however, I took some steps backward and considered questions about collective action, business 
actors, and organizations. I was puzzled as to why economic competitors in the petroleum 
industry would agree to work on these collective projects or even form an organization like API 
in the first place. I interrogated some of my own assumptions that I had about the “collective” 
nature of the petroleum industry and began to develop broader questions of not only industry 
organizations and organizational work, but also industry organizing processes. 
Thus, I began to have more questions about how and why the organization was created, 
which then led me to study the petroleum industry prior to the creation of API. Reading the 
historical accounts of the industry during the 1800s showed that the industry environment was 
contentious and characterized by bitter divisions, with industry leaders showing no signs of 
becoming organized through a national and representative trade association. However, when API 
was created in 1919, industry leaders were enthusiastic about their new organization and the 
previous divisions among petroleum industry leaders were less pronounced. This change in 
industry dynamics among petroleum industry leaders suggested that something profound had 
 73 
changed in that short period. Thus, over the course of my investigations, my research became 
increasingly historical, which caused me to reevaluate my research parameters and pursue 
questions related not only to organizational activities, but also the way that organizations are 
created. 
These shifts in my research parameters also inspired new explorations of theoretical 
foundations for understanding trade associations as social actors. Existing literature on trade 
associations did not give much insight into the inception process of trade associations, which 
further piqued my interest in understanding how and why a trade association like API had 
emerged within the petroleum industry. These gaps in the literature required explorations of 
other theoretical orientations. Given that trade associations were representative of business 
communities, I began exploring Marxist political economy discussions of the capitalist class. I 
also surveyed Marxian organizational theory, which centered discussions on the particular actors 
that create and maintain organizations as well as the wider structural processes, particularly class 
struggle, that encourage organizations to form and act. In the case of trade association 
development, this meant centering capitalists as the primary instigators of trade associations. 
With these theoretical assumptions, I began to build my theory that trade associations could only 
be understood as capitalist organizations that are the culmination of recognition among 
capitalists of their collective, class-based interests. Studying the organizing processes among 
capitalists that go into the creation of trade associations is one way to understand the inherently 
capitalist roots of these organizations. Understanding the roots of trade associations through a 
Marxist lens also led me to see the work pursued through trade associations in a new light. These 
activities embodied class-based struggle and protection of class-based interests, with most if not 
all work pursued through trade associations returning to service the capitalist class.  
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Through this research process, I finally arrived at my research questions, which focused 
both on organizational inception as well as organizational activities of trade associations broadly. 
These research questions were as follows: 
Questions on organizational inception: 
• Why and under what conditions do trade associations form?  
• What processes do capitalists go through to establish trade associations?  
• How do capitalists understand this organizing process themselves?  
• What do trade associations represent to capitalists?  
Questions on organizational activities pursued through trade associations:  
• Once created, what activities are pursued through trade associations?  
• How do these activities reflect class struggle and the pursuit of class-based 
interests?  
• What are the potential impacts and effects of trade association activities on 
(American) capitalist society? 
Data Sources 
In order to answer these questions, I sought a variety of data on API and the history of the 
petroleum industry. Data for this study came from both primary and secondary sources. All data 
sources for this dissertation were publically available.  
Primary sources for this dissertation include both traditional and digital archives of self-
produced API documents, petroleum and other industry trade journals, and government reports. 
Traditional archives of self-produced API documents were accessed at a special collection at the 
Smithsonian National Museum of American History in Washington, D.C. The archives contain 
119 boxes, which amounted to over 4,500 documents, photographs, films, and reports of API 
 75 
(Smithsonian 2017). The API archives located at the Smithsonian provided rich data on the 
organization’s work including a wide range of materials such as memos, film scripts, 
promotional brochures, videos, and photographs, from API’s inception in 1919 to the year 1990. 
The collection was donated by the American Petroleum Institute in 1999 and is titled “American 
Petroleum Institute Photograph and Film Collection” (Smithsonian 2017). Per the Smithsonian’s 
terms of use for archives, I was able to take high-resolution digital pictures of each document of 
interest for this research. I stored each picture on a password protected external hard drive. These 
data were collected over four ten-day trips to D.C. in the fall of 2014 and spring and summer of 
2015. 
Digital primary sources of API consisted of live and archived websites, including the API 
website, API campaign websites, and API social media websites. As data sources, websites are 
understood as digital spaces of institutional memory, containing original born-digital sources 
essential for organizational research (Pudrovska and Ferree 2004; Rice 2010; East 2012).  Today, 
websites serve as a clearinghouse for information production and distribution of organizational 
identity, purpose, and activities, which are all essential for understanding capitalist organizing 
and organizations. Websites can also be understood as spaces of institutional memory, often 
containing familiar documents, such as press releases, mission statements, and newsletters, 
which are all useful for organizational research. New types of “documents” specific to the 
Internet, such as web pages and blogs, are also contained on websites. Websites hold other types 
of visual media such as promotional flyers, full-length commercials, educational videos, and 
pictures from events. Both the archived and live websites of API contained organizational 
information from 1996 to 2017. Archives of the API website were accessed via the Internet 
Archive’s Wayback Machine, a website archive database available for public use. The Wayback 
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Machine contains over 485 billion web pages archived from 1996 to the present year, but its 
content is not systematic or comprehensive (Internet Archive 2017a). API’s website was 
archived extensively by the Internet Archive and is available through the Wayback Machine, 
with over 23,000 unique webpages of API’s website (Internet Archive 2017b). These pages span 
from 1996 to 2017 and were of particular importance to the final empirical chapter of the 
dissertation.   
API’s current website as well as API’s current social media accounts also served as 
original digital sources for this project. Although exact counts for the live website of API, API’s 
campaigns, and API’s social media accounts cannot be as easily determined as the archived sites, 
these pages and accounts contain site-maps which provide estimates for the amount of webpages. 
In 2017, the main API website has over 300 unique webpages and each of the campaign websites 
is estimated to contain over 30 unique webpages. Social media accounts vary in their original 
source materials, but have been consistently utilized since 2009 and continue to be an important 
space of work for organizations like the API today (Walker 2009).  
For the historical analysis that now comprises the bulk of the dissertation, two API 
documents that were of particular importance are the personal written reflections from two key 
API staff members, Leonard Fanning and Stephen P. Potter. Fanning served as the first director 
of Publicity and Statistics of API in the 1920s and stayed with the organization until his 
retirement in the 1950s, working primarily in public relations. Fanning was also a writer for 
some petroleum trade magazines prior to his employment with API. Stephen P. Potter served as 
API staff from the 1940s to the 1980s, working his way up in the organization in both the public 
affairs and government relations in API, eventually becoming the Senior Vice President of API 
focused on Public Affairs. Both men produced documents over 100 pages, which served as 
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windows into organizational activities during their time with the organization. Fanning’s work 
focused on the inception period of API until the late 1950s. Potter’s reflection focused on the 
inception period as well but primarily focused on the creation and work of the public relations 
department within API. This meant that the bulk of Potter’s work focused on the 1930s to the 
late 1980s. Each of these documents provided insights into how programs developed within API 
and some of the organizational work accomplished through the organization through the eyes of 
senior staff members of API.  
In cross-checking the histories between these two pieces, the primary difference was the 
different focuses on organizational history. Fanning was primarily interested in how the early 
activities within the trade association got started, showing insights into the meetings that created 
API and API’s subsequent programs, particularly in the 1920s. He also focused heavily on the 
personal histories of API’s initial leadership often giving insights into personality traits and 
individual motivations for what drove leaders within API to make some of their decisions about 
programming in the organization. Potter’s take was different, with his focus primarily on the 
intricate planning that went in to organizational development. In order to verify some of the 
organizational history by Potter and Fanning, I cross-checked with secondary sources as well as 
other primary sources such as trade journals and newspaper stories to verify that activities were 
actually unfolding in the ways that were reported in the personal histories. Although Fanning and 
Potter seemed to romanticize some of their reflections, the information related to the 
organizational activities appeared to be accurate, which gave me confidence in their 
organizational histories as data sources.  
Petroleum industry trade journals served as another primary source of data for this 
research. Content within these journals was particularly important for understanding the 
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organizing processes that went into the creation of API. These journals included speeches, 
editorials, report-backs from industry-wide meetings and conferences as well as personal 
reflections and quotes from industry leaders during the early 1900s. There were many different 
trade journals during this time. After examining the content of some of these journals, I elected 
to primarily utilize two journals, Oildom and National Petroleum News (NPN). These two 
journals were important and had wide distribution, but I primarily selected them because they 
were digitally archived and easily accessible. I collected all available journal issues from 1916 to 
1925. Oildom published monthly editions while NPN published monthly editions in 1916 and 
then moved to weekly editions in 1917. Oildom monthly editions ranged from 40 to 60 pages. 
Monthly and weekly NPN editions were 80 to 100 pages long. It was also useful to have two 
different journals to cross-check if there were discrepancies in the information provided within 
the journals.  
Some discrepancies between the two journals became evident. NPN clearly had a bend 
towards “Independent” petroleum concerns, which was primarily reflected in the editorials of the 
journal as well as the selection of what stories or events to report on. Oildom, though less overt 
about its allegiance, bent towards providing a more friendly view of Standard Oil. The 
significance of this division within the industry will be explained further in the next chapter. 
However, this division between the two journals did not have much impact on the types of data 
that I accessed for the case study. This was because I was primarily utilized the trade journals to 
access speeches and information about events within the industry during and immediately 
following World War I. Each journal would often publish the speeches in full and report-backs 
on industry meetings and activities were often very similar. However, knowing the discrepancy 
between the journals, I still cross-checked them to ensure that speeches were not edited or no 
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important information was left out. Occasionally, I would also consult a third petroleum industry 
journal, The Oil & Gas Journal, to further rule out major discrepancies.  
Although the dissertation focuses on API, another organization, the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, which was established in 1912 also became of interest, particularly due to its role in 
shaping the petroleum industry coordination during WWI, as I describe in chapters 5 and 6. I 
utilized the Chamber’s publication, Nation’s Business, to access similar information that was 
found in the petroleum trade journals such as speeches and conference report-backs. I collected 
all monthly editions from 1917, 1918, and 1919 in order to garner an understanding of how the 
Chamber was utilized during and after the war. Each monthly edition ranged from 50 to 100 
pages.  
Two major government reports available online were analyzed to understand the creation 
of industry advisory committees during WWI. The first was titled A Report from the Director of 
the Council of National Defense and of its Advisory Commission to the Chairman of the Council, 
which was 50 pages in length. The other was American Industry In the War: A Report of the War 
Industries Board which was 434 pages. Each of these publications gave direct insight from the 
government officials and industry leaders that were tapped to serve on committees to delivery 
war supplies which, as the case study will show, were major parts of bringing industry leaders 
together and would have impacts on industry organizing following the war. 
 Secondary sources for this dissertation were historical accounts of the petroleum industry 
broadly and API specifically. A two-volume set actually commissioned by the American 
Petroleum Institute was an immense resource of petroleum industry history. The volumes, The 
American Petroleum Industry 1859-1899: The Age of Illumination and The American Petroleum 
Industry 1899-1959: The Age of Energy, each provided insight into the early development of the 
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petroleum industry both technically and organizationally. The first volume was written by 
historians Harold F. Williamson and Arnold R. Daum in 1959. The second was also written by 
Williamson and Daum with the addition of Ralph L. Andreano and Gilbert C. Klose, who had 
served as research associates on the first volume. API provided the funding for the study. 
However, the authors provided a note in both volumes that “[i]t was clearly understood that the 
authors were to have complete freedom in conducting their research and preparing the 
manuscript for publication” (Williamson and Daum 1959:ix). The historical treatment of the 
industry was primarily focused on the technological development, the expansion of the industry 
over time, and economic conditions within the industry. However, there was also much insight 
into the way that petroleum industry leaders interacted with one another as well as how industry 
leaders maneuvered these changing technological, economic, and political climates that impacted 
the industry as individuals and through organizations. Curiously, between the two volumes, API 
itself is only mentioned a total of eleven times. When API was mentioned, it was primarily in 
passing or with a brief note about the development of a new standard or mention of the founding 
of the organization. It is unclear if this was part of an agreement that the API had with the 
researchers or if API was just not of much interest to the parameters of the project for the 
historians. However, I still found the overall treatment of the industry’s history to be accurate, 
particularly when I cross-checked against other secondary sources and some of the primary 
sources listed above. 
 Daniel Yergin’s (1991) The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power, also 
served as a crucial secondary source for this dissertation. Yergin’s broad history of the global 
development of the industry provided unique insights into some of the conditions of the industry, 
particularly prior to the creation of API. Yergin’s historical treatment of the industry weaved 
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personal stories in with global trends, giving interesting context to the development of the 
industry as a major force across the globe. Like the above two volumes, however, Yergin’s 
coverage of API was also slim, with the trade association mentioned only on four pages in the 
book. However, given Yergin’s global emphasis and on individual firms within the industry, the 
little focus on API as a US institution was not surprising. 
 Gerald D. Nash’s (1968) work United States Oil Policy 1890-1964 provided a different 
perspective, focusing on evolving state relationships to the U.S. petroleum industry over time. 
Although Nash takes a pluralist position on the state, his insights into the way that different U.S. 
presidential administrations handled the development of petroleum industry policy gave essential 
historical context, particularly during WWI. Although I came to different conclusions about the 
state and industry relationships, particularly during the inception period of the organization, he 
did provide some of the best available data on some of the early state relationships to the 
industry, which set me off in the right direction to study the inception of the organization. 
 One secondary source specifically studying API that was instrumental to this study was 
Joseph A. Pratt’s (1983) article on the early organizational development of API. In his piece 
titled “Creating Coordination in the Modern Petroleum Industry: The American Petroleum 
Institute and the Emergence of Secondary Organizations in Oil,” Pratt unpacks how some of 
API’s programs were developed in the 1920s. Pratt, an economist, was granted access by API 
staff to internal organizational materials, particularly the minutes of meetings for many different 
API departments as well as memos sent among API leadership during the organization’s early 
years. Although some data like this were found in the Smithsonian archive I describe above, 
Pratt’s data was much more extensive than what I was able to access virtually or through the 
Smithsonian collection. This made his article all the more crucial to my study, which utilized 
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many of Pratt’s insights and quotes from this data, particularly in the first part of Chapter 7 but 
also throughout the case study.  
Data Organization and Analysis 
As I collected the above data, I began the first step of data organization by organizing the 
data by year. Because the dissertation was designed as an historical case study, organizing the 
data by year allowed a quick way to garner a first read of the data and start an effective 
organizational system, which was necessary because of the sheer volume of data utilized in this 
study.  
After data collection was completed, I then returned to each year and started my analysis. 
I used a multi-step process of coding and thematic textual analysis to build the historical case 
study focused on the historical development of capitalist organizing in the U.S. petroleum sector 
(Aronson 1994; Boyatzis 1998; Attride-Stirling 2001; Yin 2014). Aronson (1994) states that 
“[t]hematic analysis focuses on identifiable themes and patterns of living and/or behavior” (1). 
For this study, thematic analysis techniques were useful for developing a systemic process for 
analysis of the data collected and the development of the descriptive, historical framework of the 
case.  
To begin my analysis, I started with my research questions (listed above), which were 
derived from literature on trade associations and Marxian organizational theory. Emerson, Fretz, 
and Shaw (1995) suggest that focusing on initial research questions helps to facilitate the 
generation of codes and themes, which are then further refined into coherent and comprehensive 
categories useful for writing up results. Through this initial coding phase, I selected passages and 
quotes from the data that fit within my initial coding scheme and created a database to organize 
the data. I kept the data organized by year to ensure the historical nature of the case was 
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preserved. Through another round of coding, I further refined my codes and themes according to 
time period to see how capitalists in the petroleum sector were organizing to protect their class-
based interests. Clear historical trends emerged, which culminated as the overarching content of 
each of the chapters of the case study. Through this process, I developed the descriptive and 
historical framework for the case (Yin 2014), and organized the data into the four historical 




Historical Background: The Petroleum Industry of 1870-1911: Organized 
Division, Competition, and Cutthroat Practices 
 
The decision to create an organization such as a trade association is one important way 
that capitalists recognize pursue action to ensure their collective ability to continue to accumulate 
profit. As highlighted in the literature review on trade associations, however, little research has 
examined the impetus to create trade associations and, thus, the roots of these organizations are 
rarely discussed when considering the purposes and subsequent work these organizations pursue 
on behalf of wider industries and business communities. The most significant recent sociological 
work seeks to understand these organizations as social actors (Spillman 2012), but elides the 
essential question of organizational emergence: how and why do trade associations form? 
Without such a focus, scholars may underestimate the political and cultural power of these 
organizations within their individual sectors as well as in the broader economic, political, and 
cultural spheres in which they pursue work to accomplish collective goals. By examining the 
events and circumstances that lead to the creation of a trade association, more insight into the 
fundamental roots of these important organizations can be understood, which can shed light on 
the social significance of these organizations as social actors in modern society.  
In this chapter, I begin to build my argument that trade associations are inherently 
capitalist organizations created to build and maintain the interests of the capitalist class. Such a 
conceptualization challenges characterizations of trade associations as organizations that build 
and maintain “disinterested solidarity” in the business community and are organizations that 
serve primarily as meaning-making spaces for particular segments of the business community. 
Although some of the work performed within trade associations may appear disinterested, the 
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very roots of trade associations are centered on a collective understanding of the need to protect 
and promote the collective identity and interests of an industry as a whole. 
In order to fully understand trade association creation from a Marxist perspective, it is 
first necessary to understand the historical conditions of organizational emergence. This chapter 
provides such an historical background for the petroleum industry. To understand why the 
establishment of a trade association like API was crucial for the petroleum industry and why this 
particular trade association was a markedly different organization both symbolically and 
organizationally for the petroleum industry at this time, I examine the state of the industry in the 
mid-1800s and early 1900s. Industry leaders during this time attempted to utilize economic 
regulatory practices and organized efforts through sub-sector specific trade associations to 
stabilize the growing and seemingly unruly industry. Instead of leading to stability and more 
industry cooperation, the industry environment was primarily characterized by bitter divisions, 
secrecy, and cutthroat practices (Ise 1926; Fanning 1959; Yergin 1991). Some scholars attribute 
this environment and divided industry to a combination of factors including rapid technological 
and industrial innovation, increased demand for petroleum products, and the uniqueness of the 
extraction process and transport of petroleum (Ise 1927; Williamson and Daum 1959; Nash 
1968). Thus, from these perspectives, the dominant narrative of the period from the mid-1800s to 
the early 1900s is one of an industry going through the maturation process with industry 
instability being an expected growing pain (Ise 1927; Nash 1968). However, attributing an 
unstable economic environment to technological innovation and development misses a more 
complex understanding of how industry leaders were involved in shaping the industry’s 
economic environment. That is, such a narrative is devoid of the actual active planning and 
 86 
choices made by petroleum industry leaders attempting to accomplish individual and collective 
goals. 
The following sections document these organizational and economic mechanisms utilized 
by petroleum industry leaders in attempts to stabilize and organize the industry for collective and 
individual benefit. These experiences show intense intra-class struggles during this time, which 
famously marked the industry in its early days. 
Organizing for Industry Stability and Industry Control: Early Organized Efforts in the 
U.S. Petroleum Industry, 1870s 
The period of the mid-1800s to the early 1900s was a time of great organizational and 
economic experimentation within the petroleum industry, where industry leaders were constantly 
working on individual and collective initiatives in an effort to stabilize the industry. From a 
Marxist perspective, this can be understood as the beginnings of a recognition of class-based 
interests within a particular industrial sector as industry leaders were interested in securing 
stability in their industry to ensure profitability across the industry. The results of these efforts, 
however, inspired deep divisions within the industry as some individuals pursued their own self-
interests with little regard for the collective. To understand why the establishment of API was 
seen as a turning point for the industry, it is essential to examine the impacts and effects of both 
the collective and individual organizational efforts in detail. 
Prior to this period of organizational and economic experimentation, the petroleum 
industry was characterized by rapid growth, lack of coordination, and unruly competition. After 
the Civil War, the ways in which petroleum was beginning to be commodified and the growth of 
petroleum markets produced unstable competition and wild price swings in the petroleum sector. 
As Williamson and Daum explain: 
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Producers, refiners, and marketers all operated overwhelmingly on an individual or 
partnership basis. Little capital was required to enter any phase of the industry and 
competition was vigorous at all levels… 
Lack of balance between various segments of the industry appeared to be chronic; crude 
production, refinery capacity and throughput, and market demand were rarely in 
equilibrium. First, production would outrun throughput by refineries; then manufacturing 
capacity would exceed either current crude production or the rate at which refined 
products could be absorbed by the market. These more or less continuous maladjustments 
were reflected in wide fluctuations in prices of crude and refined products. 
(Williamson and Daum 1959:343-344) 
Yergin (1991) further details these experiences and describes this period as a time of “wild price 
fluctuations and frequent collapse” (39). Additionally, overproduction also marked era in the 
industry: 
Towards the end of the 1860s, as overproduction caused prices to plummet again, the 
new industry went into a depression. The reason was simple – too many wells and too 
much oil. The refiners were hit no less than the producers. Between 1865 and 1870, the 
retail price of kerosene fell by more than half. It was estimated that refining capacity was 
three times greater than the market’s need. (39-40) 
Although many discussions of petroleum sector have focused on the concept of scarcity, the 
history of the industry actually shows that the core problem of the sector has long been supply 
gluts (Labban 2008; Bridge and Le Billon 2013). The mid-1800s display this as well, with 
overproduction leading the unstable markets.  
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As a response to this economic environment of overproduction crises, by the 1870s, 
petroleum industry leaders began to show interest in working together to create a more stable 
market. They recognized that they had common concerns about industry stability and began 
showing interest in economic planning through an emerging type of organization: trade 
associations. Petro-capitalists thus began planning to implement economic mechanisms to 
address overproduction, which included price agreements, agreed upon shutdown periods of 
production, pooling of crude supplies, and voluntary agreements with other sectors (such as the 
railroads) for rebates on shipping. To facilitate these various plans, petroleum leaders established 
regional and/or sub-sector specific (i.e. refiners, producers, marketers) trade associations that 
worked out agreed upon prices or production quotas (Williamson and Daum 1959; Nash 1968; 
Yergin 1991). Thus, during this time, there was a belief among industry leaders that with 
economic planning through organizations the industry could potentially be more stable for all 
sectors. 
 Their efforts echo classic Marxian understandings of recognition of class interests. Seeing 
that agreements on prices or pooling of crude oil and planning could help to stabilize the 
industry, industry leaders began to organize into trade associations. Heydebrand (1977) argues 
that organizations are formed for specific class-based objectives, and during the early 1870s, 
trade associations were created primarily along lines of sub-sectors in the industry and 
occasionally in specific geographic regions in order to advance economic mechanisms that they 
believed would help create stability for their sub-sectors. For example, the National Refiners’ 
Association was established in 1872 for petroleum refiners as “a representative body covering 
five districts, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, the Oil Regions, New York, and Philadelphia” (Williamson 
and Daum 1959:357). To achieve equal representation, the association’s board of directors was 
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made up of three men from each of the five districts and was “responsible for general policies, 
including the purchases of crude and sales of refined” (Williamson and Daum 1959:357). 
However, instead of stabilizing the industry and fostering a more cooperative environment, these 
efforts ironically culminated in a competitive and secretive industry environment often pitting 
different sub-sectors of the industry against one another (Williamson and Daum 1959; Kolko 
1963; Nash 1968; Yergin 1991). While these organizations still represented capitalist class 
interests, there were cleavages within the class based on allegiances to their specific sub-sectors 
and regions or, in other words, based on their specific relationships to the means of production. 
For example, in direct response to the creation of the National Refiners’ Association, petroleum 
producers revived their own dormant association, the Petroleum Producers’ Association, in 1872 
to counter potentially economically harmful agreements the refiners might organize. Producers 
feared that they would be at the mercy of the refiners in setting prices for crude oil (Williamson 
and Daum 1959). In response to this fear, the first task of the revived producers’ association in 
September of 1872 was a producers’ strike. Williamson and Daum (1959) explain that through 
the association, petroleum producers: 
… set out to enlist the support of every man in the Regions to agree to stop drilling for 
six months… The theory was that with no new [production] wells coming in would drop 
off sufficiently to restore higher prices for crude. (Williamson and Daum 1959:358) 
The plan worked. Prices of crude climbed over the next few months from $3.15 a barrel to $4.17 
(Williamson and Daum 1959:358). In order to further stabilize the price of crude, petroleum 
producers transformed their trade association into a stockpiling organization called the Petroleum 
Producers’ Agency. This Agency aimed to buy all available crude at $5.00 per barrel. “Oil that 
could not be marketed at this price was to be stored while the Agency took additional steps to cut 
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back production or, if necessary, establish its own refineries to maintain prices” (Williamson and 
Daum 1959:358).  
Although the Producers’ Agency never went so far as to create their own refineries, the 
threat of this action as well as effectively creating a pool of crude oil and a stable price for crude 
at $5.00 per barrel caught the attention of the Refiner’s Association. Representatives of the 
Refiners’ Association soon got in touch with the producers to make another agreement. The 
refiners proposed that the producers could set the price of crude “provided proper steps were 
taken to maintain them” (Williamson and Daum 1959:358). In December of 1872, an agreement 
was reached between the two associations: 
The producers were to sell only through their association while the refiners were to buy 
only from the producers and in such amounts as were mutually decided upon. A base 
price of $4.00 per barrel was established, with the provision that if refined oil sold in 
New York at 26 cents per gallon, no further amount was to be paid to the Producers’ 
group. But with each advance of 1 cent per gallon in the price of refined, refiners would 
add 25 cents per barrel to the price of crude until it reached $5.00. (Williamson and 
Daum 1959:358-359)6 
However, only weeks later in mid-January of 1873, it was clear to both associations that the plan 
would not work. On the producers’ side, the Producers’ Agency was not able to stabilize 
production because they could not effectively enforce the suspension of the drilling for new 
wells (Williamson and Daum 1959). And the refiners, in response to the heightened production, 
were unable to maintain the price at the $4.00 per barrel agreement. Instead, the price of crude 
dropped to $2.00 a barrel in early 1873. Additionally, refiners and producers were both selling 
                                                
6 One barrel contains 42 gallons of oil, a standard set in 1872 by the Petroleum Producers’ Association (Yergin 
1991). 
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and buying outside of the channels setup between the associations, effectively creating enough 
competition to make participants in both associations discontinue their own participation in the 
agreements. By spring, both sub-sector specific trade associations were effectively disbanded, 
returning the industry to the familiar fluctuations of markets and instability in all sub-sectors of 
the industry. 
Such strategies pursued by these petroleum trade associations echo the “economic 
regulatory activities” highlighted in Weberian understandings of trade associations, which were 
criticized by Spillman (2012) as being ineffective, particularly in the United States. Indeed, from 
the surface, it appears that this assessment is justified as the associations were unable to deliver 
on the agreements made to limit output and maintain floor prices of crude and refined oil for the 
members of the trade associations. However, when set in a Marxian context, these activities 
represent different kinds of failures: a failed recognition of wider class interests, the failed 
actualization of class consciousness, and failure of capitalists to act collectively as a “class for 
itself.” Marxian theories of capitalist class consciousness, especially in those versions that argue 
that consciousness is not needed for collective action, do not provide much explanation for 
failures such as these. It is necessary then to consider these efforts as part of an organizing 
process, where capitalists were attempting to work together to ensure a collective ability to 
succeed in their particular sub-sectors. Although these agreements aimed to stabilize the 
production and price of crude oil, they failed primarily because of lack of buy-in from a majority 
of individuals in the sub-sectors. Defectors within each of the sub-sectors found channels outside 
of these agreements, which contributed to production levels rising and prices dropping. These 
strategies also resonate with some of the criticisms of the capitalist class from structural Marxists 
in that the capitalist class is unable to plan past their short-term interests, with members of the 
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capitalist class unable to agree to planning or organizing for their long-term interests (Offe 1974; 
Block 1977). However, the creation of trade associations such during this time does suggest that 
there was an effort to consider and plan for long-term stability for the industry.  
Many of the other pools, price agreements, and shutdown agreements during this period 
also failed, particularly as more and more oil was being discovered and new competitors entered 
the industry (Ise 1926; Williamson and Daum 1959). Supply continued to exceed demand with 
little sign that agreements within the petroleum industry could foster a more stable environment 
for all firms and sub-sectors in the industry (Yergin 1991). 
The Age of Monopoly: Standard Oil and its Impacts on the Industry, 1870s-1911 
However, not all petroleum firms were comfortable with the instability of the industry. 
Instead of pursuing efforts through collective organizations like trade associations, one firm 
began to stake ground to actualize their own plans for industry control, which would at least 
create stability for its own group of petro-capitalists. One of the most notorious petroleum firms 
of this period, Standard Oil, was a central figure in shaping the economic and organizational 
environment of the industry precisely because of the way that firm leadership maneuvered and 
shaped this environment to their advantage. Already a big player in the refining sector by the 
early 1870s, Standard interests were essential to the conversations and planning across the 
industry and were initially active participants in these collective efforts to stabilize the industry. 
Standard leadership shared concerns with other industry leaders about the state of the industry, 
particularly because of falling profit margins (Yergin 1991). President of Standard Oil, John D. 
Rockefeller, even served as the president of the National Refiners’ Association highlighted 
above, actively participating in planning sessions and agreements with leaders from other sectors 
in the industry (Williamson and Daum 1959; Yergin 1991).   
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However, Rockefeller and other Standard leadership were skeptical of these organized 
efforts and had little trust in the abilities of other petroleum industry leaders to make lasting 
impacts on the whole industry through voluntary agreements and trade associations. Rockefeller 
would later characterize early petroleum trade associations that he participated in as “ropes of 
sand” (Nevins 1953:99). As a leader in the refining sector, Rockefeller was particularly skeptical 
of reaching working agreements with petroleum producers because of what he perceived as a 
lack of planning or interest in considering wider industry health and stability. Yergin (1991) 
explains: 
Moreover, there were far, far too many producers to organize any meaningful restraints. 
Estimates of producing firms in the Oil Regions in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century ranged as high as sixteen thousand. Many of the producers were speculators, 
others were farmers, and many of them, whatever their backgrounds, were highly 
individualistic and unlikely to take “a long view” and think of the common good, even if 
a workable plan had presented itself. Rockefeller, with his passion for order, looked with 
revulsion at the chaos and scramble among the producers. “The Oil Regions,” he later 
said with acid disdain, “was a mining camp.” (42) 
It was not only producers that Rockefeller thought were short-sighted, though. He was also 
doubtful of other petroleum refiners and their ability to work together to create more stability in 
the industry within the refining sector. Of other industry refiners and their business abilities, 
Rockefeller offered the following observation:  
It was apparent to me early in the organization of the Refiners’ Association that among so 
many men untrained in business there were many who could not be relied upon to aid in 
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solving a problem so difficult as the reformation my associates and I sought to bring 
about in this industry… (Nevins 1953:99) 
For Rockefeller then, the efforts to bring together other sectors of the industry seemed useless 
because of the unruliness, large numbers, and overall lack of focus and interest from the 
producers. Additionally, his lack of trust in the abilities of other refiners to reach voluntary 
agreements meant that he believed even his own sector could not effectively organize to achieve 
industry stability. So, instead of working on collective efforts across the various industry sectors, 
Rockefeller and his associates began to pursue what Rockefeller simply referred to as “our plan” 
(Nevins 1953). And this plan was meant to achieve not industry stability, but to monopolize 
industry control (Williamson and Daum 1959; Yergin 1991). 
Williamson and Daum (1959) explain that for Standard executives, “the immediate 
objective [of “our plan”] was to bring the great bulk of the industry’s refining capacity under the 
ownership or control of Standard” (368). To achieve that control, Rockefeller and his associates 
believed that integration of the refining sector under what Yergin (1991) refers to as “one giant 
combination” would be more effective for Standard’s interests than other efforts being pursued at 
this time. Yergin (1991) explains that Rockefeller and his associates believed that “[a]n actual 
combination would do what a mere pool or association could not: eliminate excess capacity, 
suppress wild fluctuations of price – and, indeed, save the business” (40). Thus, by turning away 
from the more cooperative efforts being pursued by other petro-capitalists during this time, 
Standard began to set a more individualized path towards wider industry control to ensure that 
their own interests were secured. In effect, this plan set in motion the creation of the monopoly 
structure that Standard Oil would become infamous for. 
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To accomplish this plan, Rockefeller and his associates began work to acquire as much of 
the refining sector of the petroleum industry as possible. Although Rockefeller was skeptical of 
the actual utility and efficiency of trade associations, participation in the refiners’ trade 
association proved to be essential for Rockefeller because of the contacts he made with other 
refiners across other oil regions: 
His role in the National Refiners’ Association had brought him into close contact with the 
leading refiners in the Regions, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and New York. He was 
confident that these individuals could be persuaded to join or sell out to Standard; their 
co-operation would open the way for the absorption of the rest (Williamson and Daum 
1959:368) 
And with these contacts and a plan of integration in place, Rockefeller and his associates set off 
to acquire more and more firms for Standard control.   
Standard associates took multiple approaches to their buy-outs. At first, contact and 
negotiation with competing refiners were centered on civility and persuasion: 
Rockefeller and his associates would approach their targets with deference, politeness, 
and flattery. They would demonstrate how profitable Standard Oil was compared with 
other refiners, many of which were struggling through hard times. Rockefeller himself 
would use all his own considerable talent for persuasion in the pursuit of a friendly 
acquisition. (Yergin 1991:42) 
But if firm leadership were unwilling to come into the Standard fold through these efforts, other 
tactics would be pursued: 
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If all that failed, Standard would bring a tough competitor to heel by making him “feel 
sick” or, as Rockefeller put it, by giving him “a good sweating.” Standard would cut 
prices in that particular market, forcing the competitor to operate at a loss.  
The Standard men, moving in great secrecy, operated through firms that appeared to be 
independent to the outside world, but had in fact become part of the Standard Group. 
Many refiners never knew that their local competitors, which were cutting prices and 
putting other pressures on them, were actually part of Rockefeller’s growing empire… 
Rockefeller never wavered in his defense of the secrecy of his operations. (Yergin 
1991:42-43) 
In pursuit of their plan for control of the petroleum industry, Standard Oil also invoked other 
practices in pursuit of their plan for control of the petroleum industry:  
Railroad rebates, suppression of competition through monopoly of pipe lines, unfair 
discrimination in sales, bribery and corruption of rival employees, of railroad employees, 
and perhaps of legislators, have been common Standard practices. The records show that 
there is almost no unfair business practice of which it has not been guilty. (Ise 1925:235) 
In addition to all of these tactical moves and economic mechanisms to bring more and 
more of the petroleum industry’s refining sector under Standard’s control, Rockefeller also had 
to reorganize Standard Oil in order to legally operate all of these firms in various states. Because 
the firm was chartered in Ohio (and thus, under Ohio jurisdiction), it could only legally hold 
stock and own refining plants within the state of Ohio. In order to expand, Standard leadership 
elected to reorganize the firm into a trust. Because of the more flexible legal parameters on the 
trust structure, the Standard organization could now legally expand their holdings outside of 
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Ohio. Williamson and Daum (1959) also note that this structure had another advantage for 
Standard leadership: 
… the trustee device had the further advantage of maintaining a “veil of secrecy” over 
Standard’s acquisitions. By following a strict legal interpretation of the role of the 
trustees – that they were not owners and were acting simply on behalf of stockholders 
and not for the corporation – offices from Rockefeller on down could deny under oath 
that Standard of Ohio either owned or controlled other properties. (467) 
Rockefeller and his associates now not only had the economic power to control much of the 
petroleum industry, but ensured, at least for the time being, that their continued acquirement of 
properties and overall expansion in the industry could continue in a legal manner.  
Standard’s work to implement “our plan” appeared to be a success. By the early 1880s, 
Standard “either owned or had under lease over 90 per cent of the total refining investments in 
the United States” (Williamson and Daum 1959). This level of control over refining capacity 
continued over the next ten years through 1899 (Kolko 1963). Standard also made strides to 
control as much of the transport of oil by fostering secret rebates from the major U.S. railroads 
(Ise 1926; Williamson and Daum 1959; Kolko 1963). Williamson and Daum (1959) succinctly 
describe Standard’s overarching control of the industry during this time and its impacts: 
In building a horizontal combination at the refining level backed by a virtual monopoly 
over the transport and handling of crude, Rockefeller and his associates brought a 
profound change in the competitive structure of the American petroleum industry. As the 
principal buyer and shipper of the output of the Regions, the Standard management was 
in a position to exert a major influence on prices and the volume of petroleum that moved 
from producers through the refineries and into distribution. This power in itself was 
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sufficient to make Standard’s operations highly profitable. (Williamson and Daum 
1959:429) 
These ruthless practices and hunger for strong control within the industry also had impacts on 
perception of Standard Oil both within and outside of the industry. Yergin (1991) explains: 
Standard’s critics saw a powerful, devious, cruel, entrenched, all-pervasive, and yet 
mysterious enterprise. It was accountable to no one except a handful of arrogant 
directors, and it mercilessly tried to destroy all who stood in its way (96). 
Thus, Standard’s growing notoriety and reaction to their tactics served to heighten distrust and 
bitterness in an already unstable and divided industry.  
As Standard executives pursued their goals of expansion, the collective efforts and 
desires to stabilize the entire industry through cooperative, associational efforts began to 
crumble. Instead, many firms turned their attention towards protecting themselves against 
Standard (Williamson and Daum 1959). Some of these efforts centered on passing state 
legislation to address low prices of crude oil or high costs of transportation and storage. Other 
efforts focused on organizing through sector-specific trade associations to actively oppose the 
practices of Standard or at least present a united front to negotiate with the expanding petroleum 
giant. Those petroleum firms not associated with Standard Oil referred to themselves as 
“independent” companies and worked throughout the late 1800s pursuing economic and political 
channels to protect their interests against Standard’s expanding operations.  
Over time, existing divisions within the industry amplified and instilled not only 
divisions based on sectors but also cultural and ideological reference points for industry leaders 
to rally around. Although Spillman (2012) contends that trade associations produce cultural 
categories, experiences in the petroleum industry suggest that these cultural categories already 
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exist prior to the establishment of trade associations and that other processes and collective 
experiences encourage trade association establishment. For example, in 1888, after failing to 
pass a bill to reduce storage charges (which producers believed were impacting the price of crude 
oil), petroleum producers in Pennsylvania established the Producers’ Protective Association, a 
trade association which, as seen through the following passage from the organization’s mission 
statement, had clear objectives to protect itself against Standard and its monopolistic tactics: 
To include in one organization of all producers of petroleum, and those who are engaged 
in industries incidental thereto, and known to be friendly to the producers’ interests, in 
order that they may, by united action and all honorable means, protect and defend their 
industry against the aggressions of monopolistic transporters, refiners, buyers, and sellers 
of their products, in order that the producers may reap the just reward of their capital and 
labor, and to this end encourage and assist as far as possible the refining and marketing of 
their produce and sale direct to the consumer by the producer. (Kirk 1888:2) 
In another example, petroleum producers in Kansas worked through a trade association with 
local government officials to resist Standard’s expansion at the turn of the century: 
Complaints against the Standard organization became so violent and loud that the new 
governor, E.W. Hoch, in his inaugural message in January 1905, advocated the erection 
of a state-owned and operated refinery in order to provide relief from the monopoly. The 
Kansas Oil Producers Associations, organized on January 19th backed the governor’s 
proposal and launched an extensive propaganda campaign on its behalf… 
It also passed laws setting maximum freight rates on oil, prohibiting rebating, marketing, 
making pipelines common carriers, and prohibiting discrimination in the prices of refined 
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oil within the state. These laws were designed, as Governor Hoch said, “to make the 
Standard Oil Company decent.” (Giddens 1955:98) 
While these efforts served to further entrench divisions within the industry, they also set the 
stage for the next chapter in the history of the petroleum industry in the U.S.; one marked by 
increased regulation and public pressure to address monopolistic practices.  
By the turn of the 20th century, while the petroleum industry was beset by bitter and 
deepening divisions and well-known for its cutthroat practices, the public and the government on 
both state and federal levels also began to respond more directly. Public pressure to address 
issues of monopolization and business practices that were perceived as detrimental to the public 
good were widespread at this time (Williamson et al. 1963; Kolko 1963; Weinstein 1968). Public 
outcry against the Standard Oil Trust in particular was amplified by journalistic exposés of 
Standard, particularly Henry Demarest Lloyd’s “The Story of a Great Monopoly” and Ida 
Tarbell’s “History of Standard Oil.” Yet, the loudest critics of Standard continued to be other 
firms within the petroleum industry, particularly the Independent producers, who continued to 
seek political channels through organized efforts to stop Standard’s spread into new markets. 
Although the Standard enterprise was no stranger to litigation proceedings regarding its 
practices during the late 1800s, by the turn of the century, the federal government began 
mounting its case against the trust. With the newly formed Department of Commerce and Labor 
and the Bureau of Corporations, Theodore Roosevelt’s Administration, which had run heavily on 
a campaign of trust-busting, finally had a central governmental body to pursue violations of 
antitrust laws. After its establishment, the Bureau of Corporations began investigations into 
multiple industries that were suspected of containing business combinations that the federal 
government deemed harmful (Kolko 1963; Weinstein 1968). From these investigations, in 1904 
 101 
the Roosevelt Administration directed the Justice Department to pursue 44 lawsuits against trusts 
that were deemed as participating in unlawful practices, particularly violating the Sherman 
Antitrust Act of 1890. Among these lawsuits was one mounted against Standard Oil. After years 
of litigation, in 1911 the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a decision finding the Trust in 
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act because of its excessive restrictions on trade, particularly 
its ruthless buy-out practices from the late 1870s onward. With this decision, the Standard Oil 
Trust was to be dissolved. Williamson et al. (1963) described the decision as representative of a 
“win” for multiple groups within society: 
This action marked the culmination of a groundswell of opposition against the company, 
its officials, its apparent enormous economic power, and its business practices that had 
been well underway intensively for well over a decade before 1900. States, municipal and 
local governments, organized economic and social groups, and, most importantly, other 
members of the petroleum industry, spared few invectives in expressing their opposition 
to the organization. The decision against the Standard Oil Company thus appeared to be a 
triumph for “decent” and “fair” competition. (Williamson et al. 1963:4) 
Such an observation reflects a wider class critique of Progressive era policies like antitrust laws. 
Yet, instead of this being a “win” for the wider public or a show of a strong state hand in service 
of progressive anti-business policies, the state eliminated large economic organizations like 
Standard and other monopolies because it ultimately served to create new stability for sectors 
struggling through technological revolutions from the dominance of organizations like 
monopolies. In fact, smaller firms welcomed and encouraged the regulation brought by the state 
during this time to provide stability and ensure that competition within their growing sectors 
(Kolko 1963; Weinstein 1968; Alford and Friedland 1985). A very different outcome – such as 
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nationalizing major industries – could have theoretically happened during this time. However, 
because of “the nearly universal belief among political leaders in the basic justice of private 
property relations,” state agents were aligned with ensuring some of the basic tenets of 
capitalism were protected in this era of reform (Kolko 1963:3). Kolko (1963) explains that when 
looking at Progressive Era policies, “the regulation itself was invariably controlled by leaders of 
the regulated industry, and directed toward ends deemed acceptable or desirable [to them]” (3). 
More broadly, Kolko (1963) contends that the Progressive Era was not a time of radical, people-
centered reform. On the contrary, the Progressive Era was the start of what he terms political 
capitalism, which he defines as “the utilization of political outlets to attain conditions of stability, 
predictability, and security – to attain rationalization – in the economy” (Kolko 1963:3).  
For the petroleum industry, this observation seems accurate during this era. Although 
other trusts embodying monopolistic practices were certainly operating at this time and pursued 
by the federal government, the petroleum industry and Standard Oil in particular bore the brunt 
of much of the public scrutiny and government pressures centered on monopolies at this time. 
However, the role of other petroleum firms and their organized efforts in calling for reform 
within their industry cannot be discounted. By dismantling the trust, the state attempted to create 
a stable and competitive economic environment or a more managed capitalism, which was not 
achieved through the early organizing efforts of petroleum firms through their early trade 
associations. 
Although the rise of larger independent petroleum firms had a hand in shaping this new 
industry environment, the continuing power of the Standard network was also present. The 
power of the Standard network did not disappear with the dismantling of the Trust and even 
seemed to benefit the Standard network in new ways. The break-up of the trust had little 
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immediate impact on changing the wealth of individual stockholders or the organizational 
strength of the Standard firms (Ise 1926; Williamson et al. 1963; Yergin 1991). In examining the 
impact of the break-up of Standard on the executives within Standard itself, Ise (1926) explains: 
The court rendered its decision with little immediate effect, however, by permitting the 
parent company – the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey – to distribute the shares of 
the subsidiary companies ratably [equitably] among its shareholders. By doing this, the 
Standard Oil group were enabled to preserve a very effective community of interest 
among the various companies, since the same group of men now owned much of the 
stock of each of them. (226) 
Additionally, for the major stockholders of Standard, the dissolution turned out to be incredibly 
fruitful: 
Indeed, some critics argued that the distribution of shares simply enabled the principal 
shareholders (particularly Rockefeller, Archbold, and Rogers) to own directly what they 
had formerly owned indirectly and to preserve the “pre-dissolution harmony” of interests 
among the various companies. (Williamson et al. 1963:12) 
For Rockefeller, the dissolution of Standard was particularly lucrative. Having retired from the 
day-to-day operations of Standard in 1897, Rockefeller himself still owned 25 percent of all of 
Standard’s stock at the time of the dissolution of the Trust (Yergin 1991; Chernow 1998). 
Although advised to sell some of the stock before the dissolution, Rockefeller held on to these 
shares. This turned out to be a profitable decision. One year after the break-up of the Trust, stock 
shares in the successor companies doubled and sometimes tripled (Yergin 1991). In 1902, 
Rockefeller’s wealth was estimated at $200 million. After the dissolution in 1911, Rockefeller’s 
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wealth jumped to $900 million (Yergin 1991). Today, Rockefeller is still considered the richest 
American in the history of the U.S. 
Yergin (1991) also explains this break-up as a process of “liberation” for many of the 
businessmen within the Standard fold: 
With dissolution, they were given the opportunity to run their own shows… For 
executives of the various successor companies, it was a great liberation no longer to have 
to petition 26 Broadway [Standard’s headquarters] for approval… (Yergin 1991:110) 
Such observations show that the Standard network also benefitted from these moves by the state. 
After the break-up of the trust, Standard executives were also able to enter the industry on their 
own arguably with a leg-up on their competitors. Standard executives now heading manageably-
sized firms were able to plug in to the industry in new ways, heading firms on their own. In 
dissolving the Trust, the federal government ordered that the trust would be broken into 34 
separate entities (Williamson et al. 1963; Yergin 1991). Many of the companies became 
companies still recognizable today such as Exxon, BP, and Chevron (Yergin 1991; Segall 2001). 
The ghost of Standard Oil still loomed large even after the official break-up of the Trust 
in 1911. The break-up was not enough to heal or bridge the divides in the industry particularly 
because many perceived the ways the network of Standard was still intact. The industry 
continued to operate and grow, but bitter divisions and distrust remained. Although this growth 
could be attributed to the renewed confidence in the government creating conditions that ensured 
healthy competition in the industry, other industries began to form cooperative organizations 
during this period. National trade associations in particular began to serve as collective spaces 
and voices for industries to deal with wider industry matters beyond economic regulation seen in 
the late 1800s (Spillman 2012). Antitrust laws barred associations from participating in those 
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economic mechanisms that were deemed to stifle economic competition. However, the collective 
desire to found a national, representative trade association inclusive of all types of petroleum 
firms failed to emerge among petroleum executives. The industry continued to be marked by 
distrust and divisions after the break-up of Standard Oil. 
Discussion 
The period of 1870 to 1911 is an important foundational period for understanding the 
later establishment of the American Petroleum Institute because it was the first period in which 
firms attempted to overcome competition through organizations. By the end of this period, firms 
had failed to coalesce and form a national trade association, and Standard Oil’s efforts to form its 
alternative ‘plan’ of a national monopoly had been officially brought to a stop. The federal 
break-up of Standard Oil still had not resolved the competitive threats to firm interests, however. 
In the early 1870s, petroleum industry leaders attempted to organize through trade 
associations to address issues of industry instability in their specific sub-sectors and regions. 
These efforts can be considered as a recognition of class-based interests that culminated in the 
creation of formal organizations like trade associations to work on issues of wider industry 
concern. However, agreements reached in trade associations never created long-term stability in 
the industry as many pursued individual transactions and did not work through these 
organizations or by the set agreements. In the case of Standard Oil, this strategy went to the 
extreme, with Rockefeller and other Standard executives moving away from collective efforts to 
actualize their own plan for industry control. The ramifications of Standard Oil’s practices and 
the reactions to those practices by other industry leaders had impacts on the material components 
of the industry (such as prices, markets, and patents) and wider cultural components, such as 
collective identities within the industry. These activities dealt a blow to the earlier emerging 
 106 
class consciousness within the industry, with industry leaders deepening divisions in order to 
protect their own interests.  
However, the collective efforts of capitalists within the petroleum sector did not 
completely diminish. Instead, these efforts centered on protecting themselves from Standard’s 
practices, which was further supported by state governments on local levels and eventually at the 
federal level. In the petroleum industry, the implementation of antitrust laws led to the 
dismantling of Standard Oil, which seemed like a collective “win” for many groups in society. 
However, Kolko (1963) points out that this process constitutes a turn towards “political 
capitalism,” which centers business control of state policy ultimately benefitting capitalism as a 
whole. The concept political capitalism resonates with the instrumentalist position of the state in 
that capitalists have a direct hand in shaping the regulation to bring about more stable industry 
environments, which ultimately supports the continuance of capitalism. Kolko’s theory appears 
to ring true for this period in the petroleum industry in that the economic environment resulting 
from the implementation of antitrust laws was meant to create a more stable economic 
environment or a more managed capitalism for petroleum firms after the turn of the century.  
This turn towards a more managed capitalism can also explain some of the findings from 
other studies of trade associations and the rise of large trade associations during this time period. 
If the state was beginning to have more of a hand in regulating the economy for the benefit of 
capitalism as a whole, then existing capitalist-oriented organizations would also adapt to this new 
focus. In having the state take on some of the economic regulatory activities that trade 
associations tried to accomplish in the late 1800s, trade associations were able to adapt to and 
even contribute to this new political economy in new ways. Becoming the information 
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production centers that Spillman (2012) highlights as the central shift in trade association 
activities makes sense within this Marxian, class-based framework.  
For the petroleum industry, though, no national or large trade associations that 
contributed to this type of information production had emerged during this time. Nor were any of 
the existing petroleum trade associations, which were so focused on protection against Standard, 
in a position to serve as a national organization for the entire industry given the history of the 
internal industry relations explained above. The bitter divisions and deep distrust that marked 
many of the internal industry relationships could not support a trade association where activities 
like information sharing was a central component of the organization’s work.  
Within a few years, however, the organization that would take on many of these roles, the 
American Petroleum Institute, would emerge. As the first national trade association of the U.S. 
based petroleum industry, API would come to represent many of the information sharing and 
production processes that Spillman’s (2012) analysis highlights as the primary role for trade 
associations during and then beyond this era. However, as seen from the history of the petroleum 
industry, the ability to create and maintain collective organizations like trade associations was 
not an easy task. Some of the processes that led to create earlier trade associations centered on 
collective goals for industry stability. However, these efforts ultimately failed for lack of buy-in 
across the sub-sectors and the failure of some of these planned mechanisms. After the years of 
Standard Oil domination, the petroleum industry was not in a position either ideologically or 
organizationally to work collectively as many of the divisions and divides within the industry 
continued, particularly between Standard Oil firms and Independents. In Marxian terms, the 
petroleum industry had little incentive to work as a “class for itself.” These intra-class struggles 
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did not appear to be leading to the collective efforts that could maintain a large, national 
association. 
So how, after decades of distrust and division, did an organization like the American 
Petroleum Institute come together eight years following the break-up of the Standard Oil Trust in 
1919? How were these divisions bridged and what processes led to petro-capitalists to come 
together to form an organization like API, particularly in the face of failures in the past to 
effectively organize the industry under a collective organization? For the petroleum industry, the 
catalyst to jumpstart this process was U.S. entry into World War I. The events and experiences of 
industry participation in WWI awakened petroleum leaders to the potential benefits and 
opportunities of becoming well-organized and working together on issues that impacted the 
industry as a whole. Fanning (1959), a longtime editor of a petroleum trade magazine and 
eventual API staff member, reflecting on the impact of WWI on the petroleum industry, stated:  
The war was the gestation period of the oil industry as an industry – an industry 
conscious of its common problems, of its importance to the country not only in time of 
war but in time of peace, of its obligations to the public, of its claim to survival and 
growth as weighed by its own acts. (Fanning 1959:25; emphasis in original) 
As the war unfolded and industry leaders worked together on issues related to wartime matters, 
the petroleum executives in the U.S. began to see the benefits of coming together and viewing 
themselves not only as competitors, but also as parts of a collective whole. I argue that the war 
experience allowed petroleum executives to experience a wider recognition of class-interests, 
which was essential to healing divides in the industry and pushing petroleum executives to 
consider ways that they may be able to cooperate and organize on their class-based interests. 
Creating the American Petroleum Institute following the war was the culmination of this 
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recognition process, where petroleum executives saw the creation of API as the beginning of a 
new era in the petroleum industry centered on cooperation (Fanning 1959; Pratt 1983; Potter 
1990). The next chapter provides a detailed analysis of this wartime experience, showing how 
the petroleum industry came together and began to recognize their collective interests under the 
guise of war.  
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Chapter 5 
The Petroleum Industry in World War I: Organizing for Industry 
Cooperation and Recognizing Collective, Class-Based Interests 
 
The American Petroleum Institute was officially incorporated on March 20th, 1919. 
Although the emergence of larger and more professionalized trade associations was common 
during this time (Staber and Aldrich 1983; Aldrich and Staber 1988; Spillman 2012), the 
establishment of API represented a turning point for the petroleum industry in the U.S. API was 
the first national trade association of the U.S. petroleum industry in that it included firms from 
all the various sub-sectors of the industry (refiners, marketers, and producers) and the different 
U.S. oil regions. The creation of the API, however, was more than a culmination of the industry 
becoming more organized. Among historians and industry insiders, the formation of API is 
widely considered a critical turning point or historical conjuncture for the industry 
organizationally as well as ideologically (Fanning 1959; Pratt 1983; Potter 1990).  
This chapter focuses on the circumstances that led to the creation of the American 
Petroleum Institute in 1919. I suggest that the creation of API was only possible after petro-
capitalists experienced a recognition process that led petroleum industry leadership to recognize 
their collective, class-based interests after decades of deep divisions and distrust across the 
industry. And this process occurred from industry participation in wartime committees created 
by the state during World War I. By participating in these committees, petroleum industry 
leaders saw many benefits to working together on common issues as a whole industry. Although 
regional and sector-specific trade associations for the petroleum industry existed prior to the war, 
these organizations did not serve as antecedents to the creation of a national trade association 
like API. Instead, these organizations further entrenched divisions within the industry, with 
associations being utilized to protect the interests of specific sectors or regional interests within 
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the industry (Williamson and Daum 1959). Yet, when the U.S. government brought the 
industry’s sub-sectors together during World War I, this set the stage for the later establishment 
of API immediately after the war. Rather than a self-evident rational process of increased 
cooperation or simply a cultural process of gradually building solidarity among the men leading 
the industry, this chapter focuses on how World War I and state leadership built coordination that 
eventually resulted in solidarity. The experience of cooperative work, as Marxian understandings 
of class consciousness assert, led petro-capitalists to move from “a class in itself” towards a 
“class for itself.” This solidarity, in turn, led to the establishment a formal, capitalist 
organization, the trade association API. In contrast to working class solidarity that is often built 
in spite of the state, findings in this chapter show that the state can also play an important role in 
facilitating consciousness building. By examining solidarity in the capitalist class we thereby 
complicate the concept of class consciousness. 
The following sections detail how conditions in three major areas shifted to allow this 
recognition process to emerge for the petroleum industry. First, state priorities shifted to 
encourage industry leaders to work together to increase production and deliver war supplies. 
Instead of focusing on instilling a more managed capitalism, which was a major focus of the U.S. 
federal government in the previous decades, the federal government called on industry to 
participate in some of the very activities that were deemed illegal under antitrust laws established 
in the previous decades (Solberg 1976; Yergin 1991). To accomplish these economic goals set 
by the state, industry leaders worked together in government sanctioned advisory committees 
and departments. These organizations were much different from the previous petroleum 
organizations (like sub-sector trade associations) because they were intentionally inclusive of all 
types and sizes of petroleum firms. Finally, shifts in industry identity occurred, where petroleum 
 112 
industry executives began to see their firms as part of a collective whole instead of as only 
regional or sub-sector specific types of firms. Shifting conditions in each of these areas during 
different parts of the war pushed for a recognition process among petro-capitalists to occur that 
led to the creation of API following the war. The following sections examine each of these shifts 
in detail showing how they created the necessary momentum to create API following the war. 
Shifting State Priorities: From Managing “Collusion” to Encouraging “Cooperation” 
In the beginning of the 20th century, the state took a turn towards developing a more 
managed capitalism, with capitalists having a hand in shaping policies that helped to ensure 
stability in the economy that was lacking in previous decades (Kolko 1963; Weinstein 1968). For 
the petroleum industry in particular, much state and federal policy had focused on limiting the 
economic power and monopolistic practices of Standard Oil under the pretext of ensuring a 
competitive business environment and the protection of smaller firms and the public from the 
damaging impacts of monopoly power (Williamson and Daum 1959; Nash 1968; Pratt 1983). As 
the U.S. entered WWI, however, a more focused program of state and industry cooperation was 
pursued with the state shifting policy towards fostering cooperation within and among industries 
to encourage maximum production and streamlined delivery of war supplies. For the petroleum 
industry, such a shift allowed petroleum industry leaders to work together in new ways with both 
state officials and with one another, which would have lasting impacts after the war. 
As one of the largest and deadliest wars in history, World War I was a different conflict 
than the world had seen primarily because of the industrial and technological sophistication that 
was brought to warfare through weapons, ground and air transportation, and the widespread use 
of chemical weapons (Keegan 1998; Willmott 2003). These war tactics would be amplified 
twenty-two years later in World World II, which is still on record as the deadliest war in history. 
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To put these technologies and industrial development into action during World War I, however, 
states had to implement careful planning processes to ensure both maximum production and the 
efficient delivery of war supplies. Bernard Baruch, a financier and U.S. presidential advisor 
during World War I and again during World War II, explained the importance of a state role 
organizing “economic resources” for the war: 
It is not enough to mobilize the Nation’s military strength. There must be a mobilization 
of her full economic resources – industrial, agricultural and financial. These must be 
organized, coordinated, and directed with the same strategy that governs the operations of 
the purely military arms of service. (Baruch 1921:6) 
This understanding of the need to mobilize and organize industry led the U.S. federal 
government to establish a series of working groups, advisory committees and councils, and 
formal governmental bodies. The first of the formal governmental bodies, the Council of 
National Defense, was created in October of 1916. With the Secretary of War serving as 
chairperson, the Council was composed of other prominent secretaries of the Departments of the 
Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor, and charged with “the coordination of 
industries and resources for the national security and welfare.” (U.S. Code 50, Section 1:1916). 
Connected to this council was an advisory commission of seven members appointed by President 
Wilson to work closely with the Council. Those that served on the advisory commission had 
special knowledge of particular industries and relationships with diverse members of the 
business and labor community at the time (Baruch 1921; Nash 1968).  
Baruch and the other members of the advisory commission began to implement a strategy 
for production and the efficient delivery of war supplies. Each member of the advisory 
commission undertook coordination of one of the following broad fields, which were meant to 
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correspond to wider industry sectors or important actors within society: (1) transportation, (2) 
engineering and education, (3) munitions and manufacturing, (4) medicine and surgery, (5) raw 
materials, (6) supplies, and (7) labor (Baruch 1919). After being assigned a field, the advisory 
commission members then reached out to prominent leaders in their respective fields to serve on 
more specialized, industry specific advisory committees. Baruch saw these industry specific 
advisory committees as serving as main points of contact, particularly for government agencies 
needing to purchase industry specific war supplies: 
The thought was that these committees could serve in an advisory capacity, acting as 
centers of contact from which the Government purchasing agencies could get full and 
authoritative information concerning both immediate and prospective supply capacities 
and the industries could get information showing immediate and projected Government 
needs. (Baruch 1921:21)  
In addition, the advisory committees were also thought of as negotiating arenas where price 
stabilization and allocation of purchasing contracts with the government could be discussed and 
distributed equitably among the many firms within a particular sector (Baruch 1921). Thus, the 
initial vision of these committees and councils was to establish good working relationships 
between the state and industries.  
The petroleum industry was organized under the raw materials field, which was being 
coordinated by Baruch himself. Petroleum products were particularly important for the war effort 
for two reasons: 
One was the decision made earlier in the century by the principal naval powers of the 
world to adapt or build their fighting ships to use fuel oil rather than coal. The second 
was the growing utilization during the conflict of gasoline-burning automobiles and 
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trucks to move troops and supplies, the adoption of automotive type internal combustion 
engine as the power unit for tanks and aircraft and the use of diesel type engines in 
submarines. (Williamson et al. 1963:262) 
Some early military campaigns between the Allied forces and Central Powers in Europe were 
even centered on gaining control of oil fields or blocking access to petroleum by destroying oil 
wells and refineries on enemy lands or tankers at sea (Williamson et al. 1963; Yergin 1991). 
Shipments of all products, including petroleum, by sea were attacked, particularly by German 
submarines. The number of German submarines was small at the start of the war, but by the fall 
of 1916, Germany had over 200 submarines at its disposal, which greatly enhanced its capacity 
to disrupt, capture, or destroy shipments. Although all ships were targeted by the Germans, oil 
tankers were particularly targeted. It is estimated that in the early months of 1917, German 
submarines were sinking or damaging one tanker a day (Williamson et al. 1963; Yergin 1991).  
The safe delivery of petroleum supplies from the U.S. became an issue of prime 
importance for the Allied war effort in 1917 and 1918. While German submarines were clearly a 
problem, coordinating the production and shipment of oil from the United States was a 
prerequisite. That work was allocated to the petroleum war service committee, and in late March 
of 1917 before the U.S. entered the war, Baruch approached A.C. Bedford, then president of the 
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, to lead the committee (Gibb and Knowlton 1956). Given 
Standard’s recent dissolution, this choice was perhaps surprising, but the rest of the committee 
was composed of executives of independent oil companies (see Table 5.1).7 In reflecting on 
Bedford’s time with Standard, some scholars characterized Bedford as a new type of executive, 
one whose “genius was for organization” instead of competition and domination, and that 
Bedford lacked the “terrible shortsightedness” characteristic of his predecessors within both 
                                                
7 All tables and figures of this dissertation are located in the Appendix. 
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Standard and the petroleum industry as a whole (Gibb and Knowlton 1956:238). Bedford agreed 
to serve as chair of the advisory committee for petroleum and began to reach out to other 
prominent industry leaders to fill out the rest of the committee. On April 9, 1917, three days after 
the U.S. officially entered WWI by declaring war on Germany, the Committee on Petroleum of 
the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense was formed. Almost immediately, 
Bedford and the committee went to work, meeting with top U.S. military officials and 
communicating with the British, French, and Italian embassies to gauge petroleum needs for the 
whole of the Allied forces (Gibb and Knowlton 1956; Nash 1968). 
The work of the first committee headed by Bedford was described as four broad, 
interconnected tasks all focused on oil supply (see Figure 5.1). Each of these tasks were meant to 
assess the needed petroleum supplies of the war effort and ensure the delivery of these supplies 
by creating working relationships within the industry as well as with other sectors needing 
petroleum products (Nash 1968). In addition, the committee was tasked with spurring increased 
domestic petroleum supply, which was already considered to be falling short of demand.   
The creation of these committees and the movement of the government to call upon 
industry to aid in the war effort was not without criticisms or fears, however, from oil industry 
leaders. They viewed it as a step towards nationalization since it was widely known that 
European countries were nationalizing industries and placing limitations on the domestic use of 
economic resources under the auspices of war needs. The European stance was particularly 
known and feared among leaders of the raw materials industries used for fuel, like coal and oil 
(Williamson and Daum 1959; Yergin 1991). In an attempt to assuage their fears as well as 
publically endorse the use of advisory committees by the state, early in the committee’s 
existence, Bedford and other industry leaders urged calmness and suggested that the war effort 
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would cause little change in the workings of the petroleum industry in the U.S. and that there 
was little to fear about an overreaching hand of government in industry affairs. Instead, the 
petroleum industry should rise to meet the opportunity opened by the state to participate in the 
war effort. In the first official memo from the committee to the industry, Bedford attempted to 
reassure industry leaders that the creation of these committees showed that the U.S. government 
had confidence in its industry leadership to meet the demands of war while also maintaining 
profits during wartime:  
The plan under which our government is working is that the producers in any line of 
activity shall be informed as to the needs of the country and that it shall be incumbent 
upon that industry as a whole to make certain that the government’s requirements are 
taken care of. Under this plan every producer has the opportunity to rise to his patriotic 
duty in providing promptly and adequately what the government desires and at fair 
prices, while, on the other hand, the opportunity is still left to him to exercise his own 
initiative in improving results and to effect economies in his own plants which will 
benefit his net earnings. (Bedford 1917a:7, emphasis added) 
Along similar lines, committee member H.G. James, then president of the Western Petroleum 
Refiners’ Association, following a trip to D.C., stated: 
My advice to the oil industry would be to proceed with the conduct of the business in the 
most natural manner possible. I would counsel calmness. There is no real warrant for 
exceptional economy [thrift]; no justification of extravagance… I am convinced that it is 
not the purpose of the administration to hamper or in any way retard or injure legitimate 
business. The administration is going to expect the co-operation of every good citizen in 
 118 
every avenue of endeavor, and when this is accorded, I do not believe any one need have 
any fear. (James 1917a:8) 
Such framings by industry leaders were meant to show that a cooperative relationship with the 
state did not necessarily mean that petroleum executives would have to sacrifice profits or 
disrupt everyday life. On the contrary, there could be both efficient delivery of war supplies with 
room for profits from “legitimate business” by the industry even in wartime. 
When the U.S. entered the war in 1917, Bedford and James’s assessments would prove to 
be true. As highlighted in the last chapter, petroleum oversupply had been one of the primary 
issues in the industry. What was actually most important during 1917 was securing more tankers 
to deliver petroleum and other war supplies. Moreover, early in the war, the state rarely took 
measures contrary to oil industry profits because of its dedication to free enterprise and the desire 
to continue its record of ensuring fair competition in the economy. This is an important 
difference in the strategy taken by the U.S. government compared to the European countries 
involved in the war.8 Anchoring the state in essentially supporting capitalism even in wartime, 
the state sought to foster cooperative relationships with capitalists instead of antagonistic ones 
(Weinstein 1968). 
This state-capital cooperation continued throughout the war and was further amplified by 
the state bringing capitalists into the strategizing for the war effort. Capitalists not only had a seat 
at the table during these planning processes but were invited to set the table in ways that were 
most conducive to their own agendas and processes. This agenda-setting was evident in the 
second iteration of the war service committees. Although the importance of organizing economic 
                                                
8 Of course, this can also be attributed to the U.S. having more physical distance in the war effort as well as the 
U.S.’s late entry into the war. As the war went on, some industries, such as the coal industry, did come under state 
control. However, the majority of state efforts centered on ensuring that industry leaders were at the table, helping to 
design and implement economic plans for the delivery of war supplies. 
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resources for the war was well recognized by both government officials and industry 
representatives, the first iteration of the advisory committees was met with challenges from 
industry leaders that the committees were not truly representative of wider industries and that the 
power bestowed upon these committees, particularly with the power to distribute purchasing 
contracts, could be abused. Baruch explains: 
Dissatisfaction began to come to light on the part of firms not directly represented on the 
committees. The possible misconception of the position of the committees in appearing to 
represent, even in a vague sense, both the buying and selling interests was very soon felt. 
(Baruch 1921:22) 
Such criticism inspired changes in both governmental war bodies as well as the structure and 
selection of the business centered advisory committees.  
In late July of 1917, a new government body called the War Industries Board (WIB) was 
created to replace the previous advisory commission. While still connected to the Council of 
National Defense, the establishment of the WIB brought new regulatory powers to the state to 
organize and implement the delivery of war supplies. The stated charge of the WIB was to “act 
as a clearing house for the war industry needs of the Government” and to implement strategies of 
the most effective ways to meet these demands (Baruch 1921:22). The WIB’s leadership was 
similar to the advisory commission in structure, with different divisions representing broad fields 
of economic resources. Importantly, the board’s commissioners were selected for positions in 
which they had “no financial interest, direct or indirect, in the industries concerning which they 
advised” (Baruch 1919:22). So, whereas in the first advisory commission, members with 
interests in production made decisions about production, in the WIB such tasks were separated. 
In addition, military representatives of the Army and Navy were also members of the Board, 
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which was meant to allow for direct lines of communication with the needs of the different 
military branches, but also shows that the military had a continuous seat at the table for decision-
making during the war. 
While direct interests were constrained, the Wilson Administration gave the WIB more 
power to secure supplies as well as set prices and prioritize certain buyers, both public and 
private entities, which was a power the previous advisory council did not have. Baruch (1921) 
justified the potential use of these new control mechanisms: 
To cause those commodities to flow in channels most conducive to the purposes of the 
war, the Government had either to outbid all others in the market, or to take measures to 
control purchases and prices. The most significant, and for U.S. the most novel, functions 
of the Board were the solutions which it developed for these problems in the form of the 
priority system and the price-fixing plan. Government price-fixing for all purchasers has 
been practiced from time to time as far back as the oldest known code of law. But the 
priority system, applying to Government and private purchasers alike, represents so far as 
we know, a new method of control over the products of industry. (Baruch 1921:22-23) 
Price-fixing then was an added power to the WIB, which was seen as a measure that would 
potentially be necessary to ensure economic stability during the war. The priority system was 
meant to ensure that both governments and essential industries were receiving the materials they 
needed to deliver first and foremost on war contracts. Therefore, in creating the priority system, 
the U.S. government was showing a stronger commitment to the delivery of war supplies. 
Because of the new powers, WIB members recognized that the industry specific advisory 
committees were essential, particularly for understanding current conditions within particular 
industries, which was vital in creating and implementing particular policies (Baruch 1921). 
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However, state officials also hoped that industry leadership would agree to these new conditions 
that could potentially be disruptive to their profitability. 
This careful planning process by state officials leads one to amend the structural Marxist 
understanding of the state’s relationships to capitalists. Beyond the state acting only to ensure the 
long-term interests of capitalism, the state also has short-term interests, particularly in times of 
crisis like wars, that require careful planning of, and in this case with, capitalists. If the state 
made decisions too quickly and implemented unpopular economic mechanisms without buy-in 
from capitalists that it had outlawed just decades before, it might have risked straining 
relationships that the state deemed necessary for attaining war supplies. And while the state 
retained the option to nationalize many of these industries, particularly during wartime, state 
officials instead primarily chose to center their strategies on cooperative efforts with industry, 
with some limited pressure. Members of the WIB and the Wilson Administration then took steps 
to establish what they hoped would be more representative, more accepted, and potentially more 
cooperative industry advisory groups particularly in the face of these new powers granted to the 
WIB. To develop more representative industry advisory groups, the state began working with an 
important capitalist organization: the Chamber of Commerce of the United States.  
To begin the process of the creation of new committees, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
(which had been established in 1912 by President Taft as a counterbalance to the labor 
movement) held a conference, the “War Convention of American Business,” in September of 
1917 in Atlantic City. The conference turned into a rallying moment for capitalists across sectors 
in the U.S. to come together to discuss war matters and envision a more cooperative economic 
environment for the immediate conditions of war. In its advertisements and publications leading 
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up to the conference, the Chamber appealed to the patriotism and responsibility of the business 
community to organize for the war effort: 
Step by step the government and all classes in our society have been organizing in order 
better to meet their duties and responsibilities with these new conditions… It is the 
patriotic duty of every live business man who can possibly arrange to do so to attend this 
convention, not only to show emphatically where the business men of the United States 
stand in the present crisis, but also that each may gain all possible knowledge as to how 
he can plan more intelligently to be of greater service in the common cause. (Howell 
1917:35) 
Under such expectations, business executives gathered in Atlantic City to discuss and plan next 
steps for the war effort. Over 3,000 men attended the conference, representing “every branch of 
industry, commerce and finance” as well as members of “900 trade and commercial 
organizations” (Evans 1917:9). In addition, government officers connected to the war were also 
in attendance at sessions and featured as speakers. 
The conference allowed for capitalists to respond to new governmental plans, particularly 
the potential for price-fixing and the power to establish a priority system through the newly 
created WIB. On these issues, the Chamber responded with what appeared to be acceptance. 
However, upon closer examination, the business community, through the Chamber, presented 
their own views and conditions for potential implementation of these new powers: 
[The business community] declared themselves in favor of price fixing by the 
government not only for its own needs, but for those of the public, and for government 
control of distribution to suit its understanding of the nation's needs…  
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…the committee merely asked that in dealings on a cost production basis the 
manufacturer be allowed to present evidence to the government authority in support of 
any claim that the cost of production had so altered as to make it advisable for him to ask 
a higher price for his product. 
They urged also that the Government organize its industrial-military side so that a single 
central purchasing board should handle all war buying. (Evans 1917:10) 
From this conference, then, capitalists centered on ways to work through these newly established 
bodies and navigate implementation of what could potentially be a stronger government hand. 
However, through the Chamber, capitalists were also proposing ways to ensure they had a say in 
how decisions on purchasing and production were made.  
The conference also answered the question of how to create and define more 
representative industry advisory committees, which had been a concern for capitalists at the start 
of the war. The Chamber suggested that the committees, under the broader title of “war service 
committees,” be organized through existing representative industry organizations: national trade 
associations. Seeing the significance of large, national trade associations as representative bodies 
for wider industries, the Chamber went to work contacting trade associations within sectors and 
working with industry leaders to create more representative organizations and to be sure to 
include industry leadership of large and small firms and different sections of particular industries 
(Baruch 1921; Nash 1968). Later, at a meeting in December of 1917, these representatives were 
invited to a smaller conference, where the committees were finalized and announced. The state 
welcomed this planning and accepted this plan from the Chamber as it began working through 
the WIB with industries to deliver war supplies. Trade associations then took on important 
regulatory work during the war. 
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Not all industries, however, had national and representative trade associations at this 
time. The petroleum industry was one of these industries. The petroleum trade associations that 
did exist, as detailed in the previous chapter, were primarily representative of Independent firms, 
specific sub-sectors, and regional in scope. However, the economic power of the Standard Oil 
network would not be represented through any of these existing trade associations. Baruch, who 
was now serving as the commissioner of the raw materials division of the WIB, suggested that 
the petroleum advisory committee under the Council of National Defense remain intact and 
continue to serve as a wartime service committee in lieu of a national trade association. Edward 
N. Hurley, chair of the Shipping Board, echoed Baruch’s request, citing the excellent work and 
cooperative relationships that had already been established through the previous committee 
(Nash 1968; Yergin 1991). Thus, the committee remained intact with a few new members and 
was renamed as the “National Petroleum War Service Committee” (Nash 1968). 
Soon after the establishment of the new and more representative committee, however, 
came the most significant wartime governmental organization that to impact the petroleum 
industry. The petroleum industry had enjoyed a hands-off approach during the early months of 
U.S. involvement in the war, particularly with Bedford’s strong relationship with Baruch. In 
early January of 1918, though, rumors began to circulate that the federal government was 
planning to implement control measures through the same governmental body that was currently 
overseeing production and transportation of the coal industry. The rumors proved to be true 
when on January 11th, 1918 the announcement was made that the Oil Division of the Federal 
Fuel Administration was to be created and headquartered in Washington (Nash 1968). 
Since its establishment in August of 1917, the Federal Fuel Administration held the legal 
power to impose production and supply control measures on the oil industry. The Lever Act, also 
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called the Food and Fuel Control Act, was passed with the purpose of increasing production and 
controlling supply and distribution of both food and fuel. With such a broad purpose, the Act 
allowed for the government to implement a wide range of strategies to ensure maximum 
production and remedy growing supply and distribution problems of food and fuel. As a result of 
the Act, two administrations, the Food Administration and the Fuel Administration, were created 
to oversee and implement strategies for production and distribution of food and fuel (Williamson 
et al. 1963; Nash 1968; Kennedy 2004).  
The head of the Fuel Administration, Harry A. Garfield, a law professor, close friend of 
President Wilson, and son of President Garfield, previously focused the administration’s 
resources on remedying issues in the coal industry because labor strikes in the coalfields were 
having impacts on production and the delivery of coal for the war (Kennedy 2004). Garfield’s 
efforts then turned to oil in January of 1918. In his official announcement of the creation of the 
Oil Division, Garfield was not forthcoming with any particular reasons behind his decision to 
create the division or what the work of the division would look like. He only stated in the 
announcement that the first act of the division would be to “undertake an investigation of the 
entire petroleum situation and to recommend… such action as may be necessary to handle 
petroleum matters” (NPN 1918c:11). To head the division, Garfield selected Mark L. Requa, a 
mining engineer with experience in the petroleum industry. Prior to his appointment in the new 
division of the Fuel Administration, Requa worked as the assistant director under Herbert 
Hoover in the Food Administration, seeing firsthand the power bestowed upon the division 
through the Lever Act. 
Of course, such a vague announcement worked to heighten anxiety and speculation 
among petroleum industry leaders that this would correspond to state control of the industry 
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(Williamson et al. 1963). Worries that the administration would immediately begin fixing prices, 
controlling distribution and civilian use of petroleum products riddled the headlines of petroleum 
trade magazines and newspapers. Such worry was not without cause. Industry leaders were likely 
aware of the measures previously enacted through both the Food and Fuel Administrations. 
Under the Food Administration, price was fixed for wheat and a vigorous, though voluntary, 
campaign of food rationing was aimed at the American public (particularly women), encouraging 
rationing to be seen as a patriotic duty (Kennedy 2004). The fate of the coal industry was even 
more troubling to industry leadership, as the coal industry had essentially become nationalized 
during the war to remedy a myriad of issues the government felt was impacting production and 
the delivery of supplies, particularly the labor strikes in the coal fields, which had led to a coal 
shortage in the winter of 1917-1918 (Nash 1968; Kennedy 2004). The impacts of the coal 
shortage were felt particularly on the home front: 
… the overall pace of industrial activity combined to create a shortage of coal in the 
United States – so severe that local officials commandeered coal trains passing through 
their jurisdictions, and policemen had to stand guard over industrial piles to prevent 
pilfering. Orphanages and asylums ran out of fuel, and inmates died of frostbite. Even the 
wealthy were complaining of empty coal bins and chattering teeth. (Yergin 1991:178-
179) 
These conditions led to the state ordering mandatory shutdowns of industrial plants that ran on 
coal east of the Mississippi in order to allow more of the coal supply to be directed to the East 
Coast where ships were waiting to take off to Europe (Yergin 1991). Although petroleum was 
certainly the primary fuel used in the war, coal still constituted a significant commodity for use 
in transport as well as everyday uses in factories and for heating homes. For the remainder of the 
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war, factories were also ordered to shut down every Monday in order to conserve more coal 
(Yergin 1991). Prices were also controlled by the state with little to no negotiation with coal 
industry leaders. 
Understanding these conditions within the coal industry, petroleum industry leaders were 
suspicious of the new Fuel Administration. Were similar measures to be taken for petroleum, 
they would certainly go against previous assurances by Bedford and industry leaders that the 
petroleum industry could expect a “business-as-usual” environment in the war and cooperative 
state and business relationships. In fact, the petroleum industry did not come under the same 
stringent conditions as coal. To the contrary, the first official statements and actions of the 
division were centered on assuaging the anger, fears, and anxiety of the oil industry leaders. 
Garfield and Requa reiterated that they had no intention of making immediate or vast changes to 
how the industry was handling war matters:  
It was indicated that it was not the intention of the Fuel Administration to take up at 
present the question of price fixing, but that a general survey of the whole industry would 
be made in cooperation with the various branches thereof, with a view to determining 
what action the Government might take to assist in supplying more effectively the 
necessary fuel for war purposes and to provide and arrange for the supplies of fuel oil 
necessary to the various industries at home. (NPN 1918d:6) 
After the announcement, one leading article line read “The oil industry is in the hands of the 
government” and, finding little cause as to the creation of the division, the author stated “No 
explanation as to why the industry has been put under control that any sane man can understand 
has been given” (NPN 1918c:11). Indeed, oil men were apparently confused and even outraged 
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that the government would step-in and potentially impose measures on the industry, particularly 
after they believed themselves to be working so efficiently through the war service committees. 
Although not discussed at the time, the most plausible reason that the division was 
created was that Garfield was alerted to potential abuses, particularly profiteering, in the industry 
during the winter of 1917. Because of the coal shortage in 1917, there was increased demand for 
oil, with the average price of crude oil doubling in 1918 from what they had been in 1914 
(Yergin 1991). Yergin (1991:179) suggests that such a high price encouraged producers to 
withhold supplies with the expectation that prices would continue to rise and caused refiners to 
offer bonuses and premiums to obtain supplies to obtain lucrative government contracts. And 
although the oil trade had made widely stated commitments to rise to their patriotic duty and 
forgo potential beneficial profits because of the wartime conditions, it would not be surprising if 
such practices were occurring given the history of some of the practices within the industry in 
previous decades. Industry organizing was not the strong suit of the petroleum industry.  
Days after the division was established, Requa met with A.C. Bedford, Chair of the 
National Petroleum War Service Committee, to express his desire that the committee continue its 
work, particularly as the Oil Division was surveying industry issues (NPN 1918d:6). However, in 
his early communications with the industry, Requa also made it clear that the work of his 
Division was not to be questioned or resisted. Such resistance or questioning was even labeled 
“as a deliberate propaganda for the purpose of creating unrest” in the petroleum industry by pro-
German supporters (Oildom February 1918b:8). With the weight of the Lever Act behind him, 
Requa could have imposed a variety of measures on the oil industry immediately. Throughout 
his time as administrator, he would remind the petroleum industry of this potential power, 
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particularly if industry leadership criticized the work of the Division. Requa set this tone early in 
his first official communication to the industry: 
The [governmental] control is very real and the power under the Lever bill very broad. 
They will be exercised whenever necessary in the doing of those things that will assist in 
bringing U.S. victory” (Requa 1918c:9).  
Coupled with this acknowledgement of the regulatory right of the Division, Requa also 
encouraged the industry to see the good that could come out of government oversight, 
particularly for the war effort, which, as patriotic men, petroleum industry leadership should 
embrace in Requa’s eyes: 
Democracy is quite as much on trial as in any other factor of the national defense, and I 
believe that industry to be patriotic and imbued with the spirit of service and competent 
to govern itself wisely and satisfactorily. There are, however, many things that the 
industry cannot do alone which can be done in co-operation with a governmental 
department. Under the Lever bill, pooling, allocation of oil as to priorities, allocation of 
the products, unit control of tools, utensils and implements, machinery and equipment are 
all possible…  
It appears to me, in short, that the function of the Oil Division is to make possible the 
performance of certain acts, for the purpose of winning the war, that individual 
companies cannot undertake themselves. Sacrifices may, and probably will, have to be 
made, and if so, I am profoundly convinced that the oil industry will not be found lacking 
in doing its share. (Requa 1918c:9, emphasis added) 
By sacrifices, Requa meant that short-term profits might have to be lessened, but he appealed to 
the wider patriotism and personal responsibility of industry leadership to organize for the war 
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effort and added the dimension of embracing the benefits of state partnership for organizing 
economic resources.  
Requa also challenged the industry leadership to understand their work as being under 
emergency conditions, which should inspire a better understanding of why these devices would 
be necessary: 
If we are to accomplish maximum results, we must remove ourselves from the 
atmosphere of normal business life and approach the problem primarily from the 
standpoint of great national emergency, realizing that ordinary business standards and 
practices must be discarded; in short, we must surround ourselves with an entirely new 
atmosphere and concern ourselves primarily with the problem from the viewpoint of 
national welfare. (Requa 1918d:145) 
Although this added dimension was under the guise of war, the very mention, much less an 
outright suggestion of utilizing economic practices such as pooling, unitization, price-fixing, and 
priority setting by a state official to the petroleum industry – perhaps especially to the petroleum 
industry – was quite a turn-around from the previous decades of the federal government’s 
treatment of such economic practices. However, because these practices were seen as temporary 
measures to win the war, Requa encouraged industry leaders to not see these practices as unfair, 
unjust, or disruptive to the industry as a whole.  
Requa stressed that he wanted to build cooperative working relationships with the 
industry in his new role. As a state official, however, Requa emphasized that the onus of this 
cooperation lay within the industry itself: 
If we are to accomplish any considerable part of the task that is before U.S., the success 
of our efforts will be in direct proportion to the mutual confidence and co-operation 
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characterizing our relations. I am expecting the hearty co-operation of the industry to the 
end that thoroly [sic] satisfactory and common sense policy may be finally adopted. In 
the shaping of such a policy the industry can be invaluable in an advisory capacity. This 
is no time for experiments, impractical ideas and radical fads cannot be permitted to 
interfere with the careful supervision of an industry of a most complex and delicate 
character.  
I am expecting that the oil industry will to a great degree govern itself wisely and 
conservatively, and that it will recognize the necessity of maintaining fair and reasonable 
prices and co-operating to the fullest extent in supplying most efficiently the products of 
petroleum needed to meet the requirements of our own army and navy and of the allies. 
(Requa 1918d:145; emphasis added) 
This last statement in particular set expectations for the petroleum industry to work together to 
accomplish the wartime goals, which could also diminish state intervention. If industry leaders 
could find ways to work together on delivering war supplies by utilizing methods that the state 
now allowed, Requa did not see the need for a strong government hand. Although Requa had the 
power to impose economic regulations and other more severe controls on the industry, he 
worked to ensure industry cooperation instead of coercion to accomplish these goals.  
It is worth examining some of the activities accomplished through the war service 
committees to understand this relationship with the state during the war and how this relationship 
was essential to fostering cooperation among the petroleum industry. In designing programs to 
ensure war supplies, the state shifted its priorities from managing capitalism to encouraging 
cooperation among competing firms. Many of these programs required that industry leaders 
work together to come to a consensus for economic mechanisms like price controls or cooperate 
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through information sharing like gathering statistics of current supplies. Throughout the war, 
state officials strongly recommended that agreements and activities occur on a voluntary basis, 
which meant the industry leaders were given the freedom to create their own mechanisms in 
order to reach supply needs and delivery schedules so long as they fulfilled the expanded 
demand of the military campaigns. This experience of not only delivering war supplies, but also 
working together in new ways showed petroleum industry leaders that there were benefits to 
voluntary industry-wide agreements.  
Some of the first work accomplished by the petroleum war service committees was 
focused on measuring current petroleum supplies, providing projections for future supplies, and 
working with the Allied states to ensure that petroleum supplies were transferred effectively to 
the front lines. In the U.S., this was also coupled with ensuring that domestic needs were met. 
One of the first projects undertaken by the first war service committee was to survey all of the 
refining capacity of the U.S. and report back to the state on  
The general results of this survey… indicated a total daily refining capacity of about 1.27 
million barrels of crude. Of this capacity, a little over one-fourth of approximately 
374,000 barrels daily was located at tidewater, eight in New York and New Jersey or on 
the Gulf Coast. 
On the basis of this survey it appeared that the capacity of the tidewater refineries, with a 
potential throughput of over 130 million barrels of crude annually, was more than 
adequate to take care of the projected military requirements of the Allies and the United 
States, which actually at their peak in 1918 amounted to about 7.5 million barrels of 
products. (Williamson et al. 1963:271-272) 
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Therefore, in the early months of the committee’s work in 1917, petroleum industry leaders were 
confident in their ability to supply the Allied war effort as well as all domestic needs throughout 
the war. The state took these numbers with confidence and allowed the committee to begin to fill 
war contracts and design a system of allocation of those contracts (Gibb and Knowlton 1956; 
Williamson et al. 1963). To ensure that supplies of crude would reach the Allied forces quickly, 
Bedford and the committee created a system of allocation based on geography: 
Thus, under a general plan of letting inland refiners handle the major share of rising 
domestic demand, the committee followed a policy of allocating the bulk of government 
contracts to refineries located at the seaboard shipping terminals on the Gulf Coast or 
Atlantic Seaboard. (Williamson et al. 1963:272) 
The state then relied heavily on the expertise of the petroleum leaders themselves to measure and 
design a system to fill orders early in U.S. participation in the war. By establishing this 
relationship, industry leaders began to take on the role as experts of their industries, which would 
have impacts on industries following the war.  
At times, however, the state also interceded when industry leaders could not accomplish 
state goals. For example, although supply and refining capacity early in the war was not 
perceived as an issue, delivery of crude oil and gasoline to the Allies ran into difficulties. With 
the German submarines sinking or damaging state-owned tankers, more tankers from the private 
sector had to be moved to shipping runs between the U.S. and the United Kingdom (Williamson 
et al. 1963). Bedford and the committee arranged for more tankers to be transferred to this route 
as well as the U.S.-France route following appeals from both the British and French governments 
(Williamson 1963).  
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Another area of contention, however, emerged between American and British oil industry 
leaders. When additional requests for oil supply were made by the British government, the U.S. 
petroleum industry was stretched thin, making it difficult to respond adequately to these requests. 
U.S. petroleum industry leaders were also critical of the British for not transferring some of their 
own fleet from the Far Eastern markets, which U.S. companies had done to respond to British 
requests. The British authorities argued that removing tankers from this line would threaten their 
ability to refine crucial products for aviation gasoline, but, U.S. petroleum leaders worried that 
this was a strategic move by the British to grow their Asian markets during the war (Williamson 
et al. 1963). By requesting more and more U.S. tankers, some U.S. companies had moved their 
ships away from the Far Eastern lines during this time.  
In this case, U.S. state officials stepped in to help industry leaders craft a tanker 
agreement, which called for a shift in the British operations: 
In a formal recommendation to E.F. Hurley, Chairman of the United States Shipping 
Board, Foley [of the U.S. Navy] and Thomas [of Standard Oil New Jersey] in February, 
1918, suggested that (1) the British could release the equivalent of about 13 tankers 
(73,000 gross tons) by adjusting their Far Eastern tanker trade, (2) seven American 
tankers (34,000 gross tons) should be reassigned from the United States-United Kingdom 
route to service between the Gulf Coast and the Atlantic seaboard; and (3) no more 
American tankers be moved to the trans-Atlantic route until some agreement had been 
reached on shipments to the Far East. (Williamson et. al 1963:277) 
Although under the guise of reorganizing tanker movement for the war effort, this agreement 
was also crucial for ensuring that the U.S. shares in the growing Asian markets would not 
diminish during the war. Such state support during this time shows that the U.S. state had a 
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strong commitment to ensuring that capitalists were able to continue their business processes or 
even expand them. The final agreement effectively accomplished this by restoring the balance of 
U.S. and British shares of the market prior to the war: 
… The agreed volume of products to be apportioned between the respective British and 
American interests in each area according to the percentage of trade enjoyed by each 
during the year of 1913, when the operations of the respective companies were not 
impeded by transportational difficulties arising out of the requisition of ships. 
(Williamson et al. 1963:278) 
In another example, the state took a stronger hand in developing price controls later in the 
war when state officials, particularly Requa, perceived that there were problems with the crude 
supply. Although at the start of the war, Bedford and his committee were confident in the ability 
of the industry to deliver on both domestic and wartime petroleum demands, a decline in the 
stocks of crude and rising domestic consumption began to challenge this prediction. When Requa 
came into the position of Fuel Administrator, he surveyed some of the conditions within the 
industry. Figure 5.2 shows the shifts in production, consumption, and stocks of crude oil prior to 
and over the course of the war, displaying a rise in both production and consumption and a 
depletion of stocks of crude. Such conditions made Requa begin to look more closely at the 
processes within the industry and make plans to implement different kinds of economic 
mechanisms. 
By mid-1918, Requa was particularly concerned with the rising prices of crude. Although 
prices had steadily rose throughout the war, Requa began to see these prices as unfair to the 
government: 
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So long as higher prices had served to stimulate production, Requa had left the pricing 
problem up to the industry. But in May of 1918, he was convinced that higher crude 
prices were no long performing this function and moreover they were being used as an 
excuse to charge higher prices for fuel oil and gasoline to the United States Government 
and the Allies. (Williamson et al. 1963:287-288) 
Figure 5.3 shows these rises in prices of crude in the Appalachian region, in Kansas and 
Oklahoma, and in the Gulf. Prices in crude often varied based on quality and chemical 
components of crude, which explains the regional differences. As the figure shows, however, the 
increase in prices in all oil regions was steady throughout the war. 
To address these price concerns, Requa called on the war service committee leadership to 
craft and implement price agreements. Although Requa had the legal authority to set and 
implement these prices on his own, putting the onus of creating and implementing these 
agreements on petroleum industry leaders showed confidence in the industry to cooperate and 
craft agreements themselves. However, this was also strategic on the part of Requa to ensure that 
the industry would be more accepting of these agreements because industry leaders were the 
ones setting the levels and creating price schedules. In effect, these worked more as voluntary 
agreements than government sanctions, and as a result, in the end they were more palatable to 
petroleum industry leaders at the time (Williamson et al. 1963).  
The process started in June of 1918, when Bedford and other committee members 
“proposed a price of $2.25 per barrel for oil of 33° Baume gravity, with a differential of five 
cents per barrel for each degree above of below 33°” (Williamson et al. 1963:288) to account for 
the differences in quality of crude. As representatives of the war service committees met with 
industry groups in different oil regions to get feedback, they met resistance from the Mid-
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Continent group, primarily Kansas and Oklahoma producers who rejected price controls 
completely. Due to this strong reaction, the committee proposed a new plan. This plan was to 
“simply freeze the oil in the present channels, limit the amount of premiums paid, and establish 
the prevailing posted prices as the maximum prices to be paid” (Williamson et al. 1963:288).  
Bedford and his committee members as well as Requa met with petroleum producers 
again to both cajole and pressure them. On the one hand, Bedford and Requa assured them that 
industry sectors, particularly big refiners were not somehow able to profit from this plan: 
In a move designed to explain their position and to assure the Mid-Continent producers 
that the large companies were not behind their plan, Requa and Bedford met with 
producers and refinery representatives in Tulsa on July 22, 1918. Bedford pointed out 
that refining capacity now exceeded production and that competition for crude was 
forcing up prices which were in turn reflected in the refined products. (Williamson et al. 
1963:289) 
On the other hand, Requa reminded petroleum producers of the government’s power to impose 
controls at any time. However, he still urged acceptance of the war service committee’s plans 
first. He also reminded the producers how much they relied on government contracts and 
resources, which should give them pause at resisting these measures: 
Requa not only urged the acceptance of “voluntary control” as the alternative to 
governmental action, but indicated how the government had helped producers to obtain 
steel and other necessary drilling supplies and to maintain their labor force by draft 
exemptions. As he put it, they could not produce at all without the government priorities 
for their work. (Williamson et al. 1963:289, emphasis added) 
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The final piece that helped achieve adoption of the petroleum committee’s price agreement 
proposal was the creation of a committee of independent oil men who were allowed to “inspect 
the books of the large refiners and to establish fair prices for all petroleum products, in order to 
insure the larger companies were not making excess profits” (Williamson et al. 1963:289). By 
the end of July 1918, a price agreement was reached. The agreement stipulated that prices and 
premiums would be maintained at early July levels. The agreement was officially put into place 
in August about two months before the end of the war and remained in effect until early January 
1919 (Williamson et al. 1963). 
In sum, throughout WWI, the state moved to both control the petroleum sector and to 
achieve that control via voluntary agreements that attempted to preserve a strong government 
commitment to capitalist ideals. This commitment was evident in the efforts to ensure the 
participation of capitalists from petroleum and other sectors in decision-making about issues 
impacting their industries. For the petroleum industry, this control by the government and 
coordination by the industry itself under the guise of war created cooperation within the industry 
and with the state that had been largely absent in the previous decades. In the end, the wartime 
committees helped to build solidarity among oil producers and refiners that had not existed 
before. As the above examples show, in working in these committees, capitalists across all 
sectors found new opportunities to organize on their class-based interests, strengthening their 
already burgeoning cooperative efforts of the 20th century.  
Organizations: Recognizing Intra-industry Benefits of Working Together 
It was not only government support and shifting state priorities that fostered the 
cooperative effort for the war. The active and intentional efforts of industry leaders contributed 
to this environment as well, with industry leaders recognizing the opportunities to work together 
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and have close ties with the state. Although much industry participation was explained through 
the lens of patriotic duty, there was also recognition of the benefits that could be garnered 
through industry organizing and organizations and how these organized efforts could extend into 
peacetime. In reflecting on industry participation in the war, Harry A. Wheeler, president of the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, understood the potential long-term benefits to having a more 
cooperative business environment, particularly for the development of foreign trade: 
Organization for war service is giving business the foundation for the kind of cooperative 
effort that alone can make the United States economically efficient enough to take its 
place with the nations in world trade… What furnishes a better groundwork to foster this 
cooperative association than the committees? Industries torn apart for years by factional 
differences have been brought together in the committees and are working with one 
another in closest harmony. Allied industries in some instances for the first time in their 
history have found a common meeting point. Business quarrels have been forgotten. 
Competition has been put on a clean and enduring basis… 
The integration of business, the expressed aim of the National Chamber, is in sight. War 
is the stern teacher that is driving home the lesson of cooperative effort. (Wheeler 
1918:10, emphasis added)  
For Wheeler and other leaders involved in the Chamber, the integration of business essentially 
meant a more cooperative and organized business community. In recognition of the long-term 
benefits of organizing business, Wheeler’s comments complicate some understandings of 
capitalist organizing through a Marxist lens. Instead of the antagonistic relationship between 
capitalists and the state that is painted by structural Marxists, comments like Wheeler’s shows 
that the state also provides opportunities for capitalists to recognize their long-term interests in 
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the face of short-term crises within the state.  And although Marxist scholars such as Lukács 
(1926) discuss the inevitable failures of capitalist class consciousness, the recognition by 
capitalists of the benefits of organizing as a class to expand their economic opportunities still has 
vast material and ideological impacts on society, particularly if capitalists are able to shape and 
control other institutions within society. Wheeler and other capitalists during this time period 
certainly saw the potential benefits to this work and utilized the war as a period to intensify these 
organized, cooperative efforts across and within industry sectors. 
As mentioned in the previous section, the war service committees that were created under 
the War Industries Board were primarily drawn from national trade associations, which were 
beginning to take on more responsibilities of ensuring production and delivery of war supplies. 
Under the more lax rules and the outright encouragement of utilizing economic regulations that 
had been previously outlawed by the state, trade associations moved from being organizations 
that were under suspicion of colluding towards centers of cooperation for industries on issues of 
industry concern. Such an understanding of this historical moment in the United States 
challenges Spillman’s (2012) contention that trade associations evolved into cultural institutions 
operating off of disinterested solidarity and nonstrategic action. These experiences in WWI 
clearly represent wider recognition of their potential organized power as a class. 
For the petroleum industry in particular these committees served as the conduit for 
industry leaders to heal divides and work together in ways that helped them recognize and 
organize on their collective interests. The creation of the wartime committees was understood by 
petro-capitalists as more than an opportunity to be good patriots. They recognized that the war 
service committees could serve as the foundation for a more integrated and cooperative business 
environment, particularly after the war.  
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Organizing an industry with the historical and bitter divisions that characterized the 
petroleum industry, however, meant that there were challenges to overcome to actively work on 
these initiatives. Although the committees were explicitly organized in order for the petroleum 
industry to meet wartime goals, these organizations also served as opportunities for petroleum 
industry leaders to work with one another in new ways, which was now backed by government 
support. In reflecting on one of the first meetings of the petroleum war service committees, 
Henry James, a petroleum refiner, stated: 
The meeting was productive of other results. Men who know each other find it easier to 
co-operate. The oil industry justifies, and in times like the present demands at least some 
co-ordination. The jobber, the refiner and the big companies are partners in the oil 
business. An injury to the industry hurts them all. Their interests are co-related and 
mutual. And more friendly meetings of such character should follow in the future. (James 
1917b:542) 
Although government control was always looming during the war, petroleum industry leaders 
took these opportunities and shaped the wartime organizations into organizations to foster 
industry cooperation.  
With each iteration of the war committees, more and more petroleum industry leaders 
were brought into the fold, with the committees serving as spaces for industry cooperation and 
negotiation on issues of industry concern. These organizations also set the foundation for the 
creation of their own national trade association, API, following the war. As shown in the above 
examples of work accomplished through the war service committees, the state often encouraged 
petroleum industry leaders to work together to design and reach voluntary agreements. To reach 
these agreements and continue to deliver both supplies for the war and increasing domestic 
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needs, these industry committees were essential to not only negotiate terms, but also worked to 
create a sense of community and cooperation among petroleum industry leaders. As the war 
continued, it was important to have more and more petroleum industry leaders represented on the 
committees to garner an understanding of industry conditions as well as have industry leaders 
ready to quickly negotiate and work together on creating economic mechanisms like price 
controls. The committee structures evolved then in order to have more representation as the war 
went on.  
It is useful to examine the evolution of these committees through three iterations to see 
this process of growing representation. The first advisory committee of the petroleum industry 
was organized in April of 1917. A.C. Bedford of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, was 
selected by Baruch to serve as the chair of this committee. Being described as a “genius for 
organization,” Bedford was careful in how he selected the additional committee members (Gibb 
and Knowlton 1956:238). Formed just three days before the U.S. entered the war, this committee 
was small, with seven members initially. Two members, both representing Independent trade 
associations, were then added in June of 1917. Table 5.1 provides a list of this first committee 
and Figure 5.1 provides the stated purpose of the committee. When examining the structure of 
the committee, many of the divisions that were characteristic of the industry at the time were 
represented through the nine representatives selected for this first advisory committee. 
Additionally, independent oil companies and trade associations had representation on this body 
as well. 
After the formation of the first round of advisory committees, however, issues of 
representation were brought up by the wider business community, particularly by those business 
leaders not included in the initial committees. As highlighted in the previous section, the 
 143 
Chamber of Commerce recommended that war service committees be centered in national trade 
associations of the major industries, which were already seen as representative organizations for 
many industries during this time. For the petroleum industry, no national trade association 
existed that was inclusive of the diverse firms of the petroleum industry. Baruch and other 
government officials were adamant that the existing war service committee for the petroleum 
industry remain intact in order to continue the work the committee had already accomplished. 
The committee remained with a few additions and was renamed the National Petroleum War 
Service Committee (Nash 1968). Table 5.2 lists the members of this second iteration of the 
committee. The structure of the committee was again balanced along the lines of the historic 
divisions within the industry, particularly between Standard and Independent firms.  
In order to garner support for this second iteration of the war service committee or 
perhaps make industry leaders more included in the process of committee creation, the War 
Service Executive Committee of the Chamber of Commerce composed a letter asking for stated 
support from the petroleum industry for the committee to act as a representative body for the 
wider industry (Nash 1968). In a letter released on behalf of the committee in January of 1918, 
Bedford stated that the initial committee members, all of whom were formally appointed by the 
Government and not a national trade association, “felt embarrassment” that they were continuing 
in their roles as committee members “in the absence of direct endorsement by the industry itself” 
(NPN 1918a:6). The letter detailed why the committee was created as well as the purpose of the 
committee (see Figure 5.4). The letter was sent directly to many oil companies, asking for 
statements of approval from petroleum company executives (Nash 1968). Trade association 
magazines also printed the letter in full and urged readers to endorse the committee. In doing so, 
petroleum industry leaders were seeking recognition of their leadership within the industry, 
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calling on other petroleum industry leaders to weigh in on the committee’s structure and 
legitimacy. Of course, there were no signs that the committee would be disbanded had there been 
any type of resistance.  
The third and final iteration of the petroleum war service committees emerged after the 
creation of the Oil Division through the Food and Fuel Administration. Requa was adamant 
about petroleum industry cooperation and urged industry leaders to organize together to meet 
industry goals. Although many of Requa’s threats about government control could also be read 
as coercive, petroleum industry leaders took advantage of this cooperative push to further grow 
their organizations and bridge the historic divides within the industry. One of Requa’s first 
requests was to have the war service committees broadened to include even more petroleum 
leaders in official advisory capacities. This lead to the creation of a series of sub-committees that 
were meant to represent regional divisions as well as sub-sectors of the industry. Each of these 
sub-committees was chaired by a prominent industry leader as well, which brought more 
industry leadership into the fold. 
This new organizational structure was the most representative and largest of the war 
service committees. Table 5.3 provides a list of the national committee, which continued to strike 
a balance of the Standard and Independent networks. The sub-committee chairs are also listed in 
Table 5.4, showing the growth of the committee’s representation. Finally, Table 5.5 provides a 
listing of the various sub-committees as well as the number of members belonging to those 
committees. Additionally, Requa wanted petroleum leaders within the Oil Division itself. He 
stacked his own bureaus within the Oil Division with more petroleum industry leaders, who are 
listed along with their company affiliations in Table 5.6. These bureaus were meant to provide 
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clear lines of communication for all of the various processes and committees working on the 
production and delivery of petroleum supplies. 
In comparing this evolution of these petroleum war service committees over time, there 
were clear and important changes made to the sizes and representative nature of the committees. 
Although Bedford’s initial committee was structured in a way to strike a balance with the 
different subsectors in the industry as well as ensure that the committee was not Standard Oil 
heavy, these small committees still had representation problems. The final iteration of these war 
service committees provided a structure where each of the subsectors and regions had 
representation with clear lines of communication with members of the state. In size alone, the 
final war service committees allowed for more industry leaders to participation in the war effort 
in a formal capacity. Allowing more industry leaders opportunities to voice opinions and be a 
part of decision-making processes apparently increased the legitimacy of the committee in the 
eyes of industry leaders who saw benefits to the cooperative work as the committees were widely 
celebrated within in the industry near the end of the war (Fanning 1959). Additionally, through 
these committees, industry leaders were able to meet members of other sub-sectors and forge 
relationships across these sub-sector lines that had been rigid in the previous decades.  
Framing Industry Participation: Building a Collective Industry and Class Consciousness 
Participation in these committees alone did not inspire the wider shifts necessary for 
industry leaders to recognize their collective interests as a whole industry and, thus, class. Along 
with these formal organizations, industry leaders were also active in shaping discourse about 
industry participation in war, which served as ways for industry leaders to build the frames for a 
collective industry identity that had been lacking prior to the war. Though often applied to the 
study of social movement participants (Melucci 1995; Benford and Snow 2000), such a process 
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is central to any group organizing for social change and, in this instance, building towards a class 
becoming a “class for itself.” For an industry with the deep divisions of the petroleum industry, 
the war effort allowed for a collective class consciousness to be built that was lacking within the 
industry in previous decades. Instead of viewing themselves along the lines of sub-sectors or 
regional affiliations, through their war experiences, industry leaders began to see themselves as 
parts of a collective whole, as an industry and as a class (Fanning 1959; Nash 1968). Of course, 
many of these activities were also attempts to legitimize war service committees. However, in 
this process, petroleum industry leaders were also given reasons to see the benefits of having a 
more cooperative industry environment, which was absent in the previous decades.  
The process of building these collective frames was primarily accomplished through the 
formal speeches and publications distributed by the war service committee members. Throughout 
his tenure as chair, Bedford and members of the petroleum war service committee would 
regularly distribute memos to the petroleum industry through major trade publications. They also 
attended smaller trade association meetings as speakers throughout the war, which were 
primarily representative of Independent oil firms. These trade association meetings also served 
as spaces for the other war service industry leaders to meet with representatives across the 
industry, which likely helped to provide legitimacy to the war service committees. Even industry 
leaders not active directly in the war service committees came to advocate a collective vision for 
the industry. Trade journal editors and leaders of Independent trade associations also worked to 
build a collective class consciousness during the war for collective action.  
In examining the discourse utilized by the industry at this time three primary frames were 
utilized to encourage collective action: patriotism, threats of government control, and selfless 
action. Each of these frames encouraged petroleum leaders to cooperate for the war effort, which 
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also worked to instill a collective identity among petroleum industry leaders. At the war’s end, 
petro-capitalists saw themselves as parts of a collective whole, as a cooperative industry, which 
led them to establish API. 
One of the primary frames utilized to promote industry cooperation was centered on 
appealing to the patriotism of petroleum industry individuals. Although patriotism is often used 
as a cross-class strategy by the state to inspire acceptance of state practices in times of crisis, this 
appeal to patriotism provided a useful organizing tool for industry leaders to call for widespread 
participation in the committees. For example, John H. Markham, a prominent petroleum 
producer and member of all of the national petroleum war service committees, was quoted by 
The Oil and Gas Journal in May of 1917, reflecting on the patriotism of the petroleum industry: 
I was asked…about the war spirit in the oil fields and answered that in no other industry 
could more real patriotism be shown than among oil men. The men who follow the 
petroleum business are imbued with the true American spirit, I told them, and would be 
found at their posts of duty in any warlike situation that might develop. (Markham 
1917:30, emphasis added) 
In another example, Bedford appealed to the patriotism of petroleum industry leaders. Bedford 
would often encourage petroleum industry leaders to think of the present moment and channel 
their patriotism over any sub-sector affiliation:  
This gathering tonight is another instance of the patriotic fervor of the oil men. Here are 
assembled a representative body of men from the four great divisions of the oil business, 
namely, the producing, trans porting, refining and marketing. Many of them have had 
differences in the past. Some of them have been wont to regard one another as enemies in 
business. Part of this hostility was undoubtedly due to lack of understanding, and yet, in 
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times of peace, it would have been practically impossible to have brought U.S. together 
around these tables. We are here because we are stirred by but one thought. That is love 
of country and a keen desire to let bygones be bygones and to join hands in doing our 
share in the midst of the terrific dangers confronting the nation. (Bedford 1917b:42; 
emphasis added) 
Bedford continuously utilized these opportunities to frame industry participation along the lines 
of patriotism, where he challenged industry leaders to consider their country first before their 
individual industry affiliation.  
It was not only members of the petroleum war service committees that utilized the frame 
of patriotism. J.A. Specht, secretary of the Independent Oil Man’s Association, a trade 
association representing petroleum producers, encouraged members of the association to come 
together in the name of patriotism, particularly through the war service committees:  
National necessity knows no individual; Government authorities are too busy to discuss 
matters with individuals or firms; they look to representative associations… for 
suggestions and counsel. However, up to this time the Government has been unable to 
reach “the oil industry” as a whole; it has consulted with various branches but not with 
the industry as a unit, assembled as a body in harmonious receptibility [sic]. It is 
therefore, our patriotic duty to afford the Government this opportunity. (Specht 1918:645, 
emphasis added)  
In calling for collective unity through the frame of patriotism, petroleum industry leaders invited 
participation in the committees that superseded the historic divisions within the industry.  
Although petroleum industry leaders utilized the theme of patriotism as a way to build a 
collective identity for collective action within the petroleum industry during the war, they also 
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separated this from a belief in the supremacy of the government itself. In fact, industry leaders 
during the war were wary of government control and suspicious at times of the establishment of 
different government bodies and commissions as seen in the above sections (Nash 1968; Yergin 
1991). The establishment of the Oil Division in particular led to many petroleum industry leaders 
fearing complete government control of the industry. Industry leaders then also utilized the frame 
of threats of government control to inspire petroleum leaders to work together and see 
themselves as a collective industry in order to ward off government control of the industry 
during the war.  
This frame aligned much more with a recognition of the petroleum industry having 
similar class-based interests, which was meant to inspire petroleum industry leaders to see that 
industry self-regulation and cooperative work was preferred to government control. Bedford 
introduced this frame early on in his first communications with the industry: 
If we fail to do this of our own accord, we will find ourselves confronted with the other 
alternative—rigid, autocratic government organization of industry of the German type. 
Organization of that kind, of that character, is autocracy itself. It breeds bureaucracy and 
stifles initiative, and thus democracy, at its birth… 
Our commercial institutions and the business men of this country are on trial today as 
never before. We stand as the stewards of the resources of the nation. If, with the eyes of 
the country and the world upon U.S., we fail to give a true and righteous account of our 
stewardship, the verdict of condemnation will be sweeping against U.S.… 
I tell you again, gentleman, only as we prove our fitness to run business, will we be 
allowed to run it in the future. (Bedford 1917b:44; emphasis added) 
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Here, Bedford calls the petroleum industry to action by envisioning a future of broader 
government control if their work in the war effort does not succeed. Bedford also appeals to what 
he believed was the inherent responsibility of petroleum industry leaders as “stewards” of 
resources. By framing industry along these collective lines while simultaneously pushing 
forward threats of broader government control, Bedford was also providing the building blocks 
for petroleum industry leaders seeing themselves as part of a collective whole, which would have 
impacts on how the petroleum industry’s collective identity emerged during the war.  
Editors of Independent petroleum trade journals also utilized the theme of government 
control to motivate petroleum industry members to see the work in the committees as beneficial 
to the industry. Although some early editorials questioned the legitimacy of the committee, as the 
war continued, the pages of these trade magazines increasingly featured strong support for the 
organized efforts of the committee. This was particularly true because of fear of government 
control: 
By every one in the oil industry recognizing the new Petroleum War Service Committee, 
of which Mr. Bedford is chairman, as that central authority, he will best serve this 
country as well as his own interests. If you do not recognize this Petroleum War Service 
Committee as the central and controlling authority of the oil industry, then there is no 
question but what, if the war continues as we all believe it will, you will have to 
recognize a government authority… 
But the oil industry has a chance to avoid this unhappy issue. It can support unalterably 
the Petroleum War Service Committee. It can respond with every energy at its command 
to every call of that committee. It can heed every suggestion as a command to be obeyed 
at once. By thus organizing itself into a complete unit, the oil industry can serve the 
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government so well that even the greatest of government ownership advocates would 
pause in his acquisition of his country's industries. (NPN 1918:5; emphasis added) 
Finally, petroleum industry leaders during the war also directly addressed the concept of 
the petroleum industry seeing itself as part of a collective whole. This frame often was 
juxtaposed against self-centered action or framed as “unselfish” cooperation to encourage 
petroleum leaders to think beyond their own immediate interests to work collectively on the war 
effort: 
Co-operation must be our watchword. Americans are individualistic. We believe in 
individual labor, individual initiative, individual enterprise and control, but this war has 
made it plain that none can stand alone—that each must be for all—and that the nation 
that does not stand together as one man, faces disruption… 
We must be willing to sacrifice our pleasure, our profits and our prejudices. We must join 
hands and enlist the nation. Let the politician in Congress co-operate with the executive, 
and the executive with the politician; the Government with industry, and industry with 
the Government; labor with capital, and capital with labor. Then will great achievement 
be accomplished. But woe to U.S. as a nation, as an industry, as individuals, if at this 
time we seek self-achievement and self-aggrandizement. Only dire disaster can follow 
then, for we are up against the greatest struggle this country ever faced. (Bedford 
1918:204) 
Industry leaders were not the only ones framing industry participation along “unselfish” 
lines. Requa, head of the Oil Division, also called on industry leaders to anchor their work 
through the committees in unselfish and cooperative ways: 
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And so I believe that the oil industry can govern itself wisely and well, if it will, that it 
can formulate its own rules and regulations far more satisfactorily by voluntary effort 
than through Government mandate. It needs but a realization of the crisis confronting 
U.S., a vision sufficiently broad to see beyond mere personal and selfish interests, and the 
understanding that the problems of petroleum as related to the war are national, and must 
be solved in the national interest, by the industry as a whole, regardless of the selfish 
individual—if any there be—who cannot see beyond his own immediate surroundings. 
(Requa 1918f:633; emphasis added) 
Although the immediate crisis Requa identified was the war itself, Requa was also alluding to the 
potential impacts on the business community should the Central Powers be successful in winning 
the conflict, which he saw as being particularly threatened by more centralized and controlling 
governments (Nash 1968). Aligned with his vision of less government control of the industry, as 
a state official, Requa was a strong advocate for the industry working cooperatively through 
voluntary measures. Requa’s continuing support of an organized industry also calls attention to 
how state officials who support capitalism also directly support capitalist agendas and cohesion 
as a class.  
The frame of selfless action and its connection to cooperative organized efforts, however, 
was also important for anchoring how petro-capitalists understood their role in society: 
This means that industry must be kept at the maximum of production and it must be 
geared for long sustained effort; and that means that we, the business men in whose hands 
has been placed the direction and development of industry, must be prepared to give our 
most loyal and absolutely unselfish co-operation to the great cause… 
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There rests upon the business men today not only the economic necessity of giving 
material aid to the nation in every way, but also the ethical necessity of doing all within 
their power to prevent the increasing of unrest and dissatisfaction that has been spread 
abroad amongst U.S. by the disciples of Socialism and such organizations as the I.W.W. 
Only as we prove the unselfish soundness of our methods and our willingness for public 
service will we still be permitted to lead. We must organize; we must mobilize; we must 
agree to work as one for the general good of all, sinking all questions of individual 
advantage in the common pool of national success. (Bedford 1917b:43-45; emphasis 
added) 
In this speech, Bedford connects industry participation in the war to broader concerns about loss 
of industry power and capitalism in society. He frames industry as leaders who are threatened by 
many different actors, including a strong state and a strong labor force. Calling attention to the 
need to organize “for the general good” through unselfish measures, Bedford paints industry men 
as the true leaders in society.  While petroleum industry leaders framed the industry’s 
participation in the war as selfless, this was also utilized to frame capitalists as the rightful and 
dominant class in society. This dominant role is an essential part of capitalist class consciousness 
and bourgeois ideology (Marx 1848; Lukács 1926). Such a framing invokes an understanding of 
how class consciousness is built by capitalists and the foundation of building and maintaining 
their organized efforts. 
Although each of these frames produced diverse content and messages to the petroleum 
industry, each also connected back to advocating for a cooperative and cohesive industry. Such 
discursive work helps individuals make sense of their organizing and organizations. In the case 
of the U.S. petroleum industry, the war effort brought opportunities for industry leaders to build 
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a collective class consciousness that led to the industry becoming a more cohesive and organized 
unit, which proved essential for the industry to work together during and after the war. 
Post-War: Envisioning Cooperation and the Establishment of API 
By the war’s end, the petroleum industry had successfully come together as a cohesive 
unit. Through the war service committees, petroleum industry leaders were able to reach 
agreements and work with government officials to meet petroleum demands both in the U.S. and 
abroad. Although there were moments of contention related to price controls, the formal 
committee structures ensured that petroleum industry leaders had a process through which they 
participated meaningfully in the decision-making. Mandatory licensing, price-fixing, and even 
the introduction of the voluntary “gasless Sundays” rationing program mirrored efforts found in 
other divisions of the Food and Fuel Administrations. However, none of the programs were 
created without the approval and adoption of the petroleum industry through their war service 
committees. Although Requa occasionally threatened the industry with the use of his authority 
through the Fuel Administration, it was petroleum leaders themselves who negotiated and 
reached agreements that were then presented to Requa. By the end of the war, industry 
leadership did not see this work as over-reaching government intervention or control. Instead, 
they supported these efforts, seeing these measures as the culmination of industry-wide 
patriotism and the embodiment of a new cooperative spirit within their industry (Williamson et 
al. 1963; Nash 1968). 
After the war, praise for the U.S. petroleum industry was high. Military leaders in the 
U.S. and other Allied nations expressed their gratitude for the committee, often crediting the 
industry with helping to achieve victory for the Allies. In a speech to the Inter-Allied Petroleum 
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Council, Lord Curzon, a member of the British War Cabinet, stated that “The Allies floated to 
victory on a wave of oil” (Yergin 1991). Paul Foley, a U.S. military official, stated the following: 
…had this committee hesitated in decision or failed in performance, the war, if not 
actually lost, would have at least been indefinitely prolonged. As it was, no military 
undertaking of the Allies on land, or on the sea, underneath the sea or in the air, was ever 
once interrupted through lack of petroleum supplies. (Foley 1927:1803) 
Petroleum products were certainly essential to the war effort. Williamson et al. (1963) note that 
while it is difficult to provide an exact measure of the total contribution of U.S. petroleum 
products because of lack of comparable data, a “rough estimate would suggest… throughout the 
entire period of the war totaled close to 133 million barrels” (292). 
The wartime experiences inspired a new direction for petroleum industry leaders to see 
themselves as a cohesive industry ready to work on common issues. When considered through a 
Marxist lens, this can be understood as a process of recognizing class-based interests and the 
petroleum industry seeing themselves as “class for itself”. This chapter suggests that class 
consciousness must be understood as a collective recognition process, with capitalists coming to 
see that there are benefits to working together in order to protect their interests. With state 
priorities shifting to support the war effort, petroleum industry leaders had this opportunity 
through their participation in formal committees to reach agreements on issues related to the 
delivery of war supplies. Petroleum industry leaders also utilized a number of discursive tactics 
to legitimize the work of the committee and activities for the war, which also encouraged 
petroleum industry leaders to see the benefits of becoming a cooperative industry.  
For the petroleum industry, work on the war effort proved to be the catalyst to inspire a 
more cohesive, organized industry, conscious of the benefits of collective action. As the war 
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came to a close, the desire to see cooperation continue was high across all of the subsectors in 
the industry, with industry leaders eager to plan next steps. Through their wartime experiences, 
petroleum industry leaders wanted to continue their cooperative efforts and strategize 
collectively on ways to protect and promote their interests. And to channel this desire for 
continued cooperation within the industry, it was an organization, a national trade association 
that industry leaders began to make plans to create following the war (Nash 1968). Industry 
leaders were also conscious of their history, however, fearing a return to the previous years of 
bitter divisions and competition:  
… the total strangers and “natural enemies” of yesterday were calling each other by their 
first names and saying “We can’t go back; we’ve got to be an industry; we’ve got to have 
a national trade association.” (Fanning 1959:25, emphasis in original) 
Thus, the creation of a national trade association inclusive of all firms in the industry was seen as 
a way to channel this cooperation into an organization. And that national trade association was 
the American Petroleum Institute. The next chapter provides an analysis of how API was created 





Creating the American Petroleum Institute: Conscious, Collective Action and 
the Formation of Trade Associations 
 
Following World War I, energy and enthusiasm was high within the petroleum industry 
and the wider capitalist class in the United States to continue the cooperative efforts that were 
fostered during the war. For the petroleum industry in particular, the war had served as a way for 
industry leaders to work on common issues and heal divisions within the industry that had 
marked the industry for decades. To channel their cooperative efforts, petro-capitalists saw the 
creation of a national and inclusive trade association as a way to work collectively on common 
problems within the industry and on external threats to the industry from outside actors. As the 
war came to a close, petroleum industry leaders began to make plans to create their first national 
trade association, the American Petroleum Institute.  
This chapter focuses on how the American Petroleum Institute was formed following 
World War I, extending the argument that trade associations are inherently capitalist 
organizations. Little research has examined the organizing processes that lead to the inception of 
trade associations. Some studies have focused on the wider trends of organizational emergence at 
the population level, which show patterns of when trade associations were established or when 
they declined or transformed. By studying the intentional organizing processes that capitalists 
pursue to create trade associations, insight into how capitalists recognize their collective, class-
based interests and organize to protect and promote these interests can be gained. Focusing on 
the inception of trade associations also complicates the way that any activities performed by 
trade associations are understood. Because trade associations are established as formal 
organizations through which capitalists work collectively on issues of wider industry concern, 
the activities pursued through trade associations should also be understood through this lens. 
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This means that all activities performed by trade associations are meant to protect and promote 
class-based interests. Such an understanding challenges previous conceptualizations of trade 
associations as cultural institutions that create and operate off “disinterested solidarity” and 
“nonstrategic action” (Spillman 2012) and atheoretical studies of trade associations as simple 
collective organizations (Oliver 1990; Hillman and Hitt 1999). By studying the processes 
through which capitalists come to form trade associations, their economical, political, and 
cultural significance becomes apparent in new ways. This chapter shows how API was created to 
make the point that trade associations need to be understood as the culmination of intentional 
organizing by capitalists to protect and promote their class-based interests. 
To understand how petroleum industry leaders came to form API just after the war, I first 
document the meetings and processes that petroleum industry leaders participated in to create 
API, analyzing the organizing efforts of capitalists within the petroleum industry and the wider 
U.S. business community following the war. The first stage of this process occurred during the 
Reconstruction Convention of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce held three weeks following the 
armistice on November 11 in early December of 1918. This convention called together all of the 
war service committees across industries. This conference served as an inter-industry meeting, 
where industry leaders across all industrial sectors met and discussed the future of U.S. industry 
at home and abroad. Discussions of foreign trade and government control were of high 
importance for industry leaders seeing the position that the U.S. business community was in 
following the war. With European states and industries devastated from the war, industry leaders 
in the U.S. felt their role was essential in the reconstruction effort abroad and that they could 
serve as “economic advisers” as Europe was rebuilding (Wheeler 1919:11). At home, however, 
industry leaders were eager to be liberated from some of the state controls such as price fixing, 
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pooling, and other economic regulatory activities as well as some complete government 
takeovers of specific industrial sectors that were implemented during the war. However, they 
were also keen on maintaining their cooperative networks with the state and within their 
industries and using these to promote U.S. business in foreign markets. At this conference, 
business leaders strategized and created a set of twenty-six resolutions, which served as a plan 
for how to advance their collective interests as a class through collective organizations like the 
Chamber and national trade associations.  
This conference also sponsored intra-industry meetings, where industry leaders within 
particular industry sectors could meet to plan for the future of their industries through 
cooperative measures. At this conference, petroleum industry leaders, along with government 
officials like Requa, met to discuss the future of the petroleum industry. This conference allowed 
petroleum industry leaders to begin planning for the future of the industry and forming strategies 
to accomplish collective goals. Some of this planning included contributing to the wider 
Chamber’s resolutions as well as setting intentions to form the first national trade association for 
the U.S. petroleum industry.  
Four months later in March of 1919, petroleum industry leaders organized two additional 
meetings to draft the constitution and by-laws for the national trade association, which was then 
named the American Petroleum Institute. In this final section of the chapter, I provide an analysis 
of the first iteration of API’s organizational structure. I examine the by-laws and stated purpose 
of the organization, the formal structure of API’s committees and divisions, and how leadership 
in the organization was selected to fill these positions. Each of these processes was carefully 
designed, with the goal of industry cooperation for the long-term in mind. Through the creation 
of API, petroleum industry leaders envisioned a formal organization that would be utilized for 
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collective action on issues of industry concern for years to come. Understanding the formation 
process and the roots of organizations like trade associations challenges conceptualizations and 
underestimations of these organizations as social actors, showing that these organizations have 
deeper connections to the protection and promotion of class-based interests than other 
conceptualizations suggest. That is, these organizations are not primarily cultural producers or 
“just a lobby group” (Hillman and Hitt 1999; Spillman 2012). Trade associations are inherently 
capitalist organizations created to protect and promote the class-based interests of capitalists. 
Organizing for Peacetime Prosperity: Capitalist Organizing and Organizations in the Post-
WWI era 
 Following the end of WWI, capitalists quickly began to organize and consider the future 
of industry during peacetime. After what they deemed a successful period of cooperation across 
all industrial sectors during the war, capitalists desired to continue these cooperative efforts 
following the war. However, industry leaders were also wary of continued or stronger 
government control, which they believed might be extended by the federal government into 
peacetime. Although they saw benefits to having a close relationship to the state, capitalists were 
adamant about having the ability to self-regulate and create their own institutions and processes 
that could foster better cooperation within their industries. At the end of WWI, these issues were 
fresh on the minds of capitalists and they took measures to make their positions known. In order 
to formulate ideas and plans for moving U.S. industry forward, capitalists in the U.S. organized 
meetings to come together in formal spaces with one another. The first of these conferences was 
organized by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and called the Reconstruction Conference of 
Industrial War Service Committees.  
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Reconstruction Conference of Industry War Service Committees 
Throughout the war, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce was the primary organizational 
mechanism through which capitalists across industries were able to quickly mobilize. Following 
the war, the Chamber was also utilized to bring capitalists together across sectors for the purpose 
of discussing and planning industry stability in peacetime. The importance of the war 
experiences for industry leaders were not lost on the leaders in the Chamber of Commerce: 
War performs miracles with the spirits of men. It creates new and stronger human 
associations. Realizing this, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States has been 
calling men from our industries to confer with the Government as war service 
committees. By this move, the Chamber’s program of uniting and inspiring the business 
interests of this country has been hastened forward by twenty-five years. (Uzzell 1919:9) 
To continue this momentum, the Chamber sponsored a “reconstruction” conference December 2-
5 in 1918, three weeks after Germany signed the armistice agreement, effectively ending WWI 
(Uzzell 1919; Nash 1968). All members of the war service committees were invited along with 
an open call to other industry leaders, which amounted to over 4,000 attendees at the conference 
(Uzzell 1919).  
The conference was meant to provide “the fullest possible opportunity for free expression 
of opinion” on industry matters related to reconstruction following the war, which continued the 
tradition of the Chamber bringing business leaders together for planning and strategizing, as the 
Chamber had done in suggesting trade associations be used by the war service committees 
(Uzzell 1919:9). The conference was centered on the idea that business men were the most 
“competent advisers” for “economic reconstruction,” not political leaders: 
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Men of business may not be regarded component advisers in matters of diplomacy and 
statecraft as affecting political reconstruction, but as a corollary to this assumption, the 
diplomat or stateman may not be regarded as a wholly competent adviser in matters of 
economic reconstruction. (Wheeler 1918:11) 
Indeed, as the war came to a close, capitalists saw opportunities to have a hand in the 
reconstruction process not only in the U.S., but also abroad. And by framing themselves as 
economic advisors, capitalists were showing that they believed they had skills and knowledge to 
bring to the table in the post-war period. The war also provided industry leaders with close 
relationships to state officials, which many industry leaders saw as beneficial to their industries, 
particularly as they were attempting to expand their industries at home and abroad during 
peacetime. 
The conference had two purposes. One was for all industry leaders to work on resolutions 
together that were actionable under the Chamber of Commerce. To create and discuss these 
resolutions, the Chamber organized the conference into a “pattern of pyramided committees,” 
which included: 
… the 373 original war service committees to report to thirty-six “related groups,” who in 
turn hand in their selected grist of resolutions to a clearance committee, who makes a 
final selection to be presented to the congress [of all conference participants] as a whole. 
(Uzzell 1919:9) 
Through the congress, twenty-seven resolutions were passed (see Figure 6.1). A report from the 
conference summed up the resolutions as follows: 
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All the resolutions were adopted unanimously. They represent the essence of the 
American business man’s experience during the time the United States was in the war 
and are intended to be the guiding spirit for American business in the months to come.  
(Automotive Industries 1918:996) 
The resolutions serve as a window into the capitalists’ positions on how they believed industry 
should relate to the state as well as how they believed inter-industry relationships should be 
fostered. Some of these resolutions focused on lifting or expanding wartime legislation while 
other suggested business-friendly legislation and other types of government support of industry. 
For example, Resolution 3, titled Removal of Restrictions of Industry, pushed for war regulations 
on industry to be revoked. Resolution 13 opposed government ownership of means of 
communication such as telegraphs, telephones, and cables, which had all been taken under state 
control during the war. Other resolutions focused on how the state could potentially aid in 
growing U.S. industries, particularly in foreign trade and markets. Resolution 20 urges the state 
to see “the vital necessity of encouraging and developing our foreign trade through all 
appropriate means possible…” (Automotive Industries 1919:998). 
Other resolutions were focused on building relations to other actors like labor. Resolution 
7, notably brought forward by John D. Rockefeller, Jr. of the petroleum industry, outlined 
principles for industry leaders in how they should relate to labor within their industry. Such a 
position focused on fostering cooperative relationships with labor, suggesting that “labor and 
capital are partners, not enemies… neither can attain the fullest measure of prosperity at the 
expense of the other” (Automotive Industries 1919:997). Although the petroleum industry itself 
did not face significant labor strikes, Rockefeller’s lengthy resolution was likely a response to 
the swelling of socialist organizing of labor communities in the U.S. during this time, with 
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industry leaders attempting to frame themselves as friends of labor. In recognizing this potential 
threat to the wider capitalist class, Rockefeller was advocating for a corporatist structure where 
labor’s interests would be subsumed under capitalist interests, which in turn were equated with a 
broader national interest. 
Still other resolutions focused directly on fostering internal industry relationships and 
how to make more cooperative industry environments. Some of these resolutions were simple, 
such as Resolution 25, which encouraged all industries to adopt uniform cost accounting 
methods. The final resolution, Resolution 27, suggested that national trade associations should 
now be seen and understood as “representative” entities to their wider industries: 
The experiences of the war have clearly demonstrated the value of national trade 
organizations and their service to the country as well as to industry. This conference 
heartily approves the plan of organizing each industry in the country in a representative 
national trade association and expresses the belief that every manufacturer, jobber and 
producer of raw materials should be a member of the national organization in his trade 
and cordially support it in its work. (Automotive Industries 1918:999; emphasis added) 
In examining the resolutions overall, the participants in the Reconstruction Conference 
developed plans for industrial development in peacetime that was free from direct government 
control. However, industry leaders were interested in fostering cooperative relationships with the 
state so long as these relationships did not stifle industry’s developmental ability both at home 
and abroad. Industry leaders were also conscious of potential internal industry threats leading to 
industry instability, which led to the creation of resolutions meant to foster industry cooperation 
within their industries and with other actors such as labor. All of the resolutions developed out of 
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this conference were meant to serve as a clear and united plan forward in peacetime as seen 
through the eyes of capitalists.  
Petroleum Industry Participation in the Reconstruction Conference 
The second purpose of the conference was to provide meeting space for individual 
industries to discuss issues and make plans for their internal industry organizing efforts 
following the war. Each industry sector was charged with creating resolutions outlining 
actionable items to move forward with cooperative work within their specific industries as well 
as creating resolutions to the wider congress of all industries at the conference. For the petroleum 
industry, this served as a way for industry leaders to bring all of the war service advisory 
committees together to discuss the future of the industry.  
The petroleum committee passed three resolutions at the conference. The first two 
resolutions were passed as part of the collective effort of the conference and focused on the 
continuation of the war service committees and relationships of industry to the state (see Figures 
6.2 and 6.3). Resolution One suggested that the war service committees be permitted to continue 
through the reconstruction period under the Chamber of Commerce. The thought behind this 
particular resolution was that the committees provided the necessary formal structures to bring 
industry leaders together and were essential in the post-war reconstruction period. This 
resolution eventually evolved into Resolution 26 in the final resolutions of the conference. 
Resolution Two was a much more pointed resolution meant to establish a position of how 
industry leaders viewed government intervention related to industry cooperation. This resolution 
eventually evolved into a number of resolutions, which were all expanded in the final version 
released by the Chamber. This particular resolution was published in petroleum trade magazines 
under the title “A Message to Congress From the Oil Industry of America” (NPN 1918:14). 
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Through this resolution, petroleum industry leaders were setting the tone for how they believed 
industrial development and regulation should move forward in the future. As an industry that 
bore much of the antitrust legislation, such statements about the state having “the least possible 
control” in peacetime (NPN 1918:14). The fifth point in this resolution provided a summary of 
the position of the industry: 
In short, it is our opinion that government should regard the development of industry 
from the point of view of the people as a whole, that it should not discriminate for or 
against individuals or groups: that it should be the duty of the government to promote the 
utmost possible prosperity of industry, such prosperity to be expressed in active and 
profitable domestic trade and in the carrying of American commerce to all parts of the 
world. To accomplish this, it is important that past prejudices be erased and that 
conditions as they are be squarely faced and intelligent and broad-minded measures be 
taken in the interest and welfare of the whole people. (NPN 1918:14) 
With this resolution, petroleum industry leaders were clearly advocating for a new direction 
forward for their industry, particularly regarding their relationship to the state. With their 
experiences in the war being positive, particularly under the leadership with Requa, who was in 
attendance at the conference, petroleum industry leaders representing large and small firms came 
to see cooperative relationships with the state as desirable. However, there were clearly fears that 
the industry would suffer scrutiny, particularly because of “past prejudices,” which likely 
referred to previous relationships that many industry leaders (particularly Standard Oil 
executives) saw as overreaching state power.  
The third resolution, detailed in Figure 6.4, that petroleum industry leaders passed during 
the Reconstruction Conference focused directly on the creation of a national trade association, 
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which would become the American Petroleum Institute. R.L. Welch, a member of the war 
service committees, noted that this conference served as a time of reflection for industry leaders 
and the creation of a national trade association was a crucial step forward for the industry: 
There was therefore created in the oil business, for the moment at least, a spirit of good 
will, a truly national conception of duty [from their wartime experiences]. Furthermore 
there was created between the government and the business the true spirit of co-
operation. These two great advances marked epochs in the development of the industry, 
and the problem which the industry today faces is “Shall we go back, shall we make no 
effort to work together for public and national aims. Shall we make no effort toward 
lawful co-operation and good fellowship, shall we permit the organization of the industry 
to fall apart, and abandon all efforts to continue co-operation with the government." The 
answer to these questions must be in the negative. It was to answer them in the negative 
that it was proposed to organize the American Petroleum Institute. (Welch 1919:16) 
In passing the final resolution, petro-capitalists were making concrete steps forward for their 
industry, envisioning the creation of a national trade association as a way to continue the 
cooperative work and the collective industry identity that had been fostered during the war. 
However, it was also important for the association to be established as a new organization for the 
petroleum industry that was driven by the collective agenda of industry leaders themselves, not 
the state. Although the war served as a practice run for cooperative work within the industry, the 
establishment of a national trade association would require that the whole industry be involved in 
organizing process creating the new organization. In reporting on the passage of this resolution, 
an editor of the National Petroleum News, provided some context to how the trade association 
was being conceptualized in this early meeting: 
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After the resolution had been passed Chairman Bedford, who presided at the group 
session, stated that active steps would soon be taken to effect such an organization, which 
would have no connection with the Petroleum Committee. He assured the oil men present 
that such an association could become of no importance to the industry as a whole nor to 
its individual members unless all branches and groups were represented and, in addition 
to that, unless they took active part in the work of the association to be formed. Mr. 
Bedford stated the committee had already formulated plans which it believed would work 
out in forming a comprehensive organization. He told of the many requests and 
statements that have come to the attention of the members of the committee urging the 
forming of such an all inclusive body now while the industry has before it the great 
lesson in co-operation the war has taught. (NPN 1918:14; emphasis added) 
The organizing process that led to the creation of the trade association was seen as a continuance 
of the cooperative work that was established during wartime. The establishment of the 
organization, however, created an opportunity for industry leaders to map out their own future 
plans and how they wanted to structure cooperative work through their own organization. After 
the passage of this final resolution, plans were made to hold additional meetings for petroleum 
industry leaders to form the national trade association in March of 1919. The next section details 
these meetings, highlighting how petroleum industry leaders formed the American Petroleum 
Institute to be an organization centered on the protection and promotion of their class-based 
interests. 
Forming API: Petroleum Industry Organizing for Collective Action 
Creating the formal organization of the American Petroleum Institute occurred in two 
meetings in March of 1919. The first meeting was held in New York City where petroleum 
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industry leaders through the war committees structure drafted by-laws and created a structure for 
the trade association on March 14 (Nash 1968). The bulk of the organizing and planning for the 
trade association happened during this first conference with over 500 petroleum industry leaders 
present (Fanning 1959). The second meeting happened ten days later in Chicago at a special 
Petroleum Congress during the annual meeting of the American Petroleum League, which had 
historically been a meeting only open to Independent firms (Nash 1968). At the Petroleum 
Congress, the leadership for API was elected amongst the final iteration of the petroleum war 
service committees. Requa and other members of the Oil Division were also part of both 
meetings, giving guidance about potential government cooperation in peacetime. At each of 
these meetings, petroleum industry leaders worked together to create and implement plans for the 
first year of work of the American Petroleum Institute. They also participated in dinners and 
celebratory events, which featured speakers that reiterated the success of the petroleum 
industry’s cooperation during the war and spoke of their hopes for the success of API for the 
industry as a whole. The following sections provide an analysis of these organizing processes 
and first iteration of the formal structure of the American Petroleum Institute.  
Organizational Structures in Trade Associations: Strategies for Industry Representation and 
Cooperation 
At the meeting in New York, petroleum industry leaders were charged with creating the 
first formal structure of the American Petroleum Institute as well as the by-laws and stated 
purpose of the organization. All of this formal organizing work was intentionally centered on the 
concept of industry cooperation and collective action. In his speech at a celebratory dinner at the 
New York conference, Bedford reminded petroleum industry leaders of the unity that had come 
about through their collective war experiences. However, Bedford aligned these experiences 
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within a broader moral context, suggesting that the cooperative work was also a part of 
protecting the country and humanity, which he suggested were under attack during the war: 
What we were able to accomplish was brought about by a splendid spirit of common 
sense and cooperation among the men engaged in the Oil Industry. The interests of any 
one was subordinated to the interests of all, that is, to the interests of our country and 
humanity… 
We, in the years of the war, have been able to supply the armies and navies of the United 
States and associated nations with the oil and gasoline which, after all, were the elements 
of victory. We have been able to keep the factories at home going and we have 
coordinated the manufacture and distribution of petroleum to such an extent that at no 
time in the history of any industry was there less of personality, animosity or self-seeking 
than there is in the oil industry in the United States today. (Bedford 1919:30 Oildom 
April 1919)9 
Reiterating the collective experiences and actions of the petroleum industry during the war was 
the constant backdrop to all of the meetings during the API planning period. Industry leaders saw 
the importance of grounding the roots of API in these experiences, calling attention to the 
success of the cooperative work of the war, particularly among capitalists themselves.  
With this cooperative spirit as a guide, the formation of API’s structure officially began. 
Figure 6.5 provides the first draft of the by-laws of API, which centered on fostering cooperation 
within the industry and with the state. These by-laws also centered the work of API on 
promoting the general interests of all parts of the petroleum industry and work related to industry 
improvement. While short, these four by-laws offer a window into the purpose of a national trade 
                                                
9 It is also worth noting that capitalists will often define that “national interest” narrowly along lines of capitalist 
interests, which precludes other class interests, particularly labor. 
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association at its inception. For the petroleum industry, the organization was planned to be 
inclusive and centered on cooperative and collective action.  
In reflecting on the organization’s purpose in a speech to all of the petroleum war 
committee members, Requa framed the organization as the conduit for collective action on 
emerging petroleum industry issues and potential success and a “mouthpiece” and united front 
for the industry moving forward: 
Having in mind the competition of the future for the products of petroleum and being 
familiar with the world activities, I believe that complete harmony of action and 
sympathetic co-operation between government and industry is necessary, if we are to 
serve adequately the world needs for petroleum. Your individual action in this would, I 
think, be of not the slightest utility. The promotion in general of the interests of the 
industry cannot be undertaken by any one of you. You need, and must have if you desire 
satisfactory results, a mouthpiece through which all of you may speak as a united 
industry. (Requa 1919:36; emphasis added) 
Although the U.S. petroleum industry was the dominant source of petroleum at this time and 
particularly following the war, Requa suggested that a more organized industry would be 
instrumental in expanding the U.S. petroleum industry at home and abroad in the decades to 
come (Williamson et al. 1963; Nash 1968).  
The by-laws then guided the creation of the first formal structure of API (see Table 6.1 
and Figure 6.6). Two primary issues drove the design the structure. The first was intentional 
inclusiveness of all different parts of the industry, which mirrored the by-laws of the 
organization. All petroleum trade associations prior to the war were “violently Independent,” 
with many of these organizations only representing one sub-sector of the industry (Fanning 
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1959). API then was meant to be an umbrella organization of the whole industry, which is 
represented in the “Major Groups” structure of the industry. Many of these groups were also 
modeled after the petroleum war service committees, which balanced different sub-sectors of the 
industry in order to allow wide participation across the industry within API. 
Representativeness and inclusiveness were also key parts of selecting the leadership of 
the organization. Petroleum industry leaders agreed that many of the leaders in the war service 
committees would be natural leaders in the first iteration of API. This was particularly true for 
the office of President, which many petroleum industry leaders believed should be filled by A.C. 
Bedford, who lead all iterations of the petroleum war service committees. Bedford, however, 
declined the position, citing his wishes that other petroleum industry leaders whom he felt were 
equally capable be able to fill the executive positions in the organization. Although not stated 
publically, it is also true that Bedford was wary of API appearing to be an organization that was 
intimately connected to Standard Oil (Fanning 1959). Although much of Bedford’s leadership 
style had centered on creating an inclusive industry consciousness and identity during the war, he 
was aware of the potential for a resurgence of division within the industry following the war. 
Fanning (1959) notes that during this period: “Bedford was determined to lay low the myth of 
Standard Oil control, for to permit [the myth’s] continued "existence" was to invite a return to 
the chaos and the ultimate destruction of a house divided” (Fanning 1959:37). Other leaders were 
also worried of the resurgence of past tensions within the organization. R.L. Welch, who became 
the first General Secretary of API, saw the success of API as intimately tied to moving beyond 
these past issues: 
However there is one fundamental problem in the oil business which stares U.S. in the 
face at the very outset… That problem is whether the representatives of the Standard Oil 
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Companies and of the other large interests and of their competitors can join and stay in a 
common organization having for its purpose the national and the public good. Is it 
possible, is it desirable for the oil business to forget its factional past, or should the old 
conditions be restored? Would their restoration be beneficial to the public and to the 
industry? (Welch 1919:15) 
Welch’s answer was a resounding no, with him seeing API as the collective project that industry 
leaders could work on together, which would continue to heal some of these past divides. Platt, a 
trade journal editor also encouraged Independent firm leadership to see API as a potential body 
that could quell potential issues of Standard control or dominance and that could be used to 
Independent’s advantage: 
The opportunity is theirs, if they will but grasp it, to make the American Petroleum 
Institute such a national and truly representative organization of the oil industry that it 
will dominate the Standard Oil interests, should the issue arise, just as the national 
associations in innumerable other industries dominate any one company or groups of 
companies in that industry. (Platt 1919:18) 
Even after the cooperative experiences that were fostered during the war, such sentiments 
show that petroleum industry leaders were still cautious about old divisions and how these may 
crop up again during peacetime. These sentiments may have been expressed because of the 
previous failed attempts to structure industry agreements through trade associations, particularly 
in the late 1800s. Many Independents, as well as government trustbusters, attributed these 
failures to the secretive practices of Standard executives during the time. Also, the war 
committees were the first time that many Independent oil company leaders had worked with 
Standard executives on cooperative efforts whereas Independent leaders had been organizing 
 174 
together for decades. Although the war allowed industry leaders to see the benefits of working 
together as a whole industry, the question remained as to whether it was possible for them to 
work collectively without some firms utilizing the organization for their own narrow benefits.  
The difficulties of this initial cooperation remind us that the processes of developing class 
consciousness and organizing class-based efforts are not automatic or given within the capitalist 
class. The development of class consciousness as well as organized class-based efforts requires 
continuous support and reflection in order to maintain and strengthen the bonds that are 
necessary to pursue cooperative work. This is the essence of what it means for a class to be “for 
itself” instead of narrowly or objectively “in itself.” For the petroleum industry, the renewed 
effort to unify suggests that the consciousness and collective identity that was built during the 
war was still fragile – or at least seen as fragile by many industry leaders – and worthy of 
considering in the inception of API. That is, the past of the industry echoed in the planning 
process of API, with industry leaders concerned that practices by individual firms, particularly 
the Standard Oil network and other large firms that had begun to emerge during this time, would 
threaten the collective efforts envisioned through the establishment of API. However, this should 
not be considered a failure or reversal of the cooperative efforts during the war. Instead, it shows 
that petro-capitalists had the foresight to consider how previous factions could potentially re-
emerge within their organization. 
In an attempt to quell these concerns, the first set of leaders that were chosen to run the 
institute were carefully selected to represent diverse facets and regions of the industry (see Table 
6.2). After Bedford declined the presidency of the organization, T.A. O’Donnell, a petroleum 
producer based in California, was selected as the first president of API. O’Donnell was then 
president and general manager of the American Petroleum Company and the California 
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Production Company, who has many years of experience in the oil fields of both California and 
Mexico. Table 6.2 details the roster of API leadership as elected at the Petroleum Congress in 
March of 1919.  
In examining this first iteration of API leadership, some issues related to 
representativeness emerge. Some of the committees were unable to be filled by each of the 
regional affiliations that were planned at the inception of the organization. For example, in Table 
6.1, each of the Major Groups were meant to have representation of each of the major oil 
regions. However, as displayed in Table 6.2, once leadership was selected, many of the Groups 
did not have equal regional representation. This is likely because of the maturity of some 
petroleum regions over others and how the industry was structured during this time. Some 
regions were dominated by particular sectors over others, which made the balanced design of the 
committees unrealistic when it came time to fill the positions.  
However, these committees did succeed in other ways in terms of representation. In 
worrying about the dominance of former Standard Oil firms in formal leadership positions, the 
committees were stacked with more representation from Independent firms. Although some may 
argue that true representation would come from an equal number of former Standard and 
Independent firms, this may have made the organization appear from the get go as somewhat a 
two-party system. With the goal of inclusivity, Bedford in particular was hopeful that 
Independents would drive much of the organizational planning and that much of “the initiative 
should come from the Independents, not Standard Oil” (Fanning 1959:26). Additionally, the 
committees were successful in incorporating all parts of the industry under one organization, 
which was clearly a key part of the design of the organization. This alone was a major feat for a 
petroleum trade association during this time given the past industry-driven organized efforts. 
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Organizational Committees: Strategies for Industry Stability and Protection 
The other primary issue that drove the organizational structure of API were perceived 
threats to the wider industry. In the late 1800s, trade associations were utilized to work on 
industry-wide problems, particularly related to industry economic instability. Petroleum industry 
leaders attempted to create economic mechanisms like agreed upon prices or periods of 
shutdowns of production to address this instability. These economic mechanisms were also 
utilized under state supervision during the war to produce and deliver war supplies. However, in 
peacetime, these mechanisms were not available options for trade associations as antitrust laws, 
which were frozen during the war, were reinstated, effectively outlawing these economic 
regulatory mechanisms again.  
Petroleum industry leaders then had to consider other types of industry-wide issues that 
would be worth pursuing through a collective organization. The development of API shows that 
there were still industry-wide issues that were seen as worthy collective projects for the 
petroleum industry to pursue to protect and promote their interests. The organizational structure 
of API was a reflection of these perceived industry-wide problems that could be worked on 
collectively through the trade association, showing that industry leaders were conscious of both 
threats and opportunities facing the wider industry (Fanning 1959; Nash 1968). To work on these 
industry-wide problems, API was structured into committees that were centered on addressing 
these concerns. For the first iteration of API’s organizational structure, there were six 
committees which were focused on perceived industry problems of the time (see Figure 6.6). 
Some of these issues were seemingly benign, but still incredibly useful for creating business 
culture and practices within the industry. Spillman’s (2012) study of trade associations focuses 
heavily on these practices, showing that trade associations were centers of information 
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production for industries. For API, the creation of committees such as “Statistics” and “Audit 
and Finance” could all be considered as information production efforts.  
However, when understood through a Marxist lens, these practices take on new meanings 
relating to the protection of class-based interests. For example, the Statistics Committee was 
charged with becoming “the great central authority, furnishing information not only to the 
Government but to the public at large as well” on all sub-sectors of the industry (Requa 1919:38 
Oildom April 1919). At this time, the U.S. government had two entities, the U.S. Geological 
Survey and the Bureau of Mines, which also gathered statistics related to the petroleum industry. 
However, petroleum industry leaders felt that these entities were not adequate in the collection 
and distribution of industry statistics: “Months elapse before their figures are available, and after 
the lapse of this length of time they are often of little more than academic value” (Requa 1919:38 
Oildom April 1919). API’s Statistics Committee was seen as a potential way to produce more 
timely and centralized statistics on all aspects of the industry. In producing statistics this way on 
the industry, API could potentially become the central source of information on the industry, 
which also would allow the organization to control this information. What types of information 
would get published, how it would be disseminated, and who had access to this information were 
all possibilities with API taking on this role. Additionally, by becoming the leading source of 
statistics on the industry, API would also have a meaningful role in any state-related discussions 
to petroleum. In later years, this legacy of information production and control would become 
more pronounced, as API took on the role of being the primary organization that collected and 
distributed statistics about the oil industry and spokesperson on behalf of the industry to the 
public and various government entities (Pratt 1983).  
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The proposed Audit and Finance Committee was centered on a different type of 
information control and production. This committee was meant to create uniform accounting 
methods in the industry, which was considered a crucial step in creating industry wide statistics 
and records. In creating this committee and proposing uniform accounting methods, petroleum 
industry leaders could create and implement their own technical language, which was seen as a 
mark of efficiency in the industry. Although this can be considered the development of business 
culture, it is also intimately tied to protecting and promoting the class-based interests of industry 
leaders. Indeed, when justifying the committee to petroleum industry leaders, Requa noted how 
lack of such uniform methods led to issues in many aspects of the industry that were tied to 
economic interests: 
…it handicaps the owner of the property in intelligent discussion of his taxation 
problems; it is a handicap in negotiating a sale; it is a handicap in arriving at correct 
results as to what the real costs of producing oil are. (Requa 1919:38 Oildom April 1919). 
Creating industry accounting standards was an important way for industry leaders to understand 
the costs associated with all aspects of the industry. With uniform accounting methods, 
petroleum industry leaders would also be able to better plan for their future endeavors, which 
was seen as a way to curtail industry instability. However, another issue was also at hand here 
because some firms were using accounting methods that overstated their profitability (Pratt 
1983). While these methods were harmful to wider internal industry dynamics, petroleum 
industry leaders were keen to preempt potential government oversight, even of dishonest 
accounting practices (Pratt 1983). If the industry could effectively create and implement these 
standards themselves, then they believed that the state would not attempt to control these 
industry dynamics. 
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Other committees proposed were centered on perceived threats and opportunities for the 
industry. Although the war brought about an enthusiasm for cooperative work among industry 
leaders, they also became aware of issues that would be facing the industry for decades to come. 
And though petroleum industry leaders were successful at delivering war supplies, they also 
faced the potential of depletion of crude oil and soars in demands of petroleum products both at 
home and abroad. In peacetime, industry leaders were driven by a concern a potential oil 
shortage, which was also a central discussion of these early meetings (Nash 1968). These 
discussions were connected to other concerns such as issues with labor and foreign relations, 
which could also have an impact on the growth of the petroleum industry. The organizational 
structure was designed to reflect these concerns as well. Committees such as “Improvement of 
Methods,” “Welfare Work,” and “Foreign Relations” were created to specifically address 
perceived threats and opportunities within the industry. API was envisioned as a formal 
organization where industry leaders could collectively work and create strong and united 
positions moving forward on these issues.  
For example, the Improvement of Methods Committee was centered on addressing issues 
of waste and scarcity within the industry through technological development: 
The producer of petroleum is after all a trustee administering a wasting asset in behalf of 
the population as a whole. Deliberate waste and inefficient handling of the product should 
no more be tolerated by the industry en masse, than we would tolerate railway rebates 
and other odious forms of special privileges. There should be intensive and constructive 
investigations undertaken in an effort to determine what may be done that will more 
efficiently administer the trust… 
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The methods of today are discarded tomorrow… It is obvious that in dealing with a 
wasting asset, whether it be in production, in transportation, or in refining, there is an 
obligation resting upon the individual to do the work in the most efficient manner 
possible. That it can be done by the individual alone to the extent that it can be done by 
the industry as a whole is of course impossible. There is great need in the oil industry for 
a more extensive technical literature. (Requa 1919:36-38). 
In these efforts, Requa noted that other industries could serve as a model for sharing and 
developing technological expertise: 
The metal mining industry far outranks the petroleum industry in this respect, and I 
commend to the attention of this Committee as a model the activities in metal and coal 
mining as reflected in the transactions of the American Institute of Mining Engineers. 
(Requa 1919:38) 
By developing a committee focused on improving methods, this was seen as not only a way for 
industry leaders to create better technology, but was intimately tied to how they understood the 
future of the industry. Planning for improvement in technology was meant to encourage a long-
term view of industry practices and petroleum supplies 
Another committee, the Welfare Work Committee, centered attention on labor relations 
within the industry. As seen in the Reconstruction Conference, issues related to labor were 
considered of high importance, with industry leaders attempting to frame themselves as 
cooperative partners with labor forces. Of course, from a Marxist perspective, these seemingly 
benevolent actions should be understood through a lens of class struggle and attempted 
mediation of class-based interests. Although much of the work in API was focused on how to 
bring capitalists together, the existence of the Welfare Committee provides an important window 
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into how petroleum industry leaders during this time were relating to the labor component of the 
industry. Through API, industry leaders made plans to organize and work through a formal 
organization to create positions on diverse labor issues within the industry: 
All problems having to do with the relation of the companies and labor will, I presume, 
come under the jurisdiction of this committee. Sanitation, dwellings, recreation, health, 
and all similar problems of first magnitude will be considered. It is work that the 
individual cannot do comprehensively or intelligently, and that it needs to be done 
requires as proof but a visit to some of the oil fields of the country… 
It should be the duty of this committee, among other things, to urge thrift and saving 
among workers in the oil industry. It is of little moment what wages may be paid 
provided there is nothing saved against a rainy day. I have in mind men in the mining 
industry who work as leasers for months, produce a shipment of ore, haul it to the nearest 
shipping point, get their money and squander it recklessly in a few days or a few weeks. 
Whether their wages are a dollar a day or ten dollars a day, they have nothing to show at 
the end of the period. I have in mind drillers of oil wells receiving seven dollars and more 
per day who have nothing to show in the way of savings. I believe that there is nothing 
more important than inculcating thrift among the rank and file of the oil industry; it is a 
sure method of combatting radicalism. (Requa 1919:36; emphasis added) 
Although it may be tempting to understand this as a vision of a benevolent industry, these labor 
“relations” amount to little more than attempted labor control and potential quelling of a more 
organized and “radical” labor force in the petroleum industry. This is one of the more explicit 
signs of API as a capitalist organization centered on protecting and promoting class-based 
interests of petro-capitalists. 
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The Foreign Relations Committee was also connected to perceived threats and 
opportunities within the industry. The purpose of this committee was described in a short section 
packing a powerful vision for industry expansion beyond the United States through API: 
It is clear, if the petroleum industry of the United States is to meet competition from 
foreign institutions, upon a basis of equality, it must be prepared to present a united front. 
A review of the export figures shows the increasing importance of this business, and 
without some such committee to represent the industry you will not receive the 
information, the consideration, or the trade that you are justly entitled to. (Requa 1919:38 
Oildom April 1919). 
Through this committee, API was seen as a way for all petroleum industry leaders to gain access 
to foreign markets following the war. Through this committee, API was understood as a potential 
representative body on behalf of the whole industry, which could form initial contacts with other 
states, spreading U.S. petroleum businesses across the globe. Although some companies had 
already begun to operate in other countries before the war, these were limited to a few states and 
a few companies. Through API, petroleum industry leaders sought more access and expansion. 
This is also mirrored in the “Foreign Relations” group of the leadership of the organization (see 
Table 6.1).  
API Creation: A New Era for the Petroleum Industry 
 Through these three conferences, petroleum industry leaders successfully planned and 
organized their first national, representative trade association. Although late in the organizational 
trends of trade association creation of the previous decades, the creation of API marked a new, 
cooperative era for the petroleum industry in the U.S. In closing his time working the petroleum 
industry as a government official, Requa stated the following: 
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We have arrived at the era of community effort. The individual effort a century ago 
served fairly well in meeting the demands of the times. The town pump then supplied a 
need now met by water supplies costing millions to install, the time came when the-
individual effort no longer sufficed and we were forced to community effort in order to 
supply our cities with needed facilities. And so I think we are rapidly approaching, if we 
have not already reached a point where the individual effort in the oil industry will find 
its best exemplification in co-operative action; and this co-operative action can best be 
directed through an organization such as is proposed. (Requa 1919:36). 
API’s purpose was laid out, committee positions were filled, and the organizational structure 
reflected industry priorities of the time by the end of these conferences.  
In examining the formation of a trade association like the American Petroleum Institute, 
scholars should be challenged to understand these efforts from the perspective of capitalists 
themselves. A Marxian lens centers this formation process in class struggle, which allows the 
creation and vision of organizations like trade associations to be understood as more than centers 
of cultural production. These organizations are intentionally created with the goal of industry 
protection and promotion in mind, which is intimately tied to class-based interests. In the 
creation of API, there was little evidence to support that petroleum industry leaders rooted their 
organization in “disinterested solidarity” or “non-strategic action,” which are central components 
to Spillman’s cultural argument about trade associations as organizations. As this historical 
analysis shows, petroleum industry leaders were concerned about their industry’s future, working 
hard to form an organization meant to support the petroleum trade for the decades to come. 
Although internal industry struggles were always present, API leadership were careful to design 
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the organization to serve the whole industry and center the institute’s work for the benefit of the 
industry as a whole. 
The historical context of trade association emergence also challenges some of the 
understandings of trade associations as social actors in the early 20th century. The creation of 
API did not occur within a vacuum. Instead, the petroleum industry was playing catch up to 
wider trends of industry organizations in the United States. Spillman (2012) suggests that this 
was the period of time that trade associations began their important cultural work as information 
production centers, shifting away from the economic regulation that marked trade associations’ 
work in the late 19th century. However, the collective experiences in the war and conferences like 
the Reconstruction Conference shows that capitalists were well aware and intentional about 
shaping national trade associations and redirecting their efforts to be centered on creating 
cooperative and representative organizations for industries across sectors. Although information 
production was crucial for these institutions under this charge, trade associations cannot be 
understood simply by the work that they pursue. The stated intentions of capitalists during this 
time period mark these “cultural” processes much differently, connecting them to a larger project 
of class-based organizing. 
With these historical roots, trade associations as a type of organization and social actor 
cannot simply be understood as benign cultural institutions. To do so is dangerous assumption, 
underestimating the power of these organizations for the wider business community. When 
examined through a Marxist lens, they become the centers of cooperative efforts for industries on 
issues of industry importance and primarily organizations of class-based protection and 
promotion. Although antitrust laws restricted some of these activities, there were still issues that 
industry leaders believed would be beneficial to work on together. The establishment of API, the 
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first national trade association for the petroleum industry in the U.S., clearly shows this, with the 
organization intentionally structured in ways to cooperatively work on issues that industry 




From Collective Intentions to Collective Action: API’s Activities Over Time 
 
Following its founding in March of 1919, API developed into the collective and 
cooperative organization that petroleum industry leaders envisioned. The industry itself also 
began to grow into the large and powerful industry that it is today. Pratt (1983) marks the 
creation of API as a turning point for the petroleum industry, where industry leaders utilized the 
organization to accomplish goals that firms could not accomplish by themselves: 
The most significant new oil-related institution to emerge in the 1920s was the American 
Petroleum Institute (API)… In its formative years, the API took a leading role in creating 
coordination where none had previously existed. It sought to make the petroleum industry 
more efficient by performing important functions outside the capacities of individual oil 
companies. (Pratt 1983:180-182) 
Just what those “important functions” were varied from decade to decade as API gained its 
footing as the national trade association for the entire U.S. petroleum industry. Some activities 
were phased out over time, while others constituted the backbone of the organization as essential 
parts of API’s continuous programs. However, regardless of the activities pursued through API, 
the core of the organization was consistently focused on industry stabilization, promotion, and 
protection. That is, the organization was centered on protecting the class interests of petro-
capitalists throughout its nearly 100 years of work. Each committee or campaign formed through 
API was planned and implemented as a way to work on perceived problems or threats on behalf 
of the whole industry (Fanning 1959; Pratt 1983; Potter 1990). Although there was tension at 
times as to what these programs would be, API was never without work that the whole industry 
was behind, which was a crucial part of its continued relevance as an organization in service of 
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petroleum industry capitalists. Today, API continues as the leading U.S. petroleum industry trade 
association and is an active collective force on behalf of its over 600 member firms (API 2017a). 
Although scholars have provided useful typologies of the activities that are pursued 
through trade associations, connecting these activities to the protection and promotion of 
capitalists’ interests highlights the significance of these activities in new ways. In implementing 
the work of API, the trade association became both a collective force tackling internal industry 
problems as well as an organization utilized to address threats in the external environments in 
which the petroleum industry operated. All of this work, however, always connected back to the 
intentions of the organization as serving the collective interests of petroleum industry leaders 
themselves. When grounded in a Marxist perspective that centers class struggle and the class-
based roots of organized efforts, the work pursued through trade associations cannot be 
understood as simply parts of “meaning-making” for business communities as argued by cultural 
sociologists like Spillman (2012). Nor are these activities just rational responses by business 
leaders to engage in “non-market” environments that impact their industries as argued by 
business and management studies scholars (Baron 1995; Hillman and Hitt 1999). Instead, trade 
associations are formal organizations through which the capitalist class pursues collective action. 
And all activities pursued through these organizations are a part of an intentional plan to ensure 
capitalists’ ability to accumulate profits for years to come. Understanding the types of activities 
pursued through trade associations also shows how capitalists define what their collective 
problems are and what is worthy of pursuing collectively through organized efforts.  
This final chapter of the case study provides an overview of API’s work across the 
decades, demonstrating how the organization has been used to address collective problems for 
the petroleum industry by petroleum industry leaders. Although impossible to detail every 
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campaign or activity pursued through API, I focus on two primary areas of organizational 
activities, providing a survey of these activities as well as concrete examples of the 
organization’s cooperative work over time. These areas were formed in the early years of API’s 
work and continue to mark the major activities pursued through API today. The first area of 
organizational activities accomplished through API can be conceptualized as internal industry 
organizing. These activities focus on fostering cooperative dynamics within the industry, such as 
the creation and dissemination of statistics and creation and adoption of various industry 
standards. The next area is centered on how API has been utilized to influence external industry 
environments and actors for the benefit of capitalists in the petroleum industry. Within this realm 
API has attempted to influence three primary groups of actors: labor, state officials, and the 
general public. While the specific activities of API varied over the years, API has continuously 
worked to influence or control these different actors in order to protect and promote their class 
interests. Although the API describes its work as serving an “obligation to the public,” much 
more effort has gone into shaping its publics (API 2017a).  
API and Internal Industry Organizing 
This section details work pursued by API that is best conceptualized as internal industry 
organizing. As the first organization representing all branches of the petroleum industry, API 
began to serve new roles of industry-wide coordination that smaller petroleum trade associations 
could not because of their narrow sub-sector specific or geographic scopes. Although Spillman 
(2012) suggests that the activities pursued through trade associations are primarily parts of 
cultural production for business communities, which are accomplished by building “disinterested 
solidarity” and parts of “non-strategic action,” the way that these activities developed within API 
and have been utilized over time challenges such characterizations. Creating and maintaining the 
 189 
collective purpose of the organization meant that API staff had to work to show the collective 
benefits of API’s work for the health of the wider industry, which was particularly crucial in 
API’s formative years. And while this may be read as petroleum industry leaders abandoning 
some of their “self-interests” in favor of “disinterested solidarity,” I argue that these activities are 
better understood as the development and maintenance of class-based interests and action and, 
thus, these types of activities constitute internal industry organizing efforts.  
For API, internal industry organizing activities primarily focus on information production 
and standardization, which includes the creation of statistics, uniform accounting procedures, and 
the development of standards useful for the entire petroleum industry. Today, all of these 
activities continue to constitute major parts of API’s stated purpose (see Figure 7.1) as well as 
the current committees of the organization (see Figure 7.2), with the organization considering 
itself to be a leading force of information production, education, and standardization of all 
branches of the petroleum industry (API 2017a).  
Developing itself as an information production center for the petroleum industry, 
however, did not occur without effort. Although the WWI experiences led petroleum industry 
leaders to recognize their collective interests and the organization’s work was well-planned 
following the war, implementing these plans meant that petroleum industry leaders had to 
organize to make these processes core parts of the organization’s activities. Such an observation 
fits with Heydebrand’s (1977) position that “[o]rganizing activity does not cease just because the 
organization has become established” (87). Even after the vision of a cooperative organization, 
staff within API would still have work to do to convince petroleum industry leaders to work 
together, particularly on intra-industry issues that required the sharing of information. Pratt 
(1983) explains this as an organizing process seeking consensus for API leadership: 
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After identifying a function best performed at the industry level, the API had to build a 
consensus for action among its members and then to fashion financial and administrative 
arrangements capable of addressing problems previously beyond the capacities of either 
private corporations or government agencies. (Pratt 1983:209; emphasis added) 
This was particularly true in the formative years of the organization. Although industry leaders 
were fresh off their wartime experiences and eager to start a collective organization that 
encompassed the entire industry, pursuing collective work during peacetime required new 
organizing strategies. The following explain how industry leaders worked through API to come 
to consensus on what programs to pursue through API. 
Statistics 
During WWI, the Fuel Administration focused heavily on the gathering of statistics to 
provide an understanding of different sectors of the industry and how much petroleum was being 
produced, refined, and sold both domestically and abroad (Fanning 1959; Pratt 1983). However, 
following the war, petroleum industry leaders were wary of sharing information. Pratt (1983) 
explains the varied reasons that petroleum industry leaders were hesitant to contribute to the 
statistical gathering efforts of API even after agreeing to pursue these activities during the 
reconstruction conferences: 
Some feared that the collection of detailed information about the industry would open the 
API to antitrust prosecution; other companies feared that such statistics would inevitably 
affect the sale of their stock. But the most common objection was that information 
supplied to the API might somehow find its way into the hands of competitors. (Pratt 
1983:185) 
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Fanning (1959) in an account of one of API’s early board meetings captured the very real tension 
around attempting to put the statistical production into practice: 
Colonel “Bob” Stewart, of Standard Oil Company (Indiana), had made an issue of the 
proposal at an API directors’ meeting, in a curious personal attack on Welch [the first 
secretary of API]. “When Standard of Indiana wishes to have someone tell Standard of 
Indiana how to run their business, we’ll hire you,” he shouted…  
The debate departed reason for the field of physical challenge. The men were restrained 
by others. The encounter shook the young API director [Welch] for weeks but failed to 
alter his determination, in which he was backed by a majority of the board, to make the 
institute the source of up-to-date information. (Fanning 1959:49) 
Seeing these fears and resistance begin emerge, API staff quickly organized to address 
these issues. To assuage these fears and resistance, API staff began rigorous outreach efforts, 
attending smaller trade association meetings and distributing memos through the API advocating 
reasons for a strong statistical department within API. For example, in a speech at a meeting of 
the Natural Gas Association Convention, Welch framed the gathering and dissemination of 
statistics as way to show that the oil industry was beyond the monopolistic practices of its early 
years (which was still a major part of the public’s perception of the industry in the early 20th 
century): 
The collection and dissemination of statistics alone is a monumental task. The American 
Petroleum Institute ought actually to have the best petroleum library and the best 
collection of petroleum statistics to be found anywhere in the world. The information to 
be disseminated by this department should be absolutely authoritative, and no person 
ought to be able, successfully, to dispute it… 
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Furthermore, there is a vast amount of information…which should be gotten into the 
hands of the public. The time will come, sooner or later, when it will be known to every 
person in the United States that the oil business is not in the hands of a monopoly—when 
such names as Doherty, Lufkin, Davison, Sinclair and Cosden and many other 
Independents who have made magnificent successes in the business, will be almost as 
well known as pioneers in the petroleum business. No opportunity should be lost to bring 
these facts home to the public. (Welch 1919:17) 
To Welch, gathering statistics would challenge associations of the petroleum industry with unfair 
business practices, which continued to mark the industry from the days of Standard Oil 
dominance. With statistical information on various industry activities, it was thought that API 
could utilize statistics to challenge what petroleum industry leaders believed were 
misconceptions of the industry (Fanning 1959; Pratt 1983).  
Along with these outreach efforts, API staff also devised rules and procedures for how 
information was gathered, which were centered on confidentiality: 
Publishing only aggregate figures, the API’s staff scrupulously avoided disclosing 
statistics from individual companies. Welch even used a coding system so that his staff 
could compile composite data without knowing the name of the company whose figures 
they were adding to the total. No officer of API, including the president, had access to the 
submittals of individual companies. (Pratt 1983:186). 
The final piece of the puzzle contributing to convincing petro-capitalists to work 
cooperatively on the industry-wide statistical efforts was the ability of API to speak on behalf of 
the industry to government agencies on industry wide trends. This was particularly important 
with the rise of new regulatory agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission and other 
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congressional bodies focused on business regulations as well as industry-specific governmental 
bodies such as the Federal Oil Conservation Board (FOCB). For example, with the creation of 
the FOCB in 1924, which was an advisory board created to investigate conditions in the oil 
industry because of fears of an impending oil shortage, API became one of the primary sources 
of information on all branches of the industry (Pratt 1983). Testimony by API officials helped to 
diminish concerns about the U.S. oil supply, which eventually led to the dissolution of the FOCB 
and its efforts in 1933 (Pratt 1983). 
At the end of the 1920s, API leadership had successfully won over many of its skeptics in 
the area of statistics. By 1929, API began to publish a weekly statistical bulletin, which included 
information on a wide variety of industry activities including: 
1) production and refining statistics; 
2) oil consumption by railroads, vessels, and public utilities;  
3) imports and exports of petroleum products;  
4) the consumption of gasoline and kerosene by state; 
5) drilling activities; and 
6) receipts of California oil at Atlantic and Gulf ports  
(Pratt 1983:187) 
Today, the API continues to be a leading source of statistical information for the industry and 
still produces a weekly statistical bulletin. This bulletin covers: 
… total U.S. and regional crude inventories and data related to refinery operations, as 
well as the production, imports, and inventories of the four major petroleum products: 
motor gasoline, kerosene jet fuel, distillate fuel oil, and residual fuel oil. (API 2017b) 
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Equipment Standards 
 Information production in other areas, such the development of equipment standards and 
uniform accounting methods were also developed in the early 1920s by API. Each of these areas 
produced similar, though less violent, tensions and opposition from some petroleum industry 
leaders. Like their efforts in establishing an effective statistics program, API staff were keen on 
showing the benefits of standardization and uniform accounting methods to both individual 
companies as well as for the wider industry. However, because these were voluntary measures 
within the industry and API had no actual coercive power to force the adoption of any of these 
measures, it took strong organizational leadership and organizing to encourage the adoption of 
these new industry-wide measures. Such an understanding connects API’s work as a continuous 
organizing process, with industry leaders needing to not only develop the methods of industry-
wide procedures, but also encourage and persuade industry leaders to adopt these methods, 
which were framed as beneficial to the whole industry. This challenges cultural explanations of 
the purpose of trade associations, showing that trade associations are sites that are based on and 
continue to develop class-based strategies for capitalists.    
In attempting to start the process of standardization of equipment, some petroleum 
industry leaders were concerned that the development of standards may stifle individual 
innovation and development within the industry (Pratt 1983). To mitigate these concerns, API 
staff went to great lengths to meet with petroleum industry leaders and gather input on the 
development of effective standards as they were establishing them in the early 1920s. Pratt 
(1983) describes this process: 
… the API committees coordinated the efforts of all affected in determining proper 
standards. In practices this meant a survey of all existing equipment, tests by engineers on 
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the quality of various products and designs, and lengthy discussions among producers 
and users on the results of these tests. After tentative standards had emerged from such 
discussions, the API circulated them for discussion throughout the industry. (Pratt 
1983:206) 
Petroleum industry leaders then had opportunities to give input on the standards, which would 
then go through a revision process and be redistributed to petroleum industry leaders for more 
input. After a final round of revisions,  
The revised standards were then officially passed by the API’s board of directors, and 
goods produced in accordance with the standards carried an official API seal of approval. 
“Standard” did not mean static, since the adoption of new products and new methods was 
not generally delayed by existing standards on similar products. As soon as possible after 
their widespread adoption, the API standardized new products. (Pratt 1983:206) 
With petroleum industry leaders involved in the process of standards creation and the assurance 
these standards would be flexible enough to encourage technological development and 
innovation, the development of standards gained solid footing within API.  
The implementation of these standards, however, took additional efforts. To encourage 
petroleum companies to use standard products and equipment, committee members of the 
Standards Committee within API would often use their personal relationships to persuade 
industry leaders to adopt the standards. For example, J. Edgar Pew, chair of the Standards 
Committee, sent personal letters to vice-presidents of production of API member companies 
“extolling the merits of the standards adopted for pipe” (Pratt 1983:207). The adoption of 
standards also proved to be fruitful for individual oil companies because standardized equipment 
was often more cost effective and of better quality because of the testing that went into the 
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creation of standardized products (Pratt 1983). By the end of the 1920s, API had successfully 
established its standardization process and implemented vast adoption of standardized products.  
Today, standardization continues to be a key part of API’s operations, with API 
connecting its standardization processes not only to equipment development and adoption, but 
also safety within the industry: 
Our work helps the industry invent and manufacture superior products consistently, 
provide critical services, ensure fairness in the marketplace for businesses and consumers 
alike, and promotes the acceptance of products and practices globally. 
Standards enhance the safety of industry operations, assure quality, help keep costs down, 
reduce waste, and minimize confusion. They help speed acceptance, bring products to 
market quicker, and avoid having to reinvent the wheel every time a product is 
manufactured. (API 2017c) 
Uniform Accounting Measures 
Coupled with the creation of standards, API also sought to streamline accounting 
methods within the petroleum industry. This was a key part of the conversations and planning 
meetings following WWI across all industries with industry leaders advocating for more uniform 
accounting methods within and across industrial sectors. Resistance to uniform accounting 
methods primarily came from “those segments of the industry that had traditionally attracted 
investors by using accounting methods that overstated profitability” (Pratt 1983:208). These 
shifty accounting methods, however, were increasingly being scrutinized not only by industry 
leaders, but also by state officials. API leadership took on the process of creating and 
implementing uniform accounting measures to avoid undue investigations by state officials. To 
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convince other industry leaders to adopt uniform accounting methods, API leadership and staff 
went to work to gain support by first focusing on the largest oil companies: 
The accounting committees brought together the treasurers, accountants, and controllers 
from the largest oil companies… After soliciting questions and comments from the 
industry through the API Bulletin, the accounting committee held numerous regional and 
national meetings to define the best available accounting methods for general use in the 
industry… 
Before their adoption as API-approved standards, the committee’s recommendations 
were revised after general comments from the industry and then approved by a vote of 
the API’s board of directors. (Pratt 1983:208) 
By involving petroleum industry leaders along the way of the standardization process, API 
leadership hoped that petroleum companies would adopt these accounting methods faster. This 
was particularly successful with the larger oil companies, who adopted these methods in the 
early 1920s.  
For those companies resisting the adoption of uniform accounting measures, however, it 
would not be API that would soon force these measures. Following the stock market crash in the 
late 1920s, the Security and Exchange Commission intervened across industrial sectors to 
address faulty and inflated accounting methods (Pratt 1983). Demanding that uniform accounting 
procedures be implemented in all industries, it was national trade associations like API that were 
called upon to propose and monitor the adoption of these uniform methods. By the 1930s, the 
petroleum industry had successfully adopted uniform accounting processes, which led to 
streamlining industry information. Today, API no longer puts much effort into monitoring 
uniform accounting methods. This is likely because these methods have become normalized and 
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accepted over time as an industry practice with little need for continuous organizational 
oversight from API. However, seeing the efforts that the trade association went to in these early 
days shows that API was essential in jumpstarting this process.  
Discussion 
The formative years of API in the 1920s clearly set the stage for API’s future endeavors 
and organizational activities. As the organization grew and aged over time, statistics and 
standardization methods continued to be the backbone of many of API’s day-to-day operations, 
which are still core parts of API today. Although these activities may serve as significant parts of 
business culture with the development of technical language and activities that bring meaning to 
business communities (Spillman 2012), they are also intertwined with protecting and promoting 
capital accumulation, making the industry more efficient as well as allowing industry leaders to 
produce information and create uniform practices to protect themselves from potential state 
intervention. This becomes clear when examining the development and subsequent uses of these 
activities within API. Additionally, the implementation and adoption of many of these initiatives 
required strong organized efforts by industry leaders through the newly established organization. 
In sum, capitalists not only plan for collective efforts but also take seriously the need to continue 
the organizing process beyond moments of heightened enthusiasm, such as what occurred in the 
petroleum industry following WWI. In other words, API’s activities were not benign or simply 
ways for business leaders to come together around disinterested goals. These everyday activities 
are central parts of strengthening the capitalist class and ensuring that class-based interests are 
protected and preserved. 
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Controlling and Influencing External Environments 
Through API, industry leaders have also pursued activities that focus attention on 
external industry environments and actors that could potentially have an impact on industry 
operations. Three primary groups have received targeted attention from API: petroleum industry 
labor, state officials, and the general public. Each of these actors, however, also represent wider 
cultural and political spheres that capitalists in the petroleum industry have tried to influence 
over time through their organized efforts in API. In the following sections, I focus on the 
development of API programs and the subsequent work designed to address emerging issues in 
each of these areas by petroleum industry leaders through API. 
Aligning Interests: Petro-Capitalists and Labor “Relations” 
From API’s inception, petro-capitalists were concerned about their relationship with 
labor within the petroleum industry. These concerns were mirrored in the wider business 
community at the time of API’s inception, with many capitalists worried about the potential of 
“radicalism” forming within the labor communities of their industries. As highlighted in the 
previous chapter, API leadership began to make explicit efforts to focus on labor relations within 
the industry through API. Early efforts focused on the concept of “labor welfare” or “welfare 
work” in the industry, which centered on developing a “partnership between labor and capital” 
(Welch 1919:17). R.L. Welch, the first General Secretary of API, highlighted this as one of the 
“great problems” facing the petroleum industry in the early 1900s: 
… there is no greater problem facing the industry than that which is involved in welfare 
work, for which a special committee has been appointed. The partnership between labor 
and capital is too well recognized for anyone, at the present time, to question it. It will be 
one of the purposes of the Institute to bring about, in so far as it is possible, harmonious 
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relations between the employers and the employees engaged in the petroleum business. 
The welfare committee will no doubt look into conditions of employment thruout [sic] 
every part of the industry, and doubtless constructive recommendations will be made 
from time to time. (Welch 1919:17; emphasis added) 
Labor relations then became one of the first external relationships that petroleum industry leaders 
attempted to foster (or control) through the newly formed API.  
In the early years of API, some of this work constituted the creation of labor and 
employment statistics that would show how the industry operated as an effective employer 
through the many branches of the industry. For example, in a 1935 report published by API, the 
section describing labor relations written by the Labor Committee within API focused attention 
on generating statistics of direct and indirect employment within the industry, average wages 
earned by petroleum industry workers, and the number of strikes present in the petroleum 
industry. With employment and wages reports, petro-capitalists highlighted the high numbers 
seen in both of these areas, which they also coupled with industry leaders attempting to show 
that they were ahead of trends in other industries. For example, in a section titled “Petroleum 
Employees Among Highest Paid in All Industry,” the Labor Committee reported the following: 
The purchasing power of workers in a given industry may be small or great, depending 
on their weekly earnings. Not very many years ago a work schedule of 12 to 14 hours per 
day was customary to earn subsistence wages. In recent years the trend has been 
decidedly toward shortening hours, without thereby diminishing purchasing power. 
Shortening of weekly hours by about 30 per cent resulted in an increase of the worker's 
leisure time by as much as 14 to 17 hours per week. 
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Naturally, such a material reduction in working hours would have resulted in a serious 
impairment of weekly earnings and purchasing power, with a concomitant lowering of 
the standard of living, had it not been attended by compensating hourly rate increases. 
(API 1935:183-184) 
Another section of this report also provided comparative numbers of strikes among industries, 
noting that the petroleum industry proudly had a small number compared to other industries. In 
this section titled “Small Number of Strikes is Evidence of Satisfactory Industrial Relations,” 
petroleum industry leaders extended their frame of good stewardship suggesting that the 
employment conditions within the industry corresponded to a happy labor force: 
When employees of a given industry enjoy, in general, good wages, reasonable hours, 
and the various other things that comprise “good working conditions,” it is almost certain 
that few strikes will occur in that industry. (API 1935: 196) 
In framing the increases of wages and the general labor conditions in the industry this way, 
petroleum industry leaders were painting themselves as good stewards of their labor force. Of 
course, such a narrative is devoid of any discussion of larger trends of labor struggles within the 
U.S. at this time, which were primarily centered on accomplishing federal legislation for 
comprehensive labor rights such as the 8-hour-workday (Grossman 1978). Petroleum industry 
leaders likely produced literature such as this to curtail any type of federal legislation advocating 
instead of continued self-regulation within their industries. It is interesting to note, however, it 
was activities such as these that industry leaders believed constituted “welfare work” for industry 
labor during this time. 
In the 1930s, API was also active on the ground with organizing local petroleum industry 
employees to combat legislative issues that were potentially threatening to the petroleum 
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industry on the state level. For example, in Mississippi, API staff visited local communities to 
organize “county petroleum committees.” Potter (1990) explains API’s vision behind these 
committees: 
When these local oil marketers understood how their own interests would be affected by 
a pending bill in the state legislature,… they were quick to voice their views, forcefully to 
their representatives. Moreover, using materials developed and provided by [API staff], 
these local oilmen would call on newspaper editors, chambers of commerce, farm groups 
and others for help and support. (Potter 1990:7) 
This method of creating “state petroleum industries committees” (PICs) became a standard 
practice in API and soon was extended to all 48 states (Potter 1990). Some PICs were folded into 
smaller trade associations that were already active on the ground, particularly in larger oil 
producing states like Texas, California, and Ohio (Potter 1990). Potter (1990) notes, however, 
that PICs in other states were key parts of efforts to bring petroleum industry employees into 
advocacy work to “lobby the legislature and state officials” (8).  
A decade later in the late 1940s, labor relations through API shifted to focus on efforts to 
create a strong industry identity among industry employees. Such a shift corresponded to a wider 
move within API to ramp up its public relations efforts, which had been an area API had not 
engaged much with in the past. Concerned with the public perception of the industry, API 
leadership began their public relations programs on both national and local scales. Locally, one 
of the first major PR events was centered on the creation of “Oil Progress Week,” a week long 
“celebration” of the oil industry, which were organized through the PICs developed in the 1930s. 
Potter (1990), a long-time staff member of API, described the event as follows: 
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During the week of October 11 to 15, there was a concentrated effort to bring home to 
local communities the fact that oil companies, large and small, are good citizens who 
provide many services to the public. Companies were urged to hold open houses at their 
facilities; industry spokesmen addressed local civic clubs and school audiences or 
arranged to show a new API motion picture; employees were urged to talk to their 
neighbors and friends about the industry, and special materials were provided for local 
company advertising and media relations. Over the next decade, “Oil Progress Week” 
became an annual feature of the industry’s PR efforts around the country. (Potter 
1990:15-16) 
Although clearly a part of API’s efforts to influence public perception of the industry (which will 
be further examined later in this chapter), the incorporation of industry employees into these 
events as spokespeople and volunteers were key parts of building a comprehensive industry 
identity within the rank and file of the industry. Potter estimated that by 1954, over 30,000 
industry employees had been involved in activities advocating on behalf of the oil industry 
(Potter 1990:21).  
Building attachments and allegiances to the wider industry began to be a key part of 
API’s labor relations programs. After successful events like Oil Progress Week, API leadership 
began to explore more opportunities to reach industry employees by focusing on the 
development of educational materials for “internal publics” of the industry (Potter 1990:31). By 
the late 1960s, API began to structure and disseminate these materials targeted to industry 
employees. These materials focused on “factual and analytic information about prices, profits, 
competition, taxes…” which was presented in pamphlets, slide shows, and films (Potter 
1990:31). The intention of creating these materials was for middle management to hold seminars 
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for their employees, particularly lower level employees, to learn about the petroleum industry 
(Potter 1990). However, upon closer examination, the content of these materials also presented 
clear positions on political issues potentially impacting the industry. For example, in a slideshow 
titled “Divestiture: Part of the Solution, or Part of the Problem?,” which was created in 1977, the 
script begins stating three major purposes of the slideshow: 
We are here to talk with you about the American petroleum industry – its beginnings, its 
problems, and its prospects for contributing to how you and your family will grow and 
prosper. 
We also want to talk about Energy – that much in vogue word now – the energy we 
Americans use, and how we can meet out energy demands at a time of decreasing natural 
resources. 
And we want each of you to understand some basics about the American petroleum 
industry, what we do, whom we work for, how we operate, and why we believe our 
national system of energy development and distribution is one each American can be 
proud of. (API 1977:1) 
The content of the film went on, however, to focus on a political issue of the day, which was 
centered on the oil crisis of the 1970s, which had inspired conversations about potential 
divestiture in the industry and the breaking up of big firms: 
… since the oil embargo, it has become a quick and simple answer to explain why the 
cost of gasoline is higher and why America is even more dependent on foreign oil.  
To solve the nation’s energy problems and lower gas prices, these same politicians say, 
all we have to do is “break up big oil.” 
 There it is – the pat answer. 
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 Break up big oil. The final solution. 
 Or, is it? 
Just what is meant by “breaking up big oil”? What does it really mean to you? Is it a 
solution to our energy problems, or just a convenient whipping boy that diverts public 
attention away from the failure of our Government in Washington to formulate a 
comprehensive national energy policy. (API 1977:5-6, emphasis added) 
The slideshow went on expand this argument, centering on a position that took the state to task 
for poor and ineffective policies. Additionally, the content of the slideshow also inserted 
positions about how divestiture in particular would impact workers in the industry and featured 
images of petroleum industry workers and statistics on these issues: 
Breaking up the oil companies might reduce profits, but it will also reduce the number of 
jobs, slow our drive towards energy independence, and potentially harm our national 
security by increasing our dependence on foreign oil (API 1977:13). 
Through the development of targeted educational programs like the divestiture slideshow, 
petroleum industry leaders were directing that programs be developed through API that provided 
clear positions on oil industry issues that aligned labor interests with wider corporate interests. 
The purpose behind these educational programs for internal audiences then must be understood 
as a type of political education for industry labor that was meant to merge labor interests with the 
interests of capitalists. Through API, industry leaders saw an opportunity to create these frames 
and disseminate positions on policy issues that were particularly harmful to capitalists in the 
industry under the guise of protecting industry labor. 
The development of educational materials for petroleum industry employees continued to 
serve as a way that petroleum industry leaders related to labor through API. Creating succinct 
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policy positions that showed that a threat to the oil industry was also a threat to labor was a core 
part of API’s positions on a plethora of issues throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. The most 
significant way that industry leaders have attempted to align their interests with labor interests, 
has come with API’s responses to environmental problems particularly climate change. Through 
API, industry leaders have continuously invoked the frame of “job loss” as a reason for opposing 
environmental legislation. For example, in highlighting the potential impacts of the Kyoto 
Protocol in 2001, API’s position centered on the impacts on jobs and consumers: 
To achieve the Protocol's targets, the U.S. would have to curb its energy production and 
use in ways that would cost millions of jobs and substantially raise the price of essential 
goods, including gasoline, electricity, heating oil and natural gas. (API 2001) 
Although not explicitly about the labor force within the petroleum industry, through API, the 
position of the industry on environmental issues continuously evoked this broad frame of job 
loss, which has clearly resonated among the wider labor force in the U.S.  
A more direct way that API connected to industry labor was through targeted 
advertisements and publications about environmental issues. In these publications and 
advertisements, industry employees began to be prominently featured telling personal stories of 
how the industry is a good steward of the environment. For example, in a 1997 API publication 
detailing API’s environmental programtitled “Strategies for Today’s Environmental 
Partnership,” (or STEP program) industry employees were key storytellers of the industry’s work 
to protect the environment: 
Caring for the Earth is the story of the oil industry’s environmental stewardship through 
its STEP program. It is told, in part, through the men and women who are the industry—
who watch over the environment where oil and gas are found; who operate and inspect 
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refinery equipment to keep it safe; who sail the tankers and run the pipelines; who market 
gasoline, jet fuel, heating oil, natural gas and other petroleum products; and who look for 
ways to protect the land, the water and the air. (API 1997) 
Figures 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5 are excerpts of this publication, showing how petroleum industry 
employees were tapped to create narratives for how the industry is a part of efforts to curtail 
environmental pollution.  
Today, API has continued this trend, ramping up these efforts to align capitalist and labor 
interests. Industry employees, particularly lower level laborers, are prominently featured in API 
advertisements and a central part of API’s positions on many policy issues related to energy and 
the environment. For example, one of these advertisements titled “Pipelines Create Jobs,” 
features dialogue from “Matt” a welder, who extolls the benefits of pipeline jobs to communities 
as well as highlighting the safe practices of the industry (API 2017d). The video, released in 
early 2017, is clearly timed as a response to resistance to pipeline development in the U.S. such 
as the Dakota Access and Keystone pipelines. The narrator of the commercial begins with the 
statement, “every day, tens of thousands of men and women work on pipelines to bring light and 
heat to our families. And they do it safely.” The welder, Matt, a middle-aged, white male, 
expands on this to highlight the small impact of pipeline installation as well as the jobs that 
pipeline construction creates. 
Matt: The EPA and contractors and companies are keeping an eye to make sure that we 
go in, put the pipeline in, bury it, bring it all back to original restoration just like it was 
before the pipe was even there. 
Narrator: Private pipeline investment could create more than 800,000 jobs. 
 208 
Matt: Some of the best jobs, I think, to be honest. If you can take a high school kid and 
put them in a job right off the bat where they’re making great money, they have good 
benefits, they have good solid work. I mean, what’s better than that? 
Narrator: America’s energy infrastructure is our nation’s backbone delivering clean, safe, 
affordable natural gas. 
Matt: I’m Matt, and I help build American pipelines. And I’m proud of that. (API 2017d) 
Although difficult to know if “Matt” is an actual employee in the petroleum industry or an actor 
hired for the commercial, the narrative built by API through the commercial is meant to center 
both industry safety and environmental stewardship in the process of pipeline development. With 
Matt as a conduit for this message, the petroleum industry’s message is also delivered through an 
everyday worker instead of a high power executive, which makes the message more palatable for 
public consumption.  
Additionally, API has recently revamped its efforts to organize industry labor and others 
to address what are perceived as harmful policies to the petroleum industry on local and national 
scales. This is a widely cited practice among industries and is often labeled “astroturfing” by 
environmental activists and scholars of environmental politics because the efforts and stated 
purpose of these organizations is modeled after grassroots organizations. (Hoggan and Littlemore 
2009; Walker 2009; Lee 2010). However, upon closer examination, these groups are sponsored 
and clearly represent capitalist interests and are essentially public relations (or propaganda) 
campaigns. API’s efforts are captured through their own organization “Energy Citizens,” which 
was founded in 2008 and is still active today. In describing its mission, Energy Citizens states:  
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Energy Citizens’ mission is to promote an honest national discussion about energy and 
engage every citizen in advocating for energy policies that create American jobs, spur 
economic growth, and strengthen our national security… 
Energy Citizens is made up of hundreds of thousands of Americans who are determined 
to see our nation develop balanced energy policies that support American jobs, economic 
growth, and national security. We’re building a movement to ensure our message is 
heard. (Energy Citizens 2017)  
The organization also clearly states that is it supported by API, which is not always a common 
practice with these organizations (Lee 2010). The Energy Citizens group has an active website 
and social media presence, which is utilized to disseminate API’s positions on policy issues on 
the state level. 
Although the stated purpose of Energy Citizens is to invite the wider public to join its 
efforts, a priority focus of the organization is engaging with petroleum industry labor and having 
many of their stories featured as content and evidence of the “grassroots” nature of these 
organizations. Petroleum industry workers are featured in videos and written materials, serving 
as faces associated with the jobs provided by the petroleum industry. Such strategies are utilized 
to make organizations like Energy Citizens appear to be run for and by labor or the wider public. 
Like the early petroleum committees of the 1930s, however, the Energy Citizens network is 
created and maintained by API staff.  
All of the above efforts of API give a unique view into how petro-capitalists have 
attempted to shape labor and labor relations within the petroleum industry over time. Of course, 
none of these programs ever center agency or opportunities to hear the voices of labor 
representatives themselves (at least not in an unscripted way). API’s efforts should also help to 
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challenge views that labor and poor people are fully responsible for “voting against their 
interests” or holding political positions that seem illogical or harmful to themselves. In seeing the 
efforts that capitalists go through to control and shape labor within their industries through 
organizations like trade associations, the positions that appear backward or illogical suddenly 
make sense in the context of class struggle. API’s work over time shows that capitalists are well 
organized and constantly working to shape labor relations and labor perceptions in ways that 
frame capitalists’ interests as labors’ interests.  
Industry Knows Best: API and Policy-Making 
The second major group that has been targeted by API over time are state officials. This 
area also includes many types of public policy that have been perceived as threats or 
opportunities for the industry, which have been deemed worthy of API’s efforts as a collective 
force for the industry. API staff was careful not to take on political problems of individual firms. 
Instead, an organizational policy was made to only pursue political intervention that was meant 
to benefit the whole industry. Such a foundation has continued to guide the work pursued 
through the API, with industry leaders selecting what issues to work on together through the 
organization. Today, API’s mission statement (see Figure 7.1) continues to center policy work as 
a primary part of the organization’s stated purpose: 
API’s mission is to promote safety across the industry globally and to influence public 
policy in support of a strong, viable U.S. oil and natural gas industry… 
We speak for the oil and natural gas industry to the public, Congress and the Executive 
Branch, state governments and the media. We negotiate with regulatory agencies, 
represent the industry in legal proceedings, participate in coalitions and work in 
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partnership with other associations to achieve our members’ public policy goals. (API 
2017a) 
In its mission to pursue public policy that is beneficial to the wider petroleum industry, API 
works to protect and promote the class-based interests of petro-capitalists. This is been a core 
part of API’s work throughout its history as an organization. 
API’s advocacy work began with the inception of the organization. As highlighted in the 
previous section on internal industry organizing, API’s statistical work in the 1920s was one of 
the first avenues that API leadership had to represent the industry in formal governmental spaces. 
Pratt (1983) describes this early work and its benefits to the petroleum industry: 
The API’s ability to present the best available information about the oil industry 
guaranteed its spokesmen ready access to public officials… As the API organized 
previously fragmentary information about oil into a systematic, accurate, and 
comprehensive portrait of conditions in the industry, it greatly enhanced its authority and 
ultimately its influence over public policy. (Pratt 1983:189-190) 
At the federal level, this influence marked the majority of API’s formal lobbying and public 
policy work at the federal level until after World War II.  
However, in the 1930s, API also began to establish organizations that were utilized to 
address emerging petroleum-centered policies at the state level. The initial impetus to form these 
organizations came from issues of gas tax evasion within states. Gas taxes were one of many 
ways that local governments attempted to garner more revenue because of increasing reliance on 
government assistance during the Great Depression (Potter 1990). However, during this time, tax 
evasion was also a rising issue among marketers within the industry: 
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Most of the time, the tax evader used part of his “profit” to cut his price below the 
market, thus building up volume, and then meeting that additional demand by further 
smuggling, blending or other illegal activity. This left the honest marketer in a position 
where he could not match the price of his illegally operating competitor. (Potter 1990:6) 
To help curtail these issues, API set-up a series of “Gasoline Tax Evasion Committees.” The 
purpose of these committees was to “assist state governments in policing their statutes” (Potter 
1990). Potter notes that industry intervention in this issues was “not entirely altruistic; it 
stemmed from the disruptive effects of tax evasion on the gasoline market” (Potter 1990:6).  
As the gas tax evasion issue began to turn toward the creation of penalties for gas tax 
evasion, the API committees were on the ground ready to shape the creation and implementation 
of these laws. The laws created varied in each local context, but the success of API’s state efforts 
was pleasing to industry leaders. The decision was made to formalize these local committees into 
more general policy focused groups called Petroleum Industries Committees (PICs). In reflecting 
on the establishment of these committees, Potter notes that API “for the first time developed an 
on-going capability for dealing with legislative issues in a systematic manner” on local levels 
(1990:7).  
These were the same committees highlighted in the previous section that were utilized by 
API to organize local petroleum industry employees to lobby and participate in policy issues on 
local levels. The work accomplished through these committees focused on a number of topics: 
… gasoline tax rates; administrative provisions of gasoline tax laws; refunds and 
exemptions; allowances to distributors for product shrinkage, evaporation and cost of 
collection; diversion of highway funds to non-highway purposes; and a few other similar 
matters. (Potter 1990) 
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The PICs were activated whenever state legislatures were in session with an API staff person 
essentially serving as a local organizer of the PIC in his area. To accomplish legislative work 
through the PICs, API staff developed a “Secretary’s Office Manual,” which created uniform 
procedures for each state and county PIC meeting as well as on the ground actions that were to 
occur prior to the legislative session (Potter 1990:8). Potter describes the procedures as follows: 
The usual procedure was to schedule four such meetings a week in adjoining counties… 
In the morning before the meeting, the state secretary would hold a pre-meeting 
conference with the company salesmen and the salesmen would then divide up the list of 
local oil men… and urge them to attend the county meeting that evening. Meanwhile, the 
state secretary would call on the state legislators at their homes or places of business and 
visit with key local officials and with the local media.  
At the evening meeting, the state secretary would review important actions at the recently 
concluded legislative session and outline the main issues expected to arise in the next 
session. Where appropriate, resolutions favoring or opposing certain bills would be 
adopted (based on models contained in the Secretary’s Office Manual). County 
committee officers would be elected and… a “post-meeting” news release would be 
dropped off for the local media. Then the state secretary would head for the next county 
seat, where the procedure would be repeated. (Potter 1990:9) 
The PICs then served as a way for API staff to shape local politics on petroleum related issues in 
a systemic and uniform way. Creating model legislation was also an early tactic through these 
petroleum committees, which is still a process utilized by capitalist interests today through 
organizations like the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) and other capitalist 
organizations.  
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Beyond these two efforts, API’s formal policy work and engagement with officials 
beyond the state level were not priorities of the organization until the post-WWII period. 
Following WWII, API leadership formed a Postwar Activities Committee which provided 
recommendations for the future of API. One of the recommendations centered on the need for 
“much greater attention than in the past to events in Washington” (Potter 1990:13). The 
immediate impact of this was to establish a special API office in D.C. that was separate from the 
API headquarters in New York City. The purpose of this office was to begin programs on federal 
legislation that impacted the wider petroleum industry (Fanning 1959; Potter 1990). However, it 
was not until the early 1960s that these recommendations would be implemented. API leadership 
in the 1940s and 1950s were still wary of API being centered on federal issues and were more 
concerned with strengthening state-based focuses and the internal industry organizing that had 
been central parts of the organization’s work since its inception. 
In the 1960s, however, API started to take on federal level legislation as a core part of the 
organization’s work. This change in organizational direction can be attributed to both changes of 
leadership and the structure of API as well as the rise in the number of federal legislative issues 
that were of concern to industry leaders (Potter 1990). Within API leadership, Frank Ikard, a 
former Congressional representative from Texas, joined API as Executive Vice President in 
1962. Ikard was one of the first policymakers to join API staff and had a large impact on the 
direction of API’s future policy programs. As a former policymaker friendly with the petroleum 
industry, Ikard pushed hard for a more comprehensive federal policy program within API. When 
Ikard became President of API in 1963, he officially ramped up this program, expanding staff 
within the Washington office focusing attention on policies that were deemed potentially harmful 
to the industry. 
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Although API had been involved in attempting to shape some federal legislation in the 
past, the major reason that API began to target public policy and public officials at the federal 
level was because of the rise of environmental issues: 
From a legislative and regulatory standpoint, the most significant developments in the 
last half of the 1960’s for API and the industry were centered around the phenomenal 
growth in America’s concern over the environment… 
Initially some in the industry felt that public expressions of concern were mainly the 
result of agitation by militant activists. Over the course of time, however, it became 
evident that the public’s concerns were real and deeply felt and that they would not be 
easily appeased. The petroleum industry, because of its widespread operations and the 
universal use of its products found itself (and still finds itself) a center of controversy. 
(Potter 1990:42). 
Although individual oil companies also began to ramp up their efforts to address environmental 
problems, API was the conduit through which petroleum industry leaders developed 
comprehensive strategies on emerging environmental problems and policies created to address 
them.  
In developing a focused program on environmental issues, industry leaders implemented 
new programs and created new committees. First, a special committee of industry executives was 
created to plan an expanded program and budget to fund special research programs through API, 
particularly focused on air pollution. The final budget for the program, which was to be 
implemented over three years, was over $3 million (Potter 1990). Like API’s statistical work, 
environmental research accomplished through API was created under the guise of providing 
“technically-knowledgeable support” to state officials as well as industry lobbyists, who would 
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be working on legislative issues the coming year. Of course, this research was often utilized to 
both measure environmental conditions (such as lead content in the air) and paint the industry as 
an active steward of the environment. Additionally, a focused committee named the Committee 
for Air and Water Conservation was created to house all of the efforts towards addressing 
environmental policy.  
However, it turned out that these efforts were not as fruitful as planned. Research on 
environmental issues was not developing quickly enough to have a major impact on federal 
policies. Although the industry had lobbyists working (usually through individual companies) 
and some connections to Washington, many laws were passed through Congress which had an 
impact on petroleum industry operations, including tax policies, oil conservation, import prices, 
and water pollution.  
After this perceived “loss” by petroleum industry leaders, a more directed plan of 
focusing on federal policies was put into place in the early 1970s. First, API headquarters were 
officially moved from New York City to Washington D.C., which put API in a prime position to 
work on federal policy issues throughout the year. Second, a new committee, the Committee on 
Policy Development (CPD) was established in order to research, plan, make recommendations 
and implement all API public policy positions (Potter 1990). Third, a Federal Relations 
Department was established with a director and support staff as well as nearly ten lobbyists 
focused specifically on petroleum industry issues. Each of the lobbyists was selected because of 
their previous proximity to and strong relationships with key policy-makers. Fourth, API staff 
was expanded to include economists, who made up the new Policy Analysis Department. Hiring 
economists within API was seen as essential not only in the policy-making process, but also 
because they “provided intellectual credibility to API’s testimony before legislative bodies and to 
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other API advocacy materials” (Potter 1990:57). Finally, API began to distribute daily policy 
summaries, which included “all important and relevant Congressional and Executive branch 
hearings” to its member companies (Potter 1990:58). This was implemented so individual 
petroleum companies did not have to be present at all hearings concerning the industry. Instead, 
API staff attended and synthesized information and report back to industry leaders on the daily 
happenings within Congress. 
Additionally, API was also utilized to keep the entire industry abreast to issues beyond 
daily report backs. To strengthen its Washington presence in the 1970s, API created “the 
Emerging Issues Task Force.” This advisory group under API was constituted by individuals 
working as government and public relations officials within the petroleum industry. The major 
work accomplished by this task force was to work with API staff to develop “scoping and 
background papers, option papers and other analytic materials… useful in arriving at policy 
positions on public issues” (Potter 1990:66). Additionally, the task force created a publication 
called the “Public Issues Book.” This publication “contained papers on 50 or more of the most 
important issues on which policy had been established, reviewed their stats, outlined action plans 
for dealing with them and assigned priority to each issue” (Potter 1990:67). 
These newly implemented programs, staff positions, and information programs marked a 
new direction for API as an active force attempting to influence and even change the direction of 
policy development at the federal level. With this new focus, API took on roles never seen before 
in the industry. API became both a collective voice and force for the industry in D.C. engaging 
with policy development beyond the local level. And although this shift was inspired by the rise 
of environmental issues, petroleum industry leaders expanded their policy-related interests to any 
legislative issues that could potentially impact the industry, which included tax policies, inflation 
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and other price issues related to petroleum, divestiture, and inter-state development of oil such as 
the creation of pipelines (Potter 1990). For all of these issues, API staff were ready to testify, 
make press appearances, and produce research and policy-briefings outlining industry positions.  
Although success for any of API’s work is difficult to measure, the most common way 
that industry leaders perceived a success for the industry was when no policy or regulation was 
created (Potter 1990). For example, when divestiture bills related to the petroleum industry were 
introduced in 1975 to potentially break-up large petroleum firms, API staff and industry leaders 
were continuously active for over ten years in engaging with the legislature over the bills. The 
work pursued through API was aggressive: 
The combination of a thoroughly alarmed industry, fully united against divestiture 
legislation of any kind, plus a competent and knowledgeable task force with ample 
resources and authority to take prompt action led to a program tailor-made to succeed. 
Economic studies produced “in-house” by API economists and others commissioned by 
outside experts together provided a strong intellectual basis for the industry’s case. API 
and company public affairs people drew upon these studies in creating persuasive and 
hardhitting materials for use with government, with the media and with thought leaders… 
A concerted program to recruit allies from other industries was carried out, with 
tremendous help from the member companies at the national level and from the regional 
and state organizations locally. Meetings and seminars were held in Washington and 
around the country. Legal aspects were thoroughly researched and made part of 
congressional testimony… 
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The effectiveness of its efforts is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that over the past 
decade there have been no serious efforts in Congress to revive the divestiture idea. 
(Potter 1990:65; emphasis added) 
However, if regulations of any kind were to move forward, API’s other strategy was to be 
a key part of the process of policy and regulation development. This was particularly true for 
environmental regulations that were often passed with wider support within Congress during the 
1970s. For example, in the development of Superfund implementation practices in the 1980s, 
API and other industry trade associations such as the Chemical Manufacturers Association were 
active participants in discussions of tax and funding provisions for the Superfund program. To 
garner revenue for the Superfund program, a manufacturer’s excise tax was created. How the tax 
was to be calculated, however, was still up for debate. API and CMA staff proposed a special 
type of taxing program for industries called the Superfund Excise Tax or SET, which provided a 
cap on the amount that industries were expected to contribute to the Superfund. To advocate the 
petroleum industry’s position, API staff was consistently present, meeting with congressional 
members on key committees to make their positions known: 
API seized the initiative early, meeting with key members of the Senate Finance 
Committee and convincing them of the logic behind the broad-based funding approach… 
After contacts had been made with all members of the Finance Committee (and because 
opposition had not had a chance to form) the SET was approved almost unanimously by 
the Committee… Subsequently the Senate as a whole approved this package. (Potter 
1990:82). 
The 1970s proved to be a key time of organizational development for API and set the 
stage for how the petroleum industry addressed their public policy concerns for years to come. 
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What is striking about API’s work is both the breadth and depth of API’s abilities to be on 
present on many policy issues simultaneously. This clearly corresponded to funding and staff 
capacities that other actors, such as social movement organizations, lacked in comparison to 
capitalist organizations like trade associations. The creation of positions on policies through API 
is one meaningful way that capitalists in the petroleum industry engage with policy on an 
industry wide level. The organizational transformations within API in the 1960s and 1970s to 
focus on legislation should also be understood as an intentional effort by capitalists to shape 
political environments to their advantages. Although individual petroleum companies were also 
active in creating policy positions, through API, industry leaders were able to strategize and 
create cohesive positions on legislative issues, which were then implemented by API staff.  
Today, petroleum industry leaders continue to operate a strong policy program through 
API, focusing on policies and potential regulations that could harm or benefit the petroleum 
industry, notably domestic pipeline development and climate change. Regarding the latter, API’s 
policy position on climate change has taken many shifts over the years, from first advocating a 
position of climate skepticism and denial to today taking a position that frames the industry as a 
partner in emission reduction. It is interesting to note that in the mid 1990s API did not even 
feature a coherent climate policy position on its website. Nor did it list climate change under 
issues of environmental concern, which had a separate section on its website at this time. 
Nonetheless, API did have a strong position on climate change and was active in 
disseminating and advocating its position both on and off the Hill. In a speech to the Economics 
Club of Detroit, Bill O’Keefe, then acting vice president of API, framed impending climate 
change legislation this way: 
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The Clinton Administration has decided that human activity is causing global warming, 
and that this compels immediate action to restrict carbon dioxide emissions which means 
to restrict energy use. Its current policy of supporting a legally binding international 
agreement would likely force U.S. to reduce fossil fuel use about 20 percent by 2010. 
Since energy is the mainspring of economic progress, the impact would be dramatic. 
Even after implementing all reasonable conservation measures, there is no way to do this 
and still maintain healthy economic growth. (O’Keefe 1996) 
In contrast, O’Keefe maintained a denialist position that climate change science was 
inconclusive and a “hypothesis” at best.10  
Realistically, global warming remains a hypothesis. Dire predictions are based largely on 
the projections of large, complex computer models, but none of the models purporting to 
demonstrate the connection between temperature and CO2 work in practice. Although 
they are improving, they cannot replicate either past or present temperature patterns. 
Because CO2 represents such a small fraction of all greenhouse gases, modeling its 
impact in a complex climate system is not easy. (O’Keefe 1996) 
To support his claim, O’Keefe cited Richard Lindzen, a meteorologist who has been linked to 
various conservative think tanks and is today known as a major climate denialist: 
Professor Richard Lindzen of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology – a fellow 
skeptic – says the current models are about as accurate as Ouija boards. They cannot deal 
adequately with the effects of water vapor, clouds, heat transfer, solar activity, oceans, or 
natural carbon sinks. (O’Keefe 1996) 
After outlining this position on climate change, O’Keefe detailed four “decision-making rules,” 
particularly for businesses, which are listed in full in Figure 7.6. Each of these “rules” advocated 
                                                
10 On the distinction between skepticism and denialism, see Dunlap (2013). 
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practices and policy positions that would be least disruptive to business practices. Weaved 
throughout these positions, however, was a clear point that the reality of climate change was 
uncertain or at least would not have the widespread impacts that were already increasingly 
understood by climate scientists and policymakers during this time.  
It is also worth noting that while Bill O’Keefe was serving as vice president of API, he 
was also serving as chairman of the board of an inter-industry organization called the Global 
Climate Coalition (GCC). The GCC was a strong organized capitalist force during the 1990s 
working “to coordinate business participation in the international policy debate on climate 
change and global warming” (GCC 2001). GCC policy positions on climate change mirrored 
many of those advocated by API, which suggests that there was much industry coordination on 
climate change policy positions at this time.11 Through the GCC, capitalists had a focused 
position on climate change policy that served as the backbone of its lobbying campaigns 
throughout the 1990s. When President Bush failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, one of the first 
global treaties outlining actionable items to reduce climate change, the GCC was credited as one 
of the major influences on his decision (Hoggan and Littlemore 2009). After the Kyoto decision, 
the GCC was disbanded, with the organization saying it had accomplished its goals as an 
organization (GCC 2002). 
By advocating the above positions and working closely with other capitalists to achieve 
goals on climate change, petroleum industry leaders were certainly an active force in stopping 
and redirecting the course of climate change policy during the 1990s. Although API’s messaging 
during this time was not aimed at the general public, it is not difficult to see how these organized 
                                                
11 Recent work by Jane Mayer, Dark Money, also shows evidence of the Koch Brothers being active in the organized 
climate denial machine during this time as well. 
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efforts through API itself as well as a broader coalition like the GCC could also have profound 
impacts on climate change understanding in the general population as well.  
Today, API has shifted its position on the science of climate change. In its most recent 
comprehensive publication outlining API’s position, denial and skepticism are no longer the 
primary frames utilized by the organization: 
The oil and gas industry considers climate change a very important issue and is engaging 
constructively to address this complex global challenge. United States climate policy 
must recognize the vital role of petroleum products in modern society, and the many 
benefits that oil and natural gas provide our nation and the world. (API 2017f) 
However, even though API’s position appears to have shifted, the content of its actionable and 
policy-centered positions remains practically the same as twenty years ago. API still focuses on 
defending the “vital role” of the petroleum industry and still advocates against regulation to 
address climate change. In its defense, API claims the industry is already a responsible 
environmental steward and has been working on emissions reductions for many years: 
Right now, the United States is leading the world in the production and refining of oil and 
natural gas, as well as in the reduction of GHG emissions. CO2 emissions from power 
generation in 2016 were near 30-year lows, in large part due to greater use of natural 
gas. And increased use of natural gas in the power generation sector has helped to reduce 
total CO2 emissions to their lowest level in nearly 25 years. This proves that Americans 
do not have to make the false choice between utilizing our nation’s energy resources and 
protecting the environment. (API 2017f:1; emphasis in original) 
In these positions on climate change today, API attempts to shift attention to how the industry is 
already working on climate change or, rather, the narrower frame of CO2 reduction. API also 
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broadens the industry’s operations from petroleum to include natural gas, which it suggests is a 
much cleaner burning fuel. With such a framing, API finally comes to the conclusion like it has 
in many other policy debates that no policy is necessary because the industry is already making 
essential strides in curtailing climate change through voluntary measures. Thus, API frames these 
reductions as industry responsibility and innovation and not the result of any government 
intervention: 
These reductions are the result of market forces. They have little to do with government 
programs and everything to do with the affordability of the United States’ natural gas 
resource. With such an abundant supply of affordable fuel on hand, power plants already 
have an incentive to use cleaner-burning natural gas without government interference.  
The challenge to provide more energy while lowering greenhouse gas emissions is clear. 
Government mandates like the Clean Power Plan are not the most cost-effective means to 
lower greenhouse gas emissions; the market demand for natural gas is doing that on its 
own. And a market-based, all-of-the above energy policy that encourages innovation 
and meets demand is the best combined economic and environmental option for our 
future. (API 2017f:6; emphasis in italics added) 
Today, API advocates the position that policy would actually be detrimental to reaching goals of 
CO2 reduction. This policy position therefore mirrors previous efforts of API to address potential 
government interference in the ability of petroleum capitalists to continue their business 
practices. 
Although API did not start with a strong federal-focused program, API’s early state 
efforts eventually set the stage for the organization to be utilized as a clearinghouse for policy 
issues that could potentially impact the entire petroleum industry. Impending environmental 
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regulations were major reasons that API began to focus on federal level positions. It is difficult 
to measure the impacts and effects of these focused efforts on the state and policy, but through 
API, the petroleum industry continues to be a strong force capable of continued and vigilant 
efforts to shape and prevent public policies.  
Normalizing Oil: API and the Shaping of Public Opinion and the General Public’s View of 
Petroleum’s Necessity 
The final actor that petroleum industry leaders have consistently engaged with through 
API is the general public. Shaping public opinion on the petroleum industry and petroleum 
industry products and practices has been a core part of API’s programs over time. However, 
early in API’s history, petroleum industry leaders were wary of any public relations efforts and 
wanted the newly formed association to be centered on the creation of standards and some 
limited public policy work (Fanning 1959; Potter 1990). Individual petroleum firms also rarely 
had public relations programs in house during this time, which also attributed to lack of wider 
industry support for this type of program to be established through API.  
Following WWII, however, this sentiment changed among petroleum industry leaders. 
Potter cites the leadership of R.T. Haslam, one of the directors of the board of API at the time, 
leading the charge with the following observations to justify the creation of public relations work 
through API: 
[The petroleum industry was] particularly subject to political attacks and threats of 
government control because of popular misconceptions that it was a monopoly that 
reaped excessive profits. [Haslam] pointed out that other basic industries (iron and steel, 
coal, electric power, motor vehicles, railroads, etc.) had already launched public relations 
programs. He cited surveys by individual oil companies which showed growing public 
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sentiment favoring more government control and even direct government ownership of 
petroleum resources. (Potter 1990:14) 
Other members of the Board shared Haslam’s views and supported the development of a formal 
public relations (PR) effort through API. After some preliminary public attitude surveys had 
confirmed many of the public opinions cited by Haslam, in November of 1946, the Board 
approved a $1 million budget for the new PR effort. Given that the entire budget of API at this 
time was also $1 million, it is clear that petro-capitalists were serious about investing in public 
relations (Potter 1990). Today, public relations work continues to be a high priority for API as a 
part of its broader public policy focus.  
Over time, API has utilized a number of methods in its attempts to reach the public with 
its targeted messages about the petroleum industry, its practices, and its positions on political 
issues that concern the industry. Some of these methods include: 
• Local Events including the “Oil Progress Week,” highlighted in the section on 
labor above as well as other local events, particularly during election seasons. 
Tours of local petroleum facilities were also popular tactics, particularly with state 
officials and the media. 
• Advertisements distributed through almost all forms of media including 
magazines, television, newspapers, websites, and social media. 
• School Programs including the development of primary and secondary school 
curriculum in economics, physics, chemistry, and general science, which focused 
attention on the petroleum industry’s products and processes. API staff would also 
attend teacher conventions and seminars to advocate the adoption of these 
materials and advertise in educational journals. Portions of API’s website is 
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dedicated to secondary and primary school teachers with structured curriculum 
and “fact sheets” about the petroleum industry. 
• Special Films for use in school programs and local events, highlighting the history 
of petroleum and petroleum development as a “natural” process. Popular 
television programs for children and adults also occasionally featured segments 
on the petroleum industry, which were sponsored by API. 
• Websites and Social Media focused on API’s positions on political issues that 
concern the petroleum industry. Much of these efforts have focused on 
environmental issues, the industry’s role in job creation, and safety in the 
industry. 
Through these methods of information distribution, API’s PR efforts have served two 
primary purposes. The first of these is centered on painting the industry as an essential part of 
U.S. society and normalizing the industry and industry practices to the American public. As 
shown by the quotes from the board of directors above, this focus anchored the development of 
the PR program in API and continues to mark PR produced by API today. For example, the 
creation of Oil Progress Week in the 1940s and 1950s highlighted in the above section on labor 
was created to “bring home to local communities the fact that oil companies, large and small, are 
good citizens who provide many services to the public” (Potter 1990:15). Centering attention on 
local petroleum industry companies was a strategic way to put a face to the petroleum industry, 
framing the industry as a part of local communities instead of the large monopolistic industry 
that much of the public associated with the industry. Some of API’s first advertisements were 
also created in attempts to reframe the industry as an essential part of U.S. society that 
represented American values. Figure 7.7 displays one of these first advertisements. The content 
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of the advertisement frames the industry along the lines of competition, which is also connected 
to the core of American values. Connecting the petroleum industry to “competition,” “rivalry,” 
and “American values,” was an intentional effort to encourage new public views of the industry 
that were not associated unfair business practices.  
Over the next several decades, API continued to develop materials framing the industry 
in ways that were meant to normalize its practices and processes. In the 1950s and 1960s, API 
expanded its methods into television and films. For example, scripts for episodes of the popular 
television program Art Linkletter’s House Party were developed that centered on petroleum as a 
part of everyday life in the United States and focused on the widespread nature of its use: 
… narration: “Eat a piece of candy – heat a city – build a home or skyscaper – fire a 
rocket – kill a fly – buy your wife a pair of stockings – break a speed record – sail a ship 
or run a factory – If it isn’t made of oil, then oil powers it, or helps dig it out of the 
ground, or brings it to your door… 
Before man could do much about making a better world for himself, he needed a source 
of abundant low cost energy… In the discovery of OIL, he found the world’s most 
important energy source. (API 1961:4) 
The program continues, framing petroleum as the conduit through which modern society has 
been able to progress. 
In the 1970s, API also ramped up local and regional events, as the industry was exploring 
more offshore drilling, particularly on the East Coast and in the Gulf of Mexico. To garner public 
acceptance and public support for these efforts, API developed comprehensive regional programs 
to promote offshore drilling: 
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For several years, an intensive local effort was mounted in the all of the East Coast and 
[Gulf Coast] states to develop understanding of the nation’s pressing need for domestic 
energy supplies, the industry’s ability to operate in an ecologically safe manner and the 
jobs and other economic benefits which might accrue to the local economy from a 
successful oil or gas discovery. (Potter 1990:62;) 
Such targeted strategies show how intentional these efforts have been on the part of API, with 
few activities in API being performed without forethought and strategic planning. Petroleum 
industry leaders utilized API to present packaged messages about the industry, normalizing its 
practices and even framing its endeavors as safe. To accomplish this messaging, API formulated 
a number of methods and programs to garner support for off-shore drilling: 
All the usual techniques were employed (media visits, speeches before all types of 
audiences, films, exhibits, etc.) but the most successful method of information and 
educating government officials, business leaders, the media and other thought leaders 
was through offshore tours of platforms and other facilities in the Gulf. Here, people 
could see for themselves how the industry operated in an offshore environment and ask 
questions of oil people working on the rigs. (Potter 1990:62) 
The comprehensive methods utilized by API in this regional public relations project show how 
invested industry leaders were in attempting to shape public perception of the industry. 
These attempts to normalize the industry are still core parts of API’s public relations 
programs and materials today. API relies heavily on new forms of digital media, such as 
websites and social media, to distribute its messages about the industry. However, the 
organization also still utilizes local events and sponsorships to engage with the public. The 
example of the Energy Citizens group highlighted in the labor section is a continuation of the 
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group’s presence in local communities. National campaigns during election season are also 
common, with API sponsoring debates or special events focused on energy. For example, in the 
2016 Presidential election, API developed a campaign called “Vote 4 Energy.” From a cursory 
view, this campaign appears to be a comprehensive informational program on all type of energy 
produced and used in the United States. However, upon closer examination, the messaging of the 
materials always leads back to American dependence and need for petroleum products as well as 
natural gas today and for years to come. For example, in a report developed under the campaign 
entitled “Energy is Everything: State of American Energy,” API acknowledges the development 
and potential growth of renewable energy, but argues that petroleum and natural gas will still be 
an essential part of the energy landscape in the U.S. for years to come: 
It is clear, based on the consensus opinion of most experts, including the EIA [Energy 
Information Association], that it is unrealistic to suggest that we can meet our future 
energy needs without fossil fuels. The reality is that, while renewable fuels are an 
important part of our nation’s energy equation, the high-growth renewables remain 
intermittent and therefore unable to provide a consistent and reliable base for electricity 
generation. Conversely, natural gas provides a steady, reliable and cost-effective base that 
lowers costs for consumers and also provides flexibility that makes the use of more 
intermittent sources of energy feasible. (API 2017e:10) 
Figure 7.8 shows a graph that accompanied this text, showing projections of different types of 
energy use in 2040. Oil and natural gas in this projection are still framed as major parts of energy 
development and use in the future. Framing oil and gas products as not only normal, but also 
inevitable is a strategic messaging utilized by API. To distribute this message to the public and 
policy-makers, API developed a massive web presence, television commercials (featuring people 
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who were “voting for energy” which corresponded to continued use of fossil fuels), and 
sponsored events on “balanced energy” approaches during the 2016 election.  
Through API, then, petroleum industry leaders have historically provided their own 
narratives for public consumption creating industry-friendly reference points for how the public 
could potentially understand the wider petroleum industry as well as many of its practices.  
The second purpose of API’s public relations work has been to provide unified messages 
from the petroleum industry on policy issues that could potentially impact the ability of the 
petroleum industry to continue its operations. This includes both crisis moments in the industry 
such as large environmental disasters like oil and pipeline spills or other politicized events like 
oil shortages as well as impending environmental problems, which are publically attributed to 
industry practices. Although individual oil companies have also developed positions and public 
relations efforts in response to these issues, through API, petroleum industry leaders have been 
able to develop unified responses to what they perceive as threats to the industry and their ability 
to continue to accumulate profit. API is then able to use these positions to develop materials for 
public consumption as well as policies that the industry deems as beneficial to the industry. For 
example, the activities described above on offshore development were created following the 
Santa Barbara oil spill in 1969 (Potter 1990). Petroleum industry leaders were concerned about 
public perception of the industry following the spill, which led them to produce a public relations 
program focused on safety and jobs provided by offshore development. 
After the Deepwater Horizon oil spill (also known as the BP oil spill) in 2010, API 
devoted an entire section of its website to oil spill updates (API 2010). Through this area, API 
distributed information produced by the organization that advocated the industry’s positions 
related to the spill. Like the response to the Santa Barbara spill, a major part of the content of 
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API’s information was centered on safety standards within the industry. API advocated positions 
that offshore drilling was a safe endeavor and that the spill was an anomaly within the industry: 
Offshore oil and gas exploration and production operations have been successfully and 
safely conducted in the U.S. since the 1940s. Since that time, industry, government and 
oil spill response organizations in the United States have worked together to develop an 
effective oil spill prevention, preparedness and response regime that is recognized for 
excellence around the world. (API 2010) 
Additionally, API utilized its website to present policy positions regarding oil spills and offshore 
drilling, particularly noting this spills such as this should not disrupt future development in the 
industry: 
As the White House and other political leaders have noted, the reality is that we will need 
more oil and natural gas now and for decades to come. Producing our own energy helps 
increase the nation’s energy security, creates American jobs and generates government 
revenues. That is why President Obama has said that he remains committed to his plan to 
expand offshore drilling. (API 2010) 
These messages of course were not only contained within the website of API. API staff were also 
active in legislative sessions and utilized other media forms (such as newspapers and social 
media) to present its positions.  
Today, API continues its vigilant engagement with the general public, advocating an 
understanding of the industry as an essential and normal part of the American landscape. As 
highlighted in the previous two sections, API frames the industry as a job creator and responsible 
industry that supplies essential products to the public, often utilizing labor in its commercials and 
on the ground efforts to further amplify these messages. API’s most recent advertising campaign 
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revamps the industry’s image under the banner “This Ain’t Your Daddy’s Oil” (API 2017g). API 
revealed this new campaign during the 2017 Superbowl. The ability to pay for this airtime is 
remarkable enough, but also goes to show how the industry is still attempting to reach the largest 
audiences possible. The thirty-second commercial features various uses of petroleum products, 
such as in paint, in make-up, in plastics, and as a fuel source, juxtaposed against tailored images 
of each of these uses, with simple text (see Figures 7.9, 7.10, and 7.11) such as “Oil gushes Art” 
or “Oil Strikes a Pose.” The commercial ends with the declaration: “Together, we can power past 
impossible,” which corresponds to API’s new campaign website powerpastimpossible.org, and 
small text disclosing that the advertisement was paid for by the American Petroleum Institute.  
Through all of API’s public relations efforts, petroleum industry leaders have been 
actively involved in attempting to shape public perceptions of the industry. Whether it be 
concerns about public perception of the entire industry, its individual practices, or other 
problems attributed to the industry such as environmental issues, petroleum industry leaders are 
clearly aware of these potential threats to their ability to continue to accumulate profits. Through 
API, the industry has had a consistent organized presence and platform to distribute its positions 
for nearly 100 years. Whether it be relations with labor, the state, or the general public, API has 
served as one of the primary ways that the petroleum industry has attempted to influence and 
potentially control other actors that are seen as important parts of the cultural and political 






This dissertation examined the creation and subsequent work of one national trade 
association, the American Petroleum Institute (API). The central puzzle driving my research has 
been why and how competitive capitalist firms of all sizes and business activities in the 
petroleum sector of the U.S. coalesced into a national trade association. Increasingly, the power 
of the petroleum industry has been recognized by critics of the dominance of petro-culture and 
petro-politics. Yet there continues to be little attention to the ever-present association, API, that 
stands behind this domination. In attempting to understand API better, this dissertation dug 
deeper and deeper into the history of petroleum firms’ competition and cooperation from before 
the time that API was even conceived. It also built a theoretical understanding of the importance 
of trade associations for class work by capitalists by utilizing Marxian organizational theory. 
Utilizing archival methods, findings from this dissertation challenge conceptualizations 
that trade associations are primarily institutional settings of cultural production for business 
communities (Spillman 2012) or rational responses by business leaders to collective problems 
(Aldrich and Staber 1988; Baron 1995; Hillman and Hitt 1999). Utilizing Marxian organizational 
theory, findings from this dissertation present a new conceptualization: trade associations are 
inherently capitalist organizations created to build and maintain the interests of the capitalist 
class.  
To unpack and support this conceptualization, each chapter of the case study of API 
provided insight into how and why API was important for petroleum industry capitalists to be 
able to first recognize and then protect and promote their class-based interests. Chapter Four first 
examined the difficulties of creating unity in the petroleum sector in the late 1800s. Although 
petroleum industry leaders occasionally attempted to organize through trade associations to 
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accomplish collective goals and economic stability, these efforts ironically culminated in a 
divided industry environment. These divisions were further amplified through the monopolistic 
practices of Standard Oil. In some ways, we can view Standard Oil’s goals and actions as similar 
to creating a trade association, although notably with few avenues for collective work through 
the network of Standard firms that eventually became the Standard Oil Trust. Even after the 
break-up of Standard by the federal government, the industry environment remained divided, 
with industry leaders showing little sign of working together as a collective.  
However, the industry environment shifted as petro-capitalists worked together through 
WWI war service committees. Chapter Five detailed the experiences of capitalists within the 
petroleum sector as they began to recognize their collective interests as an industry. Shifts in 
state priorities, more inclusive industry organizations, and the building of a comprehensive 
industry identity all contributed to this recognition process. Following the war, petroleum 
industry leaders were eager and enthusiastic to continue their cooperative efforts, which led to 
the creation of their first national trade association, the American Petroleum Institute. The 
establishment of API was the culmination of this recognition process that occurred during the 
war. Chapter Six examined the three meetings and conferences that petroleum industry leaders 
participated in to plan the purpose and structure of API, all of which illuminated the intentional 
strategies of petroleum industry leaders to create an organization inclusive of all sub-sectors and 
types of firms and centered on their collective goals as leaders of these firms.  
The final chapter of the case study, Chapter Seven, answered questions about what 
petroleum industry capitalists were able to accomplish after they became unified through API. I 
found that API was used for two primary purposes. One was activities that constituted internal 
industry organizing, which served to deepen ties among industry leadership and create common 
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practices and standards within the industry. The second was to influence external environments 
and actors, particularly those that could have an effect on the ability of petroleum industry 
capitalists to continue to accumulate profit. Both of these activity areas have been continuous 
throughout the history of API, showing the ongoing and expansive engagement of petroleum 
capitalists throughout the past several decades. Together, each of these chapters support the 
conceptualization that trade associations are inherently capitalist organizations created with the 
intention to protect and promote the class-based interests of the capitalist class. 
This dissertation research contributes to several areas of scholarly inquiry. The first is to 
reorient studies of trade associations through a Marxist lens, which challenges other 
conceptualizations of trade associations as social actors. A Marxist approach centers the very 
actors that work to create trade associations, showing that trade associations develop as a way for 
capitalists to define and pursue collective action together. Because these organizations were 
created with such a purpose, they are inherently capitalist organizations and are organizations for 
capitalists to contest and create solidarity with one another on internal industry issues and 
external threats and opportunities. Through trade associations, industry leaders then pursue a 
variety of programs that simultaneously protect the collective interests of and promote the 
growth of the industry. Such a conceptualization challenges characterizations of trade 
associations as organizations that primarily pursue work through “disinterested solidarity” and 
are organizations that serve primarily as meaning-making spaces for particular segments of the 
business community. While the work performed within trade associations may appear 
disinterested and while their work may simultaneously create solidarity, meaning and even 
camaraderie for its members, the very roots of trade associations are centered on a collective 
understanding of the need to protect and promote the collective identity and interests of an 
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industry as a whole. The decision to create an organization such as a trade association is one 
important way that capitalists recognize that need and pursue action to ensure their collective 
ability to continue to accumulate profit. 
Another contribution is to broader Marxist debates about the role of the capitalist class in 
social change. Although structural Marxists point to the importance of structural forces, which 
are outside of the direct control of actors within society, this study shows that capitalists are 
intimately involved in attempting to shape policies, practices, and cultural and ideological 
positions within society. Instead of abstract or deterministic conclusions about the inevitable 
“failures” of capitalist perspectives, processes, or attempts to transform society, this dissertation 
takes seriously the efforts of capitalists to organize to protect their own class-based interests. The 
point is not that individual capitalists are seizing instrumental control over the U.S. state. Rather, 
the intentional collective efforts of capitalists through organizations like trade associations 
pushes attention to the individual/motivational and organizational levels of system creation and 
maintenance. In examining these efforts, the way that structure is built and shaped, step by step 
and gradually by powerful actors in society deserves more attention in how Marxists understand 
capitalist contributions to social structure stability as well as social change.  
A final contribution of this dissertation is to studies of the petroleum industry itself as a 
social, cultural, and political actor. As highlighted in the introduction to the dissertation, the 
political and cultural dynamics at work above ground have much influence on how the oil sector 
is able to operate as an industry and continue to extract resources below ground. Recent work by 
Mitchell (2013) and Huber (2013) also contribute to these understandings, showing that the fossil 
fuel industries are active participants in shaping the way that society functions both materially 
and ideologically. However, while these studies touch on these themes, they do not dig deeply 
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into the intentional creation of political and cultural elements that are crucial to building the 
unsustainable structures that characterize much of the world today. This study of the American 
Petroleum Institute in particular shows how the industry has been a continuous and pervasive 
force in society for many decades creating narratives about petroleum that paint the industry as 
an essential part of American society and key to American prosperity. However, as the case 
study shows, all of these efforts are rooted in protection and promotion of the capitalists in the 
sector who created and maintained the organization over time. API’s efforts should also help to 
complicate understandings of why social change itself is a difficult process, either for potentially 
competing capitalist sectors such as renewable energy or particularly for those within society 
who have much less material power than petro-capitalists. Seeing how petroleum industry 
leaders have been able to organize and implement their strategies through trade associations 
makes it easier to understand some of the barriers that exist to creating just and sustainable 
policies and practices. For the petroleum industry, this is particularly true for labor and 
environmental issues. 
There are many future directions of research that stem from this study. More research on 
the development of trade associations in particular is necessary to support or challenge the 
conceptualization that trade associations are capitalist organizations. When considering the 
development of API, it is necessary to acknowledge how critical petroleum itself is as a 
commodity in the global economy, which likely had an impact on how the petroleum industry 
leaders operated through the trade association and developed its activities. Other industries likely 
do not face some of the same challenges or threats in the forms of regulations or have the same 
troubled history with the general public that the U.S. petroleum industry does. This may then 
lead to trade associations in other sectors not being as vital as API is for capitalists within the 
 239 
petroleum industry in order to protect and promote their interests. More studies of the processes 
through which trade associations are formed would help to clarify the wider significance of trade 
associations particularly to capitalists themselves. 
Further research is also necessary to assess the impacts and effects of trade associations 
on policy and public opinion. This is true of the broader population of trade associations as well 
as API specifically. By focusing primarily on the internal organizational challenges that went 
into the creation of API, this study only scratched the surface of many other social dynamics and 
processes that are of importance to assessing trade associations as social actors. Future research 
could address how API relates to the state, how API’s work impacts policy development 
specifically and broadly, and how successful API’s work actually is in its attempts to reach and 
influence various publics.  
Finally, more research on a variety of capitalist organizations and organizing efforts are 
necessary to further clarify how capitalists come together to protect their class-based interests. 
Other organizations highlighted in this study including the Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States, the Global Climate Coalition, and other trade large trade associations must be given a 
sociological treatment. Such research not only contributes to scholarly understandings of social 
actors and social change, but are also vital to understand what intentional efforts go in to the 
perpetuation of capitalist systems. In a sense, such studies are meant to bring capitalists 
themselves back into analyses of social stability and change. What this means then is that there is 
much room for future research on API as an organization, trade associations as social actors, and 
capitalist organizing and organizations in general.  
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Table 5.1 The Committee on Petroleum of the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense, 
April 1917- December 1917 
Name Company Affiliation Industry Ties 
A.C. Bedford  Standard Oil Company of New 
Jersey 
Former Standard Oil Trust 
George S. Davison Gulf Oil Corporation Independent Oil Company 
E.L. Doheny Mexican Petroleum Corporation Independent Oil Company 
E.C. Lufkin The Texas Company Independent Oil Company 
John H. Markham Oil producer (Tulsa) Independent Oil producer 
H.F. Sinclair Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. Independent Oil Company 
J.W. Van Dyke Atlantic Refining Co. Former Standard Oil Trust 
H. G. James* Western Petroleum Refiners 
Association of America 
Trade Association, Independent 
William Muir* National Petroleum Association Trade Association, Independent 
* Committee members added June 1917 
Sources: National Petroleum News, May 1917, p. 7; National Petroleum News June 1917, p. 20; Oildom, June 1917, 





Table 5.2 Members of the National Petroleum War Service Committee, January of 1918 
Name Company Affiliation Industry Ties 
A. C. Bedford, (Chair) Standard Oil Company of New 
Jersey 
Former Standard Oil Trust 
E. C. Lufkin (Vice Chair) The Texas Company Independent Oil Company 
E. W. Clark The Union Oil Company Independent Oil Company 




George. S. Davison The Gulf Company Independent Oil Company 
E. L. Doheny The Mexican Petroleum 
Company 
Independent Oil Company 








Van H. Manning Bureau of Mines, Washington, 
D.C. 
Government Official 
John H. Markham Oil Producer (Tulsa) Independent Oil producer 
Samuel Messer National Petroleum Association Trade Association, 
Independent 
H. F. Sinclair The Sinclair Oil & Refining 
Company 
Independent Oil Company 
Walter C. Teagle Standard Oil Company of New 
Jersey 
Former Standard Oil Trust 
J. W. Van Dyke The Atlantic Refining Company Former Standard Oil Trust 




A.G. Maguire* Bartles-Maguire Oil Company Independent Oil Company 




* Committee members added in March of 1918; ** Committee member added in May of 1918 
Sources: National Petroleum News, January 1918, p. 5; Oildom, January 1918, p. 16; National Petroleum News, 






Table 5.3 Members of the National Petroleum War Service Committee, June 1918 
Name Company Affiliation Industry Ties 
A.C. Bedford (Chair) Standard Oil Company of New Jersey Former Standard Oil Trust 
J. A. Moffett 
(Secretary) 
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey Former Standard Oil Trust 
A. P. Combe Standard Oil of Ohio Former Standard Oil Trust 
W. P. Cowan Standard Oil of Indiana Former Standard Oil Trust 
B. G. Dawes Ohio Cities Gas Co. Independent Oil Company 
E. L. Doheny Mexican Petroleum Co. Independent Oil Company 
H. L. Doherty Cities Service Cos. Independent Oil Company 
J. F. Guffey Guffey & Gillespie Independent Oil Company 
Dr. Van H. Manning Bureau of Mines Government Official 
J. H. Markham, Jr. Oil Producer (Tulsa) Independent Oil producer 
A. G. McGuire Oil Marketer (Milwaukee) Independent Oil marketer 
J. E. O'Neil Prairie Oil & Gas Co. Former Standard Oil Trust 
J. Howard Pew Sun Co. Independent Oil Company 
Edward Prizer Vacuum Oil Co. Independent Oil Company 
H. F. Sinclair Sinclair Corporation Independent Oil Company 
J. W. Van Dyke Atlantic Refining Co. Former Standard Oil Trust 




Table 5.4 Chairs of the Advisory Sub-Committees of the National Petroleum War Service Committee 
(June 1918) 
Name Advisory Committee Name Company Affiliation 
E. W. Clark Pacific Coast Petroleum War 
Service Committee 
Union Oil Co. of California 
W. S. Farish Committee on Production in 
Texas and Louisiana 
Humble Oil & Refining Co. 
George W. Crawford Committee on Appalachian 
Production (Eastern Division) 
Ohio Fuel Oil Co. 
J. C. Donnell Committee on Appalachian 
Production (Western Division) 
Ohio Oil Co. 
Frank Haskell Committee for Mid-Continent 
Production 
Tidal Oil Co.; Mid-Continent Oil 
& Gas Association 
Samuel Messer Committee for Appalachian 
Refining and Marketing 
National Petroleum Association 
J. S. Cosden Committee for Mid-Continent 
Refining and Marketing 
The Western Petroleum Refiners' 
Association 
E. C. Lufkin Committee on Distribution 
(Atlantic Division) 
The Texas Company 
Judge M. J. Byrne Committee on Jobbers Independent Oil Men’s 
Association 
H. M. Blackmer,  Committee for the Rocky 
Mountain Division 
Mid-west Refining Co. 
George S. Davison Committee on Pipe Lines 
(Southern Division) 
Gulf Oil Corp. 
R. D. Benson Committee on Pipe Lines 
(Northern Division) 
Tide Water Pipe Co. 
H. E. Felton Committee on Tank Cars Union Tank Line Co. 
W. C. Teagle Committee on Tank Vessels Standard Oil Company of New 
Jersey 
Martin F. Carey Committee on Law Standard Oil Co. of New York 
J. H. Barr Committee on Oil Well Supplies National Supply Co. 




Table 5.5 Advisory Committees of the National Petroleum War Service Committee, September 1918 
Name of Committee No. of 
Members 
Name of Committee No. of 
Members 
Pacific Coast Petroleum War 
Service Committee 
7 Advisory Committee On Jobbers 10 
Advisory Committee For The Rocky 
Mountain Division 
11 Advisory Committee On Pipe Lines 
(Atlantic Division) 
9 
Advisory Committee For Mid-
Continent Production 




Advisory Committee On Gulf 
Production 
12 Advisory Committee On Tank Cars 
 
16 
Advisory Committee For 
Appalachian Production (Western 
Division) 




Advisory Committee For 
Appalachian Production (Eastern 
Division) 




Advisory Committee For Mid 
Continent Refining And Marketing 
17 Advisory Committee On Tank Vessels 
 
11 
Advisory Committee For 
Appalachian Refining And 
Marketing 




Advisory Committee On 
Distribution (Atlantic Division) 
16 Advisory Committee On Natural Gas 
 
9 




Table 5.6 Directors and Bureaus of the Oil Division of the U.S. Fuel Administration, October 1918 
Name of Director Position Company Affiliation 
Mark L. Requa General Director -- 
A.E.F. Reel Secretary to General Director -- 
H.H. Eagle Bureau of Oil Distribution and 
Complaints 
American Oil Export, Co. 
Norman B. Beecher Legal Counsel Burlingham, Montgomery, & 
Beecher 
T.B. Gregory Bureau of Natural Gas Section Ohio Fuel Corporation 
Thomas Cox Bureau of Costs Cox & Juessen 
F.J. Silsbee Bureau of Statistics Pacific Petroleum Record 
Thomas A. O’Donnell Bureau of Oil Production American Petroleum Co. 
S.A. Guiberson, Jr. Bureau of Pipelines Associated Pipeline 
A.C. Woodman Bureau of Purchases and 
Lubricants 
Union Petroleum Corporation 
Aubrey G. MacGuire Chief of Oil License Section The Bartles-MacGuire Oil Co. 
W. Champlin Robinson Bureau of Oil Conservation William C. Robinson & Sons Co. 
and the Robinson Oil 
Corporation, Baltimore 
R.A. Wotowitch Export License Section, War 
Trade Board 
Crew Levick Co. 
George E. Day Bureau Oil Well Supplies Youngstown Pipe & Sheet Co. 
William A. Williams Bureau of Technology Empire Co. 
John A. Middleton Bureau of Traffic and 
Transportation 
Frisco Line 
Clifford G. Sheffield Bureau of Domestic Consumption Union Oil Co. 
Source: Oildom October 1918, p.749 
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Table 6.1 First Structure of the American Petroleum Institute Groups, March 1919 
 Source: Oildom, April 1919, p.20; 50 
 
  
Groups Details of Group Members 
Major Groups: 26 members; 7 groups 1. Production, six (6) members 
o Pacific Coast Group 
o Rocky Mountain Group 
o Mid-Continent Group 
o Gulf Coast Group 
o Appalachian (West) Group 
o Appalachian (East) Group 
2. Manufacture, six (6) members  
o Pacific Coast Group 
o Mid-Continent Group 
o Pennsylvania Group 
o Atlantic Coast Group 
o Rocky Mountain Group 
o Gulf Coast Group 
3. Distribution, six (6) members 
o Pacific Coast Group 
o Rocky Mountain Group 
o Mid-Continent Group 
o Gulf Coast Group 
o Appalachian Group 
o Atlantic Coast Group 
4. Transportation, three (3) members 
o Pipeline Group 
o Tank-Car Group 
o Ships Group 
5. Foreign Trade, three (3) members 
o Mexican and South American Group 
o Far East Group 
o European Group 
6. Supply, one (1) member  
7. Natural Gas, one (1) member 
 
Minor Groups: 9 members, 2 groups 1. Officers' Group, five (5) members ex-officio 
o President,  
o Three Vice-Presidents   
o Treasurer 
2. Group at Large, four (4) members 
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Table 6.2 First Elected Leadership of the American Petroleum Institute, March 1919 
Group Name Name Company Name Affiliation* 
Major Groups    
Production    
Appalachian (East)  G.W. Crawford Ohio Fuel Supply Company I 
Appalachian (West) J.C. Donnell Ohio Oil Company S 
Appalachian (West) B.G. Dawes Ohio Gas Company I 
Mid-Continent Frank Haskell Mid-Continent Oil & Gas I 
Mid-Continent  J.H. Markham Jr. Producer, Tulsa I 
Gulf Coast  W.S. Farish The Gulf Coast Oil Producers' 
Association 
ITA 
Manufacture    
Atlantic Edward Prizer Vacuum Oil Company I 
Atlantic  A.C. Bedford Standard Oil Company of New Jersey S 
Mid-Continent J.S. Cosden The Western Petroleum Refiners' 
Association 
ITA 
Atlantic  R.D. Benson Tide Water Pipe Co. I 
Mid-Continent E.E. Schock Indiahoma Refining Company I 
Pacific Coast E.W. Clark The Union Oil Company I 
Distribution    
Atlantic A.C. Woodman Union Petroleum Corporation I 
Appalachian (West) A.P. Coombe Standard Oil of Ohio S 
Mid-Continent G.I. Sweney Bartles-Sweney Oil Company I 
Mid-Continent C.L. Maguire Bartles-Maguire Oil Company I 
Mid-Continent R.W. Stewart Standard Oil Company of Indiana S 
Rocky Mountain H.M. Blackmer Mid-west Refining Company I 
Transportation    
Ships J.H. Pew Sun Company I 
Pipe Line J.E. O’Neil Prairie Oil & Gas Company S 
Tank Car H.E. Felton Union Tank Line Company S 
Foreign Trade    
European W.C. Teagle Standard Oil Company of New Jersey S 
Far East Martin Carey Standard Oil Company of New York S 
Mexico E.L. Doheny Mexican Petroleum Corporation I 
Supply    
 J.H. Barr National Supply Company I 
Natural Gas    
 J.E. Guffey Guffey-Gillispie Company I 
Minor Groups    
Officer’s Group    
President T.A. Donnell American Petroleum Company I 
Vice President Sam Messer National Petroleum Association ITA 
Vice President H.L. Doherty Cities Service Company I 
Vice President J.H. Van Dyke Atlantic Refining Company I 
Treasurer H.F. Sinclair Sinclair Oil & Gas Company I 
Group at Large    
 Van H. Manning Bureau of Mines G 
 Judge M.J. Byrne Independent Oil Men’s Association ITA 
 R. L. Welch The Western Petroleum Refiners' 
Association 
ITA 
 C.D. Chamberlin National Petroleum Association ITA 
* Abbreviations: Former Standard Oil Trust (S); Independent Oil Company (I); Independent Trade Association 
(ITA); Government Official (G) 
Source: National Petroleum News, April 2, 1919, p.20-22; Fanning 1959  
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1. To secure the necessary and adequate fuel oil and gasoline supplies for the fleets of the 
United States Navy, both at home and abroad, including the Coast Patrol Services; also 
the necessary gasoline supply for the transport and motor car and aeroplane service for 
our armies operating abroad and at home, and for those now in the process of 
formation. 
 
2. To secure the necessary fuel oil and gasoline supplies for the Allied Fleet of the British, 
French and Italian Navies and the gasoline supplies for the aeroplane and transport 
service of the Allied British, French and Italian armies, working directly with the War 
and Navy Departments of the Allies through the British, French and Italian Missions. 
 
3. To secure and arrange for the supplies of petroleum products (fuel, oil, gasoline and 
kerosene) necessary to the industries engaged in the production of munitions, both at 
home and abroad, and to cooperate with the various foreign agencies and Government 
departments in connection therewith. 
 
4. To coordinate the manufacture and distribution of petroleum products through the 
cooperation of the refiners of petroleum in the United States and, because of the present 
serious excess of consumption of oil over production, to endeavor to stimulate the 
producers of crude oil to increase production, to the end that all needs shall be fully 
met. 
 
Figure 5.1 Purpose of Committee on Petroleum of the Advisory Commission of the Council of 
National Defense, October 1917 





Figure 5.2 Production, Consumption, and Stocks of Crude Petroleum in Millions of Barrels, 1913-1918 
Source: Williamson et al. 1963 The American Petroleum Industry 1899-1959: Age of Illumination, p. 286; Pogue 1921, Economics of 
























Domestic Production Plus Net Imports
Year-End Stocks of Crude Oil
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Figure 5.3 Monthly Prices of Crude, 1916-1918 
Source: Williamson et al. 1963 The American Petroleum Industry 1899-1959: Age of Illumination, p. 287; Pogue 1921, Economics of 






















































































1. Act as the point of contact between the petroleum industry and our Government and our 
Allies.  
 
2. Provide the necessary fuel, oil and gasoline supplies for the armies and navies of the 
United States and of our Allies.  
 
3. Provide and arrange for the supplies of petroleum products necessary to the industries 
engaged in the production of munitions, both at home and abroad.  
 
4. Co-ordinate the manufacture and distribution of petroleum products, and endeavor to 
stimulate the production of crude oil to the end that all needs shall be fully met.  
 
5. Advise and co-operate with the Government and the Allies with reference to the 
allocation of tanker tonnage, and all transportation problems.  
 
6. Keep the Government advised as to the capacity of various plants and available stocks 
both of crude oil and refined products.  
 
7. Meet with departments of the Government to discuss questions affecting the industry 
raised by the war.  
 
Figure 5.4 Purpose of the Petroleum War Service Committee, January 1918 





1. Cancellation of War Contracts 
 
It is in the public interest that all war orders placed by any contracting agency of the government and accepted in 
good faith, whether formally and regularly executed or not, should, upon cancellation by such contracting agency, 
be promptly and equitably adjusted and satisfied as if every formality had been observed, and when so adjusted the 
amount ascertained to be due by the government should be promptly paid to the end that these funds may be utilized 
by the industries of the country to speed their transition from a war to a peace basis. If it should be ascertained that 
legislation is necessary or desirable to accomplish this end, Congress should forthwith enact such legislation. 
Officials dealing with questions of adjustment on account of war orders must necessarily be familiar with all the 
conditions affecting the order. It will greatly promote expedition and the interests of both the government and 
private enterprise for the officials who made the contracts to remain in the government service to participate in the 
readjustments.  
 
2. Surplus Government Supplies 
 
Under date of Nov. 29, 1918, the Secretary of War issued a public statement, i.e., “To prevent too violent dislocation 
of industry from the stand point of both employee and employer, accumulation by the War Department of either raw 
material or finished product will be distributed when and where liquidation of such sup plies will least interfere with 
the return of industry to normal condition.” Such action would seem to insure the stability of the industries affected 
which fully appreciate this liberal position. Therefore the War Service Committees of American Industries hereby 
tender to the War Department their services for their respective industries for the purpose of advising with and 
assisting the War Department in the disposition of such materials.  
 
3. Removal of Restrictions of Industry 
 
It is in the public interest that all war regulations of industry should be revoked and all war restrictions on industry 
should be removed as speedily as practicable, save such industries as are engaged in the production, preparation or 
distribution of foods, feeds, and fuel and such last named group of industries should be freed from war regulations 
and restrictions as early as consistent with the welfare of this nation and of the Allies.  
 
4. Pivotal Industries 
 
Conditions brought upon U.S. by the European war at its beginning, as well as our national necessities after we 
entered the war, made it of the highest-importance that a number of industries should at once be developed in the 
United States. Large investments, both of capital and skill, have since been placed in these enterprises. Upon the 
production of some of them, relatively small in themselves, the continuation of some of our largest industries has 
depended. Some of the recently developed industries have national importance in fields much broader than the 
markets of their products; for they may serve, for example, to promote scientific research, which will add to national 
efficiency, resources, and wealth in many distinct ways.  
 
It becomes essential, therefore, that the government should at once proceed to ascertain the industries which have 
been developed during the European war and ascertain those the maintenance of which is indispensable for the 
safety of our industrial structure and our military establishment.  
 
When these pivotal industries have been ascertained, means suitable in view of their nature, and situations should at 
once be provided for their encouragement and preservation.  
 
5. Industrial Co-operation 
 
The war has demonstrated that through industrial co-operation great economies may be achieved, waste eliminated, 
and efficiency increased. The nation should not forget, but rather should capitalize these lessons by adapting 
effective war practices to peace conditions through permitting reasonable co-operation between units of industry 
under appropriate federal supervision. It is in the public interest that reasonable trade agreements should be entered 
into, but the failure of the government to either clearly define the dividing line between those agreements which are, 
and those which are not, in unreasonable restraint of commerce, or to provide an agency to speak for it on 
application of those proposing to enter into such agreement in effect restricts wholesome co-operation and deprives 
both industry and the general public of its benefits. The conditions incident to the period of readjustment render it 
imperative that all obstacles to reasonable co-operation be immediately removed through appropriate legislation. 
Figure 6.1 Resolutions Passed and Adopted at the Reconstruction Conference of the Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States, December 2-6, 1918 
Source: Automotive Industries, the Automobile, December 12, 1918, p.996 
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6. Federal Trade Commission 
 
The Federal Trade Commission was advocated by the President, and was created as an agency to make the 
administrations of our trust legislation explicit and intelligible, and to provide “the advice, the definite guidance and 
information” which business enterprises require. The normal importance of the commission's task is now 
tremendously increased by the imperative need for whole-hearted and sympathetic co-operation between the 
government and industry especially during the readjustment period and suggests the desirability of the two existing 
vacancies in the commission's membership being promptly filled with able men of broad business experience and 
clear vision prepared to assist actively in discharging these tasks along constructive lines.  
 
7. Industrial Relations 
 
The Convention heartily endorses in letter and spirit the principles of the industrial creed so clearly and forcibly 
stated in the paper read to it Thursday morning by Mr. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., and urges upon all units of 
industry—where they may not now be employed—the application of such principles. Without approving or rejecting 
his particular plan or machinery, the principles advanced by Mr. Rockefeller are as follows:  
 
1—Labor and capital are partners, not enemies; their interests are common interests, not opposed, and 
neither can attain the fullest measure of prosperity at the expense of the other, but only in association with 
the other.  
2—The purpose of industry is quite as much to advance social well-being as material well-being and in the 
pursuit of that purpose the interests of the community should be carefully considered, the well-being of the 
employees as respects living and working conditions should be fully guarded, management should be 
adequately recognized and capital should be justly compensated, and failure in any of these particulars 
means loss to all.  
3—Every man is entitled to an opportunity to earn a living, to fair wages, to reasonable hours of work and 
proper working conditions, to a decent home, to the opportunity to play, to learn, to worship, and to love, as 
well as to toil and the responsibility rests as heavily upon industry as upon government or society to see 
that these conditions and opportunities prevail.  
4—Industry, efficiency and initiative, wherever found, should be encouraged and adequately rewarded and 
indolence, indifference and restriction of production should be dis countenanced.  
5—The provision of adequate means for uncovering grievances and promptly adjusting them is of 
fundamental importance to the successful conduct of industry.  
6—The most potent measure in bringing about industrial harmony and prosperity is adequate representation 
of the parties in interest; existing forms of representation should be carefully studied and availed of in so 
far as they may be found to have merit and adaptable to the peculiar conditions in the various industries.  
7—The application of right principles never fails to effect right relations; the letter killeth and the spirit 
maketh alive; forms are wholly secondary, while attitude and spirit are all important, and only as the parties 
in industry are animated by the spirit of fair play, justice to all and brotherhood, will any plans which they 
may mutually work out succeed. 
8–That man renders the greatest social service who so co-operates in the organization of industry as to 
afford to the largest number of men the greatest opportunity for self development and the enjoyment by 
every man of those benefits which his own work adds to the wealth of civilization.  
 
8. Relocation of Labor 
 
The conversion of the industry of the country from a peace basis to a war basis involved a general and important 
dislocation of labor. This movement was gradual. The end of the war involves a much more rapid change in 
industry; while there will be a great demand for labor to meet the foreign and domestic requirements there may be 
for a time in special places a temporary condition of unemployment.  
 
In the new relations of industry to labor we conceive it to be incumbent upon the community affected promptly to 
meet such conditions.  
 
The local chambers of commerce should be able to contribute in an important way in this work.  
 
9. Public Works 
 
The development of public works of every sort, as recommended by the President, should promptly be resumed, in 
order that opportunities of employment may be created for unskilled labor. 




The cessation of hostilities brings to business interests a feeling of deep concern in the matter of taxation. The 
problems of readjustment are made more difficult through inequalities in the present law.  
 
We believe, therefore, that in the consideration of amendments to the present act, or the passage of new revenue 
legislation, attention must be given to the views expressed by organizations of commerce and industry. Ability to 
pay, inventory values and proper reserves together with careful survey of the amount of revenue required under the 




We urge that Congress should give careful consideration to the grave menace now facing all industry due to the fact 
that both raw materials and finished goods are carried in full measure to meet the extraordinary requirements of the 
government and of the people, and that in large part the stocks have been acquired at abnormal cost and are therefore 
carried into inventories at inflated values, thereby showing apparent profits which have not been realized, and which 
probably will never be fully realized. These are largely bookkeeping or “paper” profits, and should not be used as a 
basis for taxation.  
 
We therefore recommend that any tax law shall provide that during present conditions the taxpayer shall be allowed 
to make a deduction from his apparent profit by way of a reserve for a subsequent shrinkage in the value of 
merchandise.  
 
We believe that the interests of the government can be protected against abuse of this privilege by the fixing of a 




The Congress of the United States should speedily enact legislation providing for the early return under federal 
charters to their owners, of all railroads now being operated by this government under federal regulations per mitting 
the elimination of wasteful competition, the pooling of equipment, combinations or consolidations through owner 
ship or otherwise in the operation of terminals, and such other practices as will tend to economies without destroying 
competition in service.  
 
13. Means of Communication 
 
We are opposed to government ownership and operation of telegraphs, telephones, and cables.  
 
14. Merchant Marine 
 
We recommend that the construction of a great Merchant Marine be continued and amplified, and that its operation 
under American control be kept safe by such legislation as may be necessary to insure its stability and its lasting 
value to American industries.  
 
15. Port Facilities 
 
The recommendations of the Port and Harbor Facilities Commission of the United States Shipping Board for 
development of ports are supported. Vessels of foreign register needed for our commerce by sea are attracted to 
those ports which are best fitted to coal, to load, and to unload cargoes, and thus provide means for a quick turn 
around. After ascertaining the port facilities of European countries, and their plans for further development, the com 
mission has recommended that there should be a local port commission at each of the important ports upon our 
coasts, that upon these commissions there should be representatives of industrial, commercial, and railroad interests 
centering at the port, that facilities should be installed to meet the needs of the port, and that a zone system should be 
arranged by which exports and imports would flow through those ports which are within economic transportation 
distance of the points of origin and destination. There should be co-operation with the Facilities Commission in its 
task of expanding means which will enhance the position of the United States among maritime nations. 







16. Public Utilities 
 
Public utilities have faced difficult problems, which have been accentuated by conditions arising out of war. The 
development and efficiency of such a utility as local transportation has immediate importance for every community. 
It is recommended that the Chamber of Commerce of the United States should appoint a committee to investigate 
and study the question of local transportation as it relates to the control of rates and service, franchises, taxes, the 
attraction of capital into the business, and such other questions as the committee may find pertinent. Such a 
committee should report its recommendations to the Board of Directors of the National Chamber, and the board 
should deal with them in accordance with the established procedure of the chamber.  
 
17. Water Powers 
 
Industrial activity is dependent upon the available supply of power. A bill which would effect the development of 
hydroelectric, power upon waterways and lands which are subject to federal jurisdiction is now before a committee 
of conference between the two Houses of Congress. It is important in the public interest that Federal legislation on 
this subject should be enacted without further delay. We accordingly urge that the conference committee arrive at an 
acceptable form of legislation in season for enactment at this session of Congress. 
 
18. International Reconstruction 
 
In war we have made common cause with the Allies. We should likewise make common cause with them in seeking 
the solution of the immediate problems of reconstruction which they face, because of the efforts they put forth in the 
war. These problems peculiarly depend for their solution upon commerce.  
 
Raw materials and industrial equipment which we possess the Allies urgently require, that they may reconstitute 
their economic life. We should deal generously with them in sharing these resources.  
 
In order that we may share our materials with the Allies, we must also provide them with credits through which they 
may make the necessary payments.  
 
Our ocean tonnage must supply our troops overseas and help to provision the inhabitants of war-devastated regions. 
The part of our ocean tonnage not required for these paramount needs, and vessels of associated countries which are 
in a similar situation, should be entered into the common service of all nations. This common service should secure 
to all nations their immediate needs of food, raw materials, and transport for their products.  
 
19. European Commission 
 
The business men of the United States, having devoted their energies and resources toward the winning of the war, 
regardless of sacrifices or burdens, in support of the principles for which this country fought, appreciate the 
necessity of continuance of unremitting effort in order that the world may be restored to normal conditions as 
quickly as possible and the blessings of peace brought to all peoples.  
 
In the accomplishment of these results the highest efficiency of the great commercial and industrial powers of our 
own country and that of the Allied nations will be developed only through co-operative effort and common counsel.  
 
In order, therefore, to contribute to the fullest toward the prompt solution of the problem presented, the Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States is requested to enlist the co-operation of national bodies devoted to the extension 
and promotion of American commerce, and particularly foreign trade, in the appointment of a commission 
representative of American business, which shall proceed without delay to Europe and establish machinery for the 
following purposes: 
A—To study at first hand the reconstruction needs of European countries in conjunction with business men 
of these nations in order to advise the business men of the United States as to how they may be most 
helpful in meeting the necessities of Europe and caring for the interests of American industry and 
commerce.  
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B–To be available to the Peace delegates of the United States for any needed information which they may 
be able to present or for any other aid which may be given by the business men of the United States through 
the medium of such a commission.  
 
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States also is requested to appoint members of the commission to 
represent the business men of the United States at the forthcoming meeting of the Permanent Committees of the 
International Congress of Chambers of Commerce. 
 
20. Markets for Foreign Trade 
 
We strongly urge upon our government the vital necessity of encouraging and developing our foreign trade through  
all appropriate means possible, in order that the production of industry may afford employment to wage earners and 
prosperity to the nation.  
 
21. South American Relations 
 
It has long been the policy of this nation to cultivate relations of close sympathy with the nations of the western 
hemisphere as expressed in the Monroe Doctrine. We believe that these relations should be supplemented and 
strengthened by a vigorous development of our commerce and financial associations with our neighbors of North 
and South America.  
 
The government’s control of shipping should be brought to the accomplishment of this purpose as soon as it is 
consistent with other urgent needs, and the work of the Pan-American Union should be continued and broadened in 
scope.  
 
22. Property Rights in Mexico 
 
By provisions in a constitution adopted while much of the country was engaged in civil strife, and through 
subsequent legislation, Mexican authorities have threatened rights acquired by Americans in good faith, especially 
in minerals, including petroleum. Against threatened confiscation the American Government made formal protests. 
The attitude taken by the American Government is heartily commended as in accordance with obvious justice.  
 
23. Education for Foreign Commerce 
 
In the larger opportunities which are to be opened to American business men to play a part in the international 
commerce of the world the need will be felt for more men who are trained to a knowledge and understanding of the 
language, the business methods and the habits of thought of foreign lands. Complete success can only come to those 
who succeed in putting them selves into full accord and sympathy with the peoples with whom they are to deal.  
 
We urge upon our industries that they take steps to provide opportunities to young men to obtain an education in the 
practices of overseas commerce and finance and in the practical use of foreign languages.  
 
We call the attention of the various departments of government and of educators to the importance of this matter and 
ask that special efforts be made to supplement the valuable work already done, and to open up every facility to the 
furtherance of a successful prosecution of this educational work. 
 
24. Forest Products Laboratories 
 
The Forest Products Laboratories, of the United States Forest Service, have rendered valuable service through 
scientific investigation of the physical properties of American woods and their adapt ability for structural, industrial 
and ornamental usage. It is of great importance to American industry that the government should extend and 
adequately maintain the work of the Forest Products Laboratories.  




25. Cost Accounting 
 
It is the sense of this Convention that uniform cost accounting should be adopted by industries.  
 
26. Council and Executive Committee 
 
Your Committee has given serious consideration to the suggestion that following this conference an executive 
committee should be appointed to relate the efforts of the various war service committees, keep them continuously 
informed on matters of common interest, and co-ordinate their work on national problems.  
 
It is the conviction of your Committee that it is absolutely essential to the stability of business in this country and the 
prompt and wise solution of our problems that the war service committees should continue their work in co-
operation with government agencies and now turn their attention to the new questions with which the country is 
faced. We therefore recommend that all present committees so represent their industries and that an Executive 
Committee be named with as little delay as possible.  
 
At the meeting of the chairmen of the war service committees held in Washington, D. C., on Dec. 12, 1917, the 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States was requested to undertake the organization of committees in all the 
industries not then represented.  
 
By vote this conference also requested that the War Service Executive Committee of the National Chamber should 
act as the executive committee of these committees of the industries.  
 
At the meeting in December, 1917, it was suggested to the War Service Executive Committee of the Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States that as soon as practicable a council be appointed representative of all the industries 
which would act as advisory to the War Service Executive Committee.  
 
It is believed that the time has now arrived when such a council should be formed and it is recommended that this 
council be composed of the chairmen of the war service committees.  
 
The Board of Directors of the National Chamber has stated that if it be the desire of this Convention, the Chamber 
will be glad to reconstitute its War Service Executive Committee and have it continue to serve in the same capacity 
in which it has acted during the war, directing attention particularly to the problem of reconstruction affecting all 
industries.  
 
In this direction the Chamber would wish to make the co-operation of these committees on a national scale as 
effective as possible, and it will continue to publish such bulletins and reports as may be necessary for their benefit, 
and place at their service the facilities of its general headquarters in Washington and its branch offices.  
 
It is the opinion of your Committee that this Conference should immediately take advantage of the willingness of the 
Chamber to undertake this responsibility, and it therefore presents the following resolutions:  
 
Resolved, That this conference requests the Chamber of Commerce of the United States to appoint a War 
Service Executive Committee of such number as may seem best to relate the efforts of all of the War 
Service Committees, and to aid in making effective the action of this conference and pledges its assistance 
to the National Chamber in securing the service on the Committee of such leaders of industry as may be 
called to act. 
 
Resolved, That the chairmen of the War Service Committees of the industries shall constitute a Council to 
be advisory to the War Service Executive Committee, and to meet from time to time at the call of the 
Executive Committee or any twenty-five members of the Council.  
Resolved, That new War Service Committees representing industries not now organized may be recognized 
by the War Service Executive Committee or by the Council.  
Figure 6.1 Continued 
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27. National Trade Associations 
 
The experiences of the war have clearly demonstrated the value of national trade organizations and their service to 
the country as well as to industry. This conference heartily approves the plan of organizing each industry in the 
country in a representative national trade association and expresses the belief that every manufacturer, jobber and 
producer of raw materials should be a member of the national organization in his trade and cordially support it in its 
work 
Figure 6.1 Continued 
 
WHEREAS, during the period of the war various War Service Committees have most effectively served 
the country as well as their various industries, and  
 
WHEREAS, we are now facing new problems of the reconstruction era which are of paramount 
importance to the various industries of the country,  
 
Now therefore be it resolved, that it is the sense of this assembly that the War Service Committees should 
continue in existence during the period of reconstruction under the auspices of the Chamber of Commerce 
of the United States of America. 
 
Figure 6.2 Resolution One Passed by the Petroleum Committee at the Reconstruction Conference 
of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, December 2-6, 1918 
Source: National Petroleum News, December 11, 1918, p.13 
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Resolved, That it is the judgment of this assembly: 
 
1. That while government supervision over industry may be essential in wartimes, in peace times 
there should be the least possible control, and that this control should be exercised intelligently 
and with a desire to promote the interest of the industry.  
 
2. That experience during the war has shown that the greatest advantage to industry and the public at 
large is realized not by unrestricted competition but by co-operation. such co-operation being 
conducted publicly and with the knowledge and approval of the government, and that such 
principle of co-operation should not be forbidden by legislation, and all existing legislation 
contrary to this principle should be repealed.  
 
3. That the government should extend to foreign commerce the strongest possible help, giving the 
industries the right to co-operation or to combine their business interests in foreign countries.  
 
4. That industries engaged in the development of natural resources, particularly in prospecting for 
new sources of supply, should be encouraged. If it is considered that the undiscovered and 
undeveloped natural resources of the country located on the public lands are a part of the people’s 
domain, our belief is that the recovery of the people's share of such resources should be thru a 
system of wise taxation rather than any government partnership, ownership or management. Our 
view in this respect is actuated solely by our conception of what will promote the broadest and 
most enduring national prosperity.  
 
5. In short, it is our opinion that government should regard the development of industry from the 
point of view of the people as a whole, that it should not discriminate for or against individuals or 
groups: that it should be the duty of the government to promote the utmost possible prosperity of 
industry, such prosperity to be expressed in active and profitable domestic trade and in the 
carrying of American commerce to all parts of the world. To accomplish this, it is important that 
past prejudices be erased and that conditions as they are be squarely faced and intelligent and 
broad-minded measures be taken in the interest and welfare of the whole people.   
 
Figure 6.3 Resolution Two Passed by the Petroleum Committee at the Reconstruction 
Conference of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, December 2-6, 1918 
Source: National Petroleum News, December 11, 1918, p.14  
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WHEREAS, The results achieved by the National Petroleum War Service Committee and its affiliated 
advisory committees during the period of the war have been generally acknowledged as contributing a 
distinct benefit to the petroleum industry and the public at large; and,  
 
WHEREAS, It has been generally recognized that the Petroleum Industry as well as the public would be 
benefited by the establishment of a permanent national organization or association which would have for 
its purpose the collection of useful data and statistics and the dissemination of the same among its 
members; and,  
 
WHEREAS, It is believed that such an organization would bring about a better understanding of the many 
complex problems confronting the Petroleum Indus try; and,  
 
WHEREAS, The various branches of the Petroleum Industry are now represented in the membership of 
the National Petroleum War Service Committee;  
 
Now, therefore, be it Resolved, by the representatives of the Petroleum Industry here assembled that the 
National Petroleum War Service Committee be requested to promptly formulate and effect a permanent 
and comprehensive National organization of the petroleum industry. 
 
Figure 6.4 Resolution Three Passed by the Petroleum Committee at the Reconstruction 
Conference of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, December 2-6, 1918 
Source: Oildom, January 1919, p. 26-28 
 
 
The objects of the American Petroleum Institute, according to the By-laws adopted, are:  
 
1. To afford a means of co-operation with the Government in all matters of national concern; and  
 
2. To foster foreign and domestic trade in American petroleum products; and  
 
3. To promote in general the interests of the petroleum industry in all its branches; and  
 
4. To promote the mutual improvement of its members and the study of the arts and sciences 
connected with the petroleum industry. 
 
Figure 6.5 First By-Laws of the American Petroleum Institute, March 1919 




Figure 6.6 First Organizational Chart for the American Petroleum Institute, March 1919 





API’s mission is to promote safety across the industry globally and to influence public policy in 
support of a strong, viable U.S. oil and natural gas industry. 
 
Advocacy 
We speak for the oil and natural gas industry to the public, Congress and the Executive Branch, state 
governments and the media. We negotiate with regulatory agencies, represent the industry in legal 
proceedings, participate in coalitions and work in partnership with other associations to achieve our 
members’ public policy goals. 
 
Research & Statistics 
API conducts or sponsors research ranging from economic analyses to toxicological testing. And we 
collect, maintain and publish statistics and data on all aspects of U.S. industry operations, including 
supply and demand for various products, imports and exports, drilling activities and costs, and well 
completions. This data provides timely indicators of industry trends. API’s Weekly Statistical Bulletin 
is the most recognized publication, widely reported by the media. 
 
Standards 
For more than 85 years, API has led the development of petroleum and petrochemical equipment and 
operating standards. These represent the industry’s collective wisdom on everything from drill bits to 
environmental protection and embrace proven, sound engineering and operating practices and safe, 
interchangeable equipment and materials. API maintains 685 standards and recommended practices. 
Many have been incorporated into state and federal regulations; and increasingly, they’re also being 




Each day, the oil and natural gas industry depends on equipment to produce, refine and distribute its 
products. The equipment used is some of the most technologically advanced available in the search for 
oil and gas and allows the industry to operate in an environmentally safe manner. Designed for 
manufacturers of production, drilling, and refinery equipment, the API Monogram Program verifies 
that manufacturers are operating in compliance with industry standards. API also provides quality, 
environmental, and occupational health and safety management systems certification through APIQR. 
This service is accredited by the ANAB (ANSI-ASQ National Accreditation Board) for ISO 9001 and 
ISO 14001. Let APIQR’s industry expertise certify your organization to API Spec Q1, OHS 18001. 
 
API also certifies inspectors of industry equipment through our Individual Certification Programs, 
designed to recognize working professionals who are knowledgeable of industry inspection codes and 
are performing their jobs in accordance with those codes. Through our Witnessing Programs, API 
provides knowledgeable and experienced witnesses to observe critical material and equipment testing 
and verification. API’s Training Provider Certification Program provides third-party certification for a 
variety of oil and gas industry training courses, further ensuring that any training provided meets 
industry needs. 
 
In helping to improve industry safety, API has a way for service station owners to make sure their 
contractors have been trained to industry safety standards. API WorkSafe™ is a service station 
contractor safety qualification program that identifies personnel who have received training for and 
passed on-line standardized exams covering the latest service station industry safety practices. 
Figure 7.1 API’s Overview and Mission, July 2017 
Source: API 2017, “About U.S. – Overview and Mission,” 
(http://www.api.org/about#tab_overview-and-mission) 
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For consumers, API provides the API’s Engine Oil Licensing and Certification System (EOLCS). It is a 
voluntary licensing and certification program that authorizes engine oil marketers who meet specified 
requirements to use the API Engine Oil Quality Marks. These emblems go directly on each container of 
oil that retains the certification for and is there to help consumers identify quality engine oils for their 
gasoline- and diesel-powered vehicles. 
 
Events & Training 
API organizes seminars, workshops, conferences and symposia on public policy issues. Through API 
University, we provide training materials to help people in the oil and natural gas business meet 
regulatory requirements and industry standards. 




The Upstream Committee is open to companies producing oil or natural gas in the United States  (vertically 
integrated companies may be members of more than one API segment). 
• Focuses on upstream regulatory policy, legislative issues, and industry technical standards and 
recommended practices. 
• Emphasizes efforts to ensure that operations are conducted in a safe, efficient and environmentally 
responsible manner. 
The Market Development Committee is open to companies producing oil or natural gas in the United States 
(vertically integrated companies may be members of more than one API segment). 
• Focuses on identifying policy opportunities and impediments to sustaining and growing demand for U.S. 
natural gas resources in targeted markets, advocating for legislative and regulatory policy and market 
designs that leverage the full value of natural gas. 
• Educates potential customers and decision makers on the abundance, reliability, affordability and 
environmental advantages of natural gas. 
The Midstream Committee is open to companies gathering, processing, storing and transporting oil and natural 
gas in the United States (vertically integrated companies may be members of more than one API segment). 
• Develops policy positions for gathering, processing, storing and transportation and oversees the review 
of related federal, state, and local laws and regulations. 
• Identifies opportunities for technical studies and research to address issues related to development of 
U.S. infrastructure, use of equipment, development of operational procedures, and safety, health and 
environmental performance. 
The Downstream Committee is open to companies that refine and market petroleum products in the United 
States (vertically integrated companies may be members of more than one API segment). 
• Provides guidance on the impact of legislative and regulatory proposals on downstream operations and 
provides scientific, economic, environmental, and risk analysis information on associated issues. 
• Develops standards, practices and positions that allow industry to provide products to consumers in the 
most safe, efficient and environmentally responsible way. 
The General Membership Committee addresses the needs of non-oil company members such as service 
companies, drilling contractors, and other suppliers to the oil and natural gas industry.  Members can provide 
services to any industry segment, including upstream, downstream, marine or pipeline. 
• Works closely with all other industry segments to promote the shared interests of the industry. 
• Focuses on both domestic and international issues, particularly international trade issues, since many 
members in this segment supply products and services worldwide. 
 
Resource Committees 
The Committee on Communications oversees API’s outreach to the media and other external audiences to 
ensure they have the facts and information to develop informed perspectives on energy and industry issues.  This 
includes media relations, external communications, materials and publications development, Internet-based 
communications, community engagement and other educational outreach. 
The Committee on Economics and Statistics oversees API's Policy and Statistics Departments.  Committee 
members provide guidance to API staff in policy analysis and statistical preparation. The committee vets 
fundamental policy positions and provides guidance to other API departments. 
The Committee on Federal Relations implements API policies and programs on industry issues before 
Congress and the executive branch, and coordinates the government relations efforts of API and its member 
companies.  The committee is composed of the heads of member company offices in Washington, DC, 
responsible for federal government relations. 
The Committee on Finance focuses on internal and external issues related to auditing, accounting, insurance and 
risk management.  It formulates industry responses to regulatory and legislative initiatives and to developments in 
industry finance areas.  The committee, composed of oil industry chief financial officers, sponsors API's Finance 
and Accounting Program. 
Figure 7.2 List of Committees and Descriptions of the American Petroleum Institute, July 2017 




The Committee on Health, Environment and Safety is responsible for identifying major health, environment and 
safety issues that could impact the industry and oversees those programs within API.  The committee also promotes 
sharing best practices and improving industry health, environmental and safety performance. 
The Committee on Information Management and Technology oversees API’s interests in information 
technology; electronic business and telecommunications systems and management; cyber security; data privacy; 
and industry-level projects for evolving information systems.  This committee sponsors API's Information 
Technology Program. 
The Committee on Law ensures API’s legal affairs are handled properly and efficiently.  The committee is 
responsible for reviewing and approving any litigation with which API becomes involved and works closely with 
other committees to ensure consistency of legal positions on industry issues.  The committee is composed of 
member companies’ general counsels. 
The Committee on State Relations establishes industry policy for and ensures the proper management of state 
legislative and regulatory issues in the 33 states where API staffs state petroleum councils.  The committee 
coordinates with other API committees on policies and priorities at the state level. 
The Global Industry Services Committee has jurisdiction over all non-dues programs, such as revenue-generating 
and cost recovery programs and special solicitations.  The committee provides financial oversight, works with API 
segment committees, and ensures that new opportunities meet API policy. 
The Committee on Taxation formulates API tax policy and provides tax advice to the API president and 
board.  The committee determines the priority tax issues, both legislative and regulatory, and sets the overall agenda 
for the various tax subcommittees and the API Tax Department.  The committee is composed of senior taxation 
professionals at member companies. 
 






Figure 7.3 Excerpt 1 from “Strategies for Today’s Environmental Partnership” 
Source: American Petroleum Institute (API). 1997. “Strategies for Today’s Environmental 




Figure 7.4 Excerpt 2 from “Strategies for Today’s Environmental Partnership” 
Source: American Petroleum Institute (API). 1997. “Strategies for Today’s Environmental 




Figure 7.5 Excerpt 3 from “Strategies for Today’s Environmental Partnership” 
Source: American Petroleum Institute (API). 1997. “Strategies for Today’s Environmental 
Partnership.” Retrieved July 19, 2017. 
(https://web.archive.org/web/19970611224225/http://www.api.org:80/step/pdf/bigbook.pdf)  
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First, be slow to commit. Until you must, do not bet your company, or your country, on something that has a low 
probability of being true. If possible, postpone decisions while key uncertainties are resolved. In the case of 
global warming, we have time to address these uncertainties. Nothing we do in the next 20 years will have any 
appreciable impact on the world's average temperature in 2050 or 2100. 
This fact is absolutely crucial, because costs are exceedingly sensitive to timing. Many capital investments, 
including those in energy and automobile industries, are long term. If change can be deferred until current 
equipment reaches the end of its useful life, and until more efficient devices are on-line, costs may be 
substantially less. Over the past 22 years, new technologies have enabled U.S. to reduce energy intensity per 
dollar of gross domestic product by about 32 percent. This progress should continue. 
Recent analysis by the Electric Power Research Institute and the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum concludes that 
an orderly, long-term strategy for achieving a scientifically justified CO2 objective would cost only one-fifth as 
much as a program that requires near term cuts.5 Only the federal government would think that spending five 
times as much for the same outcome is a good bargain. 
Invest in information. This is the second decision-making rule. Spend money to narrow the range of possibilities 
and to better understand the implications of alternative courses of action. We need to invest in information about 
climate science and about energy technology. We desperately need better climate models, for example. We also 
need to invest in contingency plans. What measures will most efficiently reduce future carbon emissions? What is 
the best time schedule? If reduction turns out to be necessary, how can we achieve reasonable goals without 
relying on mandates from a U.N. bureaucracy? The era of big government should not be replaced by the era of 
unelected international government. 
The third rule is called "no or low regrets." Look for actions that will produce benefits under any set of 
circumstances. API has developed a list of emission-reducing actions that would be worthwhile even if the threat 
of global warming turns out to be another environmental hoax. We have shared our ideas with a wide range of 
groups including the Clinton Administration. For example, if the problem is global, it makes sense to look for 
cost-effective solutions through a wide lens. In contrast, a policy of committing to large emission rollbacks in the 
U.S. over the next two decades, regardless of the state of knowledge, alternative opportunities, or the timing of 
investment decisions, is guaranteed to produce big regrets. 
The fourth rule is to consider alternatives. It is embarrassing, to say the least, when an option never considered 
seriously is the one you should have bet on. Even if the global warming problem turns out to be real, a crash 
program of prevention is likely to be the wrong option. In much of the world, the impact of warming could be 
neutral or even benign. In other cases, it might make more sense to commit resources to adaptation. These options 
need serious consideration and analysis, and they are not currently getting it. 
Figure 7.6 Excerpt from Bill O’Keefe’s Speech “In Defense of Skepticism Challenging the 
Political View of Climate Change,” November 1996 
Source: O’Keefe, William F. 1996. “In Defense of Skepticism: Challenging the Political View of 





Figure 7.7 Early API Advertisement, LIFE magazine 1947 
Source: LIFE Magazine. 1947. “Understand Rivalry and You Understand 




Figure 7.8 Excerpt from Energy is Everything: State of American Energy 
Source: American Petroleum Institute (API). 2017e. Energy is Everything: State of American 





Figure 7.9 Excerpt 1 from API Commercial “Power Past Impossible 




Figure 7.10 Excerpt 2 from API Commercial “Power Past Impossible 




Figure 7.11 Excerpt 3 from API Commercial “Power Past Impossible 
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